



Youth Violence in Post-War Societies

Conceptual Considerations on Continuity and Change of Violence

Project Working Paper No. 1

*Social and Political Fractures after Wars:
Youth Violence in Cambodia and Guatemala*

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The present study is part of the research project on “Social and Political Fractures after Wars: Youth Violence in Cambodia and Guatemala”. The project is financed by the German Foundation for Peace Research and is located at the Institute for Development and Peace at the University of Duisburg-Essen. The project aims at explaining different levels of youth violence in two post-war societies whose processes of war termination are regarded as successful. However, both societies face serious problems of post-war development that are closely related to the experiences of war and war termination. While Cambodia’s democratisation process is considered more or less as a failure, Guatemala suffers from levels of violence higher than during most of the war. The differences between both countries in levels of violence and mechanisms of violence control are also visible in the incidence of youth violence.

The project aims to explain these differences through the contextualisation of youth violence. Thus the main focus is directed at the societal and political fractures war and war termination cause for youth and their life-worlds. The working hypotheses were related to differences according to a) the levels of social differentiation; b) the relationship between political and economic power; c) normative frameworks; and d) the sequencing of post-war developments (namely between liberalisation and stabilisation). This approach has methodological consequences insofar as different levels of youth violence are what we seek to explain. The perspective of the actors themselves is beyond our approach. After having identified the relevant fractures this would be the task of further research. This working paper introduces a conceptual framework for the analysis of both post-war societies and youth violence. This conceptual framework then serves as basis for the comparison of post-war developments in Cambodia and Guatemala with a focus on violence control and public security (working papers no. 2 and 3). The topic of youth violence will be addressed in working papers no. 4 and 5. The working papers will be followed by a comparison of the case studies and an outline of consequences for future research (working paper no. 6).

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Youth Violence in Post-War Societies

The termination of long lasting wars is predominantly considered a fundamental step towards violence reduction because warring parties end their mutual hostilities. Violence can arise in very different forms ranging from direct physical harm to structural, cultural and psychological forms. In this study the term violence will be used only for forms of direct physical violence; youth violence will be used for violence used by and against young people. Although this draws a line to other forms of violence these will be included through the analysis of context and the causes of violence.¹

In many societies such a profound process of change poses significant challenges with the result that they slide back into war or experience merely a violence reduction to the level of armed conflict. But even below the threshold of the relapse into war no post-war society remains entirely free of violence, although considerable differences between post-war societies can be identified. For instance, while violence decreased significantly in countries such as Cambodia and Mozambique, violence even increased at least temporarily after the termination of war in Central America and South Africa. Academic and policy oriented analysis of post-war violence usually employs a dyadic perspective: It is seen either as a relapse into war or as unrelated because this new violence has no or only indirect effects on war-related violence because different actors and motivations have become dominant. If youth violence is addressed at all as a phenomenon of post-war societies, it is predominantly analyzed from the criminological perspective of deviant behaviour, which is also prevalent in the debate on youth gangs.²

Yet that perspective fails to address the relevant dimensions of the problem for several reasons: First of all, causes of youth violence in post-war societies are closely related to the experiences of war and widespread violence at different levels. Secondly, the dynamics and processes of institutionalisation of youth violence are highly dependent on the particular context which means that they differ in societies that are in a state of war, post-war or non-war. Thirdly, the reduction of youth violence to the simplistic notion of deviant behaviour leads to the codification and legitimisation of youth's marginalisation and exclusion.

¹ On the difficulties to define violence and for different approaches see: Heitmeyer/ Soeffner 2004 and Gugel (2006:47-60).

² For a critique of this approach see Hagedorn 2008.

The following study introduces a concept that enables the analysis of youth violence in post-war societies in the broader context of social change and transformation of war to non-war situations.³ In addition, it enables the comparison of youth violence in different historical and cultural contexts. The first chapter will describe the to-date mostly disconnected research fields of violence in post-war societies and of youth violence, thus showing the necessity for a framework for analysis that allows for a societal perspective on both phenomena. Chapter two gives a first overview on the fundamental changes caused by the incidence of war, war termination and the transformation to non-war situations in the three basic social orders that shape the development of societies. Post-war societies are not necessarily pointed away from war to the state of non-war but constitute a specific social space whose direction of development is historically open. The developed framework for analysis puts the focus on a dual area of tension characterized by the intersections of external influences and societal basis on the one hand, and between the dynamics of violence and peace on the other. At the end of the chapter the main processes of violence and violence control in post-war societies will be discussed. As a result, it is possible to include causes of violence that are consequences of war-related changes and/or of new problems. In addition, we can show that violence in its transition process from war to non-war displays specific forms and dynamics.

The analysis of youth and youth violence in the life-worlds of post-war societies is at the center of chapter three. Youth violence is not a new phenomenon but is related to processes of social and societal change which in post-war contexts are intimately related to war and violence. Therefore, the relationship between youth and armed conflict or war requires special consideration. What kind of roles have young people played in armed conflicts? How do war and armed conflicts influence their future life-worlds and perspectives? The question here is whether armed conflicts and the social consequences cause youth violence in post-war contexts and to what extent other actors are able to integrate or instrumentalise youth violence. The considerations of post-war societies as a life-world for youth focus on the challenges that processes of transformation pose to young people. What are the opportunities and what are the limitations for them at the end of a war?

Different causes and forms of youth violence are discussed in chapter four. This chapter elaborates a framework for analysis of youth violence in post-war societies based on the preceding considerations. This makes it possible to disaggregate analytically different forms of youth violence and to comprehend their context related dynamics. A differentiated analysis of youth violence is a necessary prerequisite for the development of strategies of how to cope with youth violence beyond scandalisation, criminalisation and repression. The latter point goes beyond the scope of this study and warrants further research.

³ For the terms of war and armed conflict, the definition of the Working Group on the Causes of War (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung, AKUF) of Hamburg University will be used (see Gantzel/ Schwinghammer 1995). The time after the end of a war will be called non-war as the concept of peace is even more difficult to define than that of war.

1. Youth Violence and Violence in Post-War Societies – two disconnected research fields

In many post-war societies youths are perceived as troublemakers that seem to be “out of control” or a “lost generation”.⁴ But the perspectives and problems of youth – and thus of youth violence – can shed light on the perspectives of war termination and peace-building.

1. Young people represent transition in different respects – from childhood to adulthood, from family to society. With a demographic share of 18 % of the world’s population (UN-DESA 2007:xv) youths play an important role for the future of most developing societies.
2. Youths have lived through war and suffered consciously from its consequences; they are affected by the war-related processes of the dissolution of traditional social relationships. Experiences, attitudes and values acquired during adolescence form the core of their personal and collective socialisation.
3. Youths are only seldom included in processes of war termination. These processes together with politics and economy are dominated by the elders. This creates a structural foundation for inter-generational conflict.

Therefore, the integration or exclusion and the dealing of post-war societies with youth pose an important indicator for the sustainability of these societies and for the direction and success of peace-building efforts. Youth violence in post-war societies can exist due to very different causes, dynamics and consequences. As is the case in other transformation societies it is a primarily urban phenomenon, and in many cases youths exemplify the various problems of the transition out of war. Youth violence has manifold forms of organisation and different levels of institutionalisation. In many cases violence serves personal enrichment and is related to more or less organised forms of criminal behaviour; but youth violence can also be instrumentalised for political purposes and goals by other actors. Most violent youth groups lack a shared ideology – like the one of many guerrilla groups and other armed actors of the second half of the 20th century although they might have had a common identity. In that respect they can be interpreted as privatised violent actors.

⁴ A general definition of to what age cohort youth belong does not exist. Depending on the context boundaries are changing. The United Nations World Youth Report (UN-DESA 2007) includes the cohort aged 15 to 25, the World Health Organization that from 15 to 29 (WHO 2002), the World Bank’s World Development Report (2006) youth between 12 and 24. The term *lost generation* was created in Europe between the two World Wars.

1.1. Youth Violence – a fragmented research field

Hitherto, existing research has discussed youth violence within various academic disciplines. The main topics were the individual experiences of young people, their organisations and the effects of the social context on the future perspectives of youth.⁵ These debates overwhelmingly took place in the fields of psychology, sociology, pedagogy, and criminology; youth violence was mostly discussed in relation to development processes in big cities of the industrialised world. The United States – and there the University of Chicago – pioneered this research since the 1960s not focusing on youth violence in general but rather explicitly on youth gangs.⁶ Only recently research has begun to analyze gangs, their organisations and their handling by society in a more comparative way and in relation to the globalisation process.⁷ Historical research mostly investigated youth organisations and youth violence with a regional focus on Europe during the first half of the 20th century.⁸

Although the focus of the present study is not on gangs alone but on youth violence as a broader phenomenon, some elements of the discussion on gangs are useful for the explanation of youth violence in general. The context of youth violence is mostly explained as the interplay of factors residing in the societal context and the individual or collective perceptions on three intertwined levels: Most of these debates investigate the relationship either between individuals (level 1) and collective organisations (level 2) or between individuals and society (level 3). The main interest of the concept of the present study lies in the analysis of the relationship between collective actors and structures (i.e. societal context), focusing on the interrelation between the level of collective organisation and society (levels 2 and 3).

So far, the youth violence issue has not been discussed systematically with regard to war and post-war contexts, although the debate about “new” wars does consider young men as major violence actors.⁹ The discussion on youth in violent conflicts is dominated by two very different discourses:

On the one hand, youths are mostly seen as victims of violence. This perspective is shaped by the reports of United Nations expert on children in violent conflict, Graça Machel (1996, 2001). It is also influenced by various reports of international NGOs. The debate focuses on (children and) adolescents up to the age of 18, as this is the threshold for international mechanisms in the protection of children. In a similar vein the discussions on child soldiers mostly

⁵ See the edited volume by Daiute et al. 2006 as example.

⁶ Most gang definitions include criminal behaviour as constitutive criteria, thus narrowing the debate considerably by excluding other forms of violence. On the problems of definitions and delimitations between gangs and other youth groups see Klein/ Maxson (2006:4f) as well as Covey (2003:16ff); for a critique Hagedorn (2008:xxiv ff) and Kersten 2002.

⁷ See Hagedorn 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, Klein et al. 2001, Watts 1998, Klein/ Maxson 2006.

⁸ See for example Kuhr-Korolev/ Plaggenborg/ Wellmann 2001 on youth in the Soviet Union or Kater 2005 on Nazi Germany.

⁹ In relation to Africa there is an incipient discussion, see Abbink 2005; Dowdney’s 2005 study examines children and youth in organised armed conflict in the grey area between war and peace. On adolescents in war see Brett/ Specht 2004.

perceive children and adolescents as victims of other violent actors – even if they have a weapon in hand and thus become perpetrators themselves.¹⁰

On the other hand, during recent years a discourse on young people as perpetrators and security risk has gained ground. The basic argument is the thesis of the so called “youth bulge” that was formulated amongst others by Samuel Huntington in his book “The Clash of Civilizations”.¹¹ A youth bulge exists when the age group between age 15 and 24 in a given society exceeds at least 20% of the population. The main argument is that this leads to an excess of young males without perspectives for the future and thus creates a conflict prone environment. The “new” wars in Africa, Islamic violence, terrorism, youth gangs and organised criminality are the subjects discussed within this perspective. Even the UN High Panel on Security embraced this perspective in 2004:

“While it may not reach the level of war, the combination of a surging youth population, poverty, urbanization and unemployment has resulted in increased gang violence in many cities of the developing world.” (UN 2004:24)

In this security-oriented discourse young males are the new enemy and the target for – mostly repressive and control oriented – security strategies combating “the new urban insurgency” (Manwaring 2005).

However, a series of quantitative studies shows that beyond demographic factors context matters the most. Urdal (2006) explains that youth bulges do not seem to be related to large-scale wars but to less organised forms of low-intensity political and intra-state violence. The study of Wagschal/ Schwank/ Metz (2008) shows a correlation between youth bulges and other conflict relevant factors like migration, HIV/AIDS and economic growth. Hence, empirical evidence does not allow for simplistic one-sided relationships although demographic factors have to be included in the analysis (see Kröhnert 2008).

During recent years a very different discourse transcending the victim-perpetrator dichotomy has been developed. This discourse identifies youths as relatively autonomous actors in conflicts.¹² Qualitative research on young people in armed conflicts has proved that these show a high degree of resistance and adaptability to the violent environment. Despite demonstrating the necessity for a qualitative actor-oriented approach, these debates lack a connection to the discussion on gangs and youth violence.

The causes for the integration of youth in armed conflicts and for youth violence in non-war situations show a series of structural similarities:

- poverty and marginalisation are the main triggers for the use of violence;
- violent behaviour is preceded by the personal experience of violence in the private-familiar or public environment;

¹⁰ The “Encyclopedia of Youth and War” edited by Sherrow (2000) is no exception, but Richard’s study on youth in Sierra Leone from 1996 is.

¹¹ See Huntington 1997, in the German speaking area Heinsohn (2003). On the problems of statistical operationalisation of youth bulges see Wagschal/ Schwank/ Metz (2008:15f).

¹² McEvoy-Levy 2006, UNDP 2006, Sommers 2006.

- the institutionalisation of groups and their connections to the illegal economy heighten the level of violence used.

Consequently, for the analysis of post-war societies it is necessary to bring together these different debates, because the importance of context for youth violence is beyond controversy. The central question is not just if and to what extent war and war termination reinforce the causes for youth violence. In order to explain the different levels of youth violence it is necessary to identify the existing patterns of integration and/or control of youth that might counter-vail or neutralize these influences. This allows for the identification of features of continuity as well as change of violent youth behaviour. Although marginalisation and exclusion are a generalised phenomenon related to the manifold causes of youth violence¹³, violent behaviour of young people is not ubiquitous. Even in very difficult environments only a small part of youths turns to violence. Depending on the historical, regional and cultural environments young people see very different possibilities and options. They can accept life as it is, they can migrate (to the urban centres or beyond the borders), or they can try to change their personal and collective perspectives for the future. In order to achieve this, they can use civil as well as violent mechanisms. Therefore, in the post-war context the analysis of social change and of the consequences of war and war termination for youth is a central condition to explain youth violence.

1.2. Violence in Post-War Societies – more than just a relapse into war

While the discussion on youth violence is a very fragmented one, the debate has been predominantly geared towards the question of backslide into war. The reasons for this are manifold: On the one hand, many post-war countries do relapse back into war and armed conflicts although the concrete number of relapses is disputed (see Suhrke/ Samset 2007). On the other hand, this focus reflects the fact that violence in international politics is usually only perceived and treated as a problem when defined as war (see Kurtenbach 2004). Different aspects and developments can be identified as crucial for post-war violence:¹⁴

First, there is the so-called security gap, which emerges in relation to former combatants when there is no guarantee for their physical safety at the moment of handing over their arms or leaving a territory under their control. If a peace accord does not address the related vulnerability and the resulting insecurity, there is a real danger of failure. Mechanisms of power sharing as well as observation and guarantees of external actors can be important coping mechanisms in this regard. Then, there are the activities of so-called spoilers: These are mostly the ones who lose first with the termination of war. These can either be ex-combatants who try to prevent the signing or to influence the content of a peace accord, or to change some provisions in the aftermath in order to better their own standing. As counter-mechanism,

¹³ For a broad overview of the explanations for youth violence in developing countries from a conflict theory perspective see Imbusch 2008.

¹⁴ See Hampson 1995, Snyder 1997, Walter/ Snyder 1999, Darby/ McGinty 2000, Darby 2001, Walter 2002, Stedman/ Rothchild,/ Cousens, 2002, Schneckener 2003, Collier et al. 2003. This issue is also at the core of the discussion on stabilisation of post-war countries, in which state-building focuses on the restructuring of the security sector (military and police).

the inclusion of veto-players is often suggested: These are actors that can veto the implementation of peace accords and make concessions, e.g. with respect to the prosecution of human rights violations. Furthermore, the continuity of root causes of war as source for continued or new violent conflict is under discussion. This is mostly but not exclusively related to ex-combatants.

Despite the depth of this research field, the perspective of relapse into war and thus on “political” violence has been too narrow for the discussion of post-war violence because the concentration on the armed actors’ behaviour embraces their own logic. Consequently, it leaves out other actors that might not have been directly involved in the armed conflict but pursue their own interests by resorting to violence.

It is only recently that the discussion on post-war violence is opening up to a broader perspective. Darby (2006:4ff) identifies two sources of violence beyond spoilers: violence exerted by state actors that can be as divided as their adversaries, and violence “on the ground” which consists of unorganised conflicts, riots or increasing criminality of paramilitary actors that transform into criminal networks.

Both issues are related to fundamental problems in post-war societies which until today have been neglected by scholarly research and are underestimated by policy makers: The question of the establishment of at least minimal standards of public security and the symbiotic relationship between political and criminal forms of violence. These developments are closely related to the experience of war and to the deficits in the process of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating of ex-combatants and the entire population.

Post-war societies are characterised by a high level of fire arms circulation. This does not necessarily pose a problem per se but constitutes a problem given the lack of functioning state and non-state mechanisms of violence control and sanctioning. This leads to a high level of privatisation and diffusion of violence. At the same time, violence shifts from the political sphere into society. The main actors are not merely the gangs of former ex-combatants who secure their daily survival with their gun because they lack other options (and capabilities). Main actors also extend to criminal groups that might not have been directly involved in the war but have benefited from the post-war power vacuum. In addition, the increase in domestic violence in almost every post-war society is rooted in these developments.

So far, these structures of violence are mostly discussed in policy-oriented contexts that rarely include other context related factors. Therefore, there is a distinction between (politically motivated) violence in conflicts and (economically motivated) criminal violence. In the context of post-war societies as well as in the debate on “new” wars one main feature is not addressed: the fact that both forms of violence are intrinsically interrelated and that motivations and aims of violence can shift and change over time (see Kurtenbach 2005).¹⁵

This short overview on academic debates on post-war violence already shows the necessity to develop a framework for analysis of post-war violence that enables us to

¹⁵ The distinction between both forms of violence in academia and in development cooperation leads to very different strategies of addressing these problems.

- a) analyse post-war societies as a specific social space which is characterised by different dynamics and whose direction of development is historically open;
- b) investigate youth violence in different cultural, social, political and economic contexts with categories that allow for a systematic comparison.

2. Post-War Societies as Specific Social Spaces

The challenges confronting post-war societies today are quite different from the experiences of post-war societies in the mid-20th century; experiences that are used as model for today's analysis and strategy development.¹⁶ Three main differences can be identified:

First of all, the international context after the Second World War favoured political and economic development models that, despite being elite-centred, strengthened the distributive power of the state (at least until the first oil shock in the 1970s) and thus bore a strong inclusive component. The contemporary context of a globalised world is very different: During the last decades, in many fields there has been a proliferation of norms and regulations (most of all with recourse to political, economic, social and cultural human rights) that the majority of states have at least signed. The number of actors in the international system has multiplied leading not only to multiple but in some case even to contradictory priorities between different external governmental and non-governmental actors in post-war societies. Further, the engagement of international actors is mostly selective – with the exception of some protectorate regimes – and resources are limited. Notwithstanding these limitations, external actors promote a comprehensive transformation agenda including the termination of violence, democratisation and market-oriented economies.¹⁷

Secondly, the internal foundations of contemporary post-war societies are quite different to those of the past. Europe's post-war societies have had a relatively high level of social differentiation – which is considered a favorable transformation factor. Today's post-war societies do not only show high variations of social differentiation but mostly comprise the poorest countries of the world.

Ultimately, the transformation conditions vary according to the character of the war (internal or interstate) and the forms of its termination (defeat, victory, accord or slowing down). In post-war Germany and Japan the military defeat and subsequent occupation led to a significant debilitation of the forces opposing transformation (or at least coerced these into cooperation). The consequences of internal wars – these are the majority today – are much more ambivalent and mostly lead to a high level of fragmentation in state and society. Peace accords

¹⁶ See for example the study of the RAND-Corporation on US nation-building from Germany to Iraq (Minxin/Kasper 2003).

¹⁷ The Liberal Peace-building Paradigm is based on the assumption (and the experiences in post-war Europe) that there is a positive and reciprocal cycle of democratisation, market-oriented development and pacification. On the debate see Paris 2004, for a critique Richmond 2006, Kurtenbach 2007 and 2007a.

reflect a fragile military balance of power given that the fundamental transformations of the political, economic and social status quo are very conflict-prone.

The consequence of these three issues is that contemporary post-war societies are rather unlikely candidates for successful transformation.

The social space of post-war societies is thus characterised by different, overlapping and interacting processes and dynamics, shaped by social change as well as by the consequences and aftermath of war and violence and external interventions and influences. Post-war societies display high levels of instability, fragility and inequality (Licklider 2001:697f). Hence, the term “war-torn societies” used by the UN Research Institute (UNRISD) in the mid-1990s is much more appropriate than the widespread term of “post-war” or “post-conflict society” used nowadays in academic and policy debates.¹⁸

In most discussions the timeline for the end of the post-war space is defined as a period of five or ten years. This is highly inappropriate because due to the various problems these spaces can last much longer as European history has shown. This is not only true for the use of stereotypes and prejudices in bilateral relations but also for internal wars leading to ethnic or social polarisation. For instance, when looking at the national elections in Spain in 2003 we have seen a revival of civil war identities throughout the country more than 60 years after the end of the war and more than 25 years after the successful democratic transition.

The liberal peace-building paradigm assumes that the end of war is a “critical conjuncture” for transformation that – on the basis of the external actors’ support – allows for changes of historical development paths. Yet crucial questions remain: if and under what conditions the end of war can lead to the activation of the essential key variables, to the necessary conditions for success, or to blockades and the evolution of hybrid orders? Ultimately, the development direction is a historically open process.

When analyzing post-war societies, the first indispensable step must therefore be an examination of the consequences that war and war-termination pose for a given society.

2.1. Basic Social Orders in Post-War Contexts

Success or failure of peace-building in post-war societies are determined by continuity and change in three basic orders¹⁹ that are also relevant for the question of integration or exclusion of youth and youth violence:

- the political order, that is, the organisation of power;
- the economic order, that is, the forms of economic reproduction and particularly the use and control of resources;

¹⁸ Between 1994 and 1998 UNRISD organised a research project called *War torn Societies Project* (WSP) that focused on the main problems of developing societies in their transition out of war. Based on an action participation oriented methodology the project did not only aim at analysis but also on the development of concrete proposals and strategies for internal as well as external actors. Case studies were elaborated on Eritrea, Mozambique, Guatemala and Somalia. On Guatemala see Torres-Rivas/ Arévalo de León 1999.

¹⁹ Siegelberg/ Hensell 2006 elaborate on the deficits of war research and the necessity for a society based approach addressing these orders and their relation to war.

- the symbolic order that is fundamental for the identity of actors and thus for the legitimisation of the transformation processes and for violence as a means of conflict resolution.

Besides the empirical variety of these three orders, it is possible to construct basic relations and development directions that are closely related to the question of violence and war as well as to the efforts of war termination and peace-building.

The character of the political regime has been an important cause of many wars and an indicator for the lack of the state monopoly of power. Opposition against dictators, authoritarian or violent regimes has been and still is one form of violent conflict. Closely related to this is the question of the form of the state's organisation. This can be a war cause by itself and shapes to a high degree the characteristics, dynamics and outcomes of war. While external wars can strengthen a state (e.g. through the appropriation of resources or the production of internal cohesion) internal wars are per se an indicator for the lack of violence control (and thus the lack of a state monopoly of violence) and of state fragility. Fragile states are further weakened by internal wars.²⁰

Wars have repercussions on the political regime by strengthening vertical hierarchies up to open militarisation even in consolidated democracies (as could be seen after 11 September 2001 for the “war on terror”). But war and war termination can also lead to a regime change either through the victory of the regime's internal or external enemies or because a regime is weakened by defeat and thus must stand down.²¹

Since the end of the Cold War democratisation is a basic element of peace-building strategies. With respect to the comparison of different developments in post-war societies the questions of substance and quality of the regime changes are thus fundamental. Are the changes of political and state power fundamental or are they just adaptations of the existing structures to a new façade?²² Of utmost importance in this context are changes in the basis of legitimacy. Traditional features of legitimacy are mostly based on informal, conveyed or religious foundations while legitimacy in democracies rests on the compliance with a set of procedures (or rules) and on their output. All actors in society are affected by these processes and have to make the necessary changes. This is obvious with respect to the ex-combatants facing the challenge to establish their position in society on a new legitimate and social basis beyond

²⁰ External wars can contribute to the process of state and nation-building at least on the side of those who win. This is the core of Tilly's argument in *war making as state making* (Tilly 1985). But in the context of today's internal wars these can only strengthen the state when there is a clear winner. This argument uses the concept of Norbert Elias (1976) who suggests that there has been a successful elimination contest between competing claims of power. Otherwise fragmentation and partition remain and may even be aggravated by the “normal” consequences of war.

²¹ There are many historical and contemporary examples for this development such as Germany after the First World War, victorious revolutions that were preceded by war (as in Mexico, Russia or Nicaragua) or the wars on decolonisation in Africa and Asia during the second half of the 20th century.

²² On democratisation in post-war societies see Kumar 1998, de Zeeuw/ Kumar 2006, Barnes 2001, Jarstad/ Sisk 2008.

gunfire. But others actors such as civil society organisations do face similar problems of adaptation, too.

The orders of economic reproduction of a society as well as the access and control of resources are and have been prominent causes of wars. Historically, the debate has focused on the importance of inequality and mal-development as motivations for armed actors, a debate that was closely linked to the discussion on political regimes. During the last decade the debate shifted to the analysis of war economies and on greed as main driving force of conflict which uncoupled the debates on political and economic causes of war.²³

War and violence have serious consequences for the economic orders of society. This becomes particularly apparent in rural regions, when people are forced to leave their homes in “cleansing” processes (under ethnic or political prefixes) and their property is divided among the evictors. Another example is combat over resource rich territories (oil, diamonds, and precious wood, among others).²⁴ Most of the classical interstate wars of the 19th and 20th century were fought over the control of natural and human resources. The difference to the “greed” of today’s actors can be reduced to the fact that the state actors claimed that they wanted to use the resources for state, nation and fatherland and not for personal benefit. Reality was quite different than the dichotomy between “old and new wars” suggests. Independently of the question of who benefits, it is beyond discussion that wars destroy resources. Social and economic infrastructure is a case in point as well as human resources and related knowledge.²⁵

While changes of a political regime lead to a more or less fundamental transformation of the political system, changes in the economic order are much more difficult to analyze. There is only an incipient debate on the necessity to transform war economies. The linkages between war economies and the legal, criminal and informal spheres of the global economy are a major aspect; seen from the peace-building perspective the related political and social power structures are just as well important.²⁶ The analysis of these structures must be a primary focus in the investigation of developments in post-war societies.

The symbolic order of a social group or society, that is, the identity and the forms of social cohesion, are highly related to the causes and dynamics of wars.²⁷ Symbolic orders depend on cultural and historical features and tend to change much slower than political and economic orders. They influence the systems of norms and values in a society and serve as the main reference point indicating either the legitimacy or the non-legitimacy of violence. At the same time, they are the basis of existing forms of collective organisation and social cohesion.

²³ See Ross 2004 for an overview. On the economy of war and war economies see Keen 1998, 2000, Jean/Rufin 1999 and Collier et al. 2003, Berdal/Malone 2000, for a critique Ehrke 2004.

²⁴ Therefore, it is astonishing that the rural sector has been neglected in most of the discussions on post-war developments so far. One exception is a research project of the United Nations University in Tokyo on the role of agriculture for peace (see Taeb 2004, Addison 2005). On the different aspects of the use of resources in post-war societies see the edited volume of Ballentine/ Nitschke 2005 and Heupel 2006.

²⁵ On the economic costs of war see Lake 1990, Stewart/Valpy 2001 (2 vol.), Collier 2001.

²⁶ See Lock 2003, 2004, Naylor 2002; on the problem war economies pose for post-war societies and the regional dimensions of war economies see Pugh/ Cooper 2004.

²⁷ In the context of Africa and the Balkans this has led to a discussion on „ethnic“ wars that reduce conflict to this dimension.

Wars destroy existing networks of social relations or change their structure; they produce winners as well as losers (see Schlichte 2002, 2004). Mass murders, forced migration and the permanent threat of violence lead to the traumatising of large segments of the population. This produces a climate of fear and distrust that does not come to an end just because a peace treaty is signed.²⁸ However, violence does not only destroy, it also leads to realignments and new forms of order in a society under highly asymmetrical, informal and power driven structures. In a climate of widespread fear and distrust this can either lead to the establishment or renewal of vertical relationships of loyalty under a formally democratic façade²⁹, or to the establishment of networks of solidarity and help within the environment of victims, refugees or diasporas.

Wars have also indirect consequences for social relationships as they influence the social geography of the societies; they lead to a disproportional increase of cities especially in their marginalised quarters. Displacement and escape from violence force people to leave their homes and to seek protection in the cities as most armed actors have their basis in the rural areas. This leads to the transfer of traditional structures organised mostly along family, clan or ethnic group lineages to the urban environment, the strategic value of which then increases in the context of war economy structures (see Rufin 1999). Most criminal networks and structures rely on the existence of traditional social relationships, where kinship is enlarged through clientelistic mechanisms such as godparenthood (see Naylor 2002: 25f). Thus, in many contexts, migration to the cities structurally favors the prolongation of war and leads to continuity and renewal of violence structures in post-war societies.³⁰

Given that all these developments influence post-war transformation processes to a high degree, they have to be a constitutive element of analysis. From a peace-building perspective the symbolic order is of special significance because it can support (or undermine) the norms and values which are necessary for the transformation processes.

Independently from the influence of war and violence on the three orders, they depend on social change³¹, which can be accelerated, frozen or interrupted by war. So far, research on post-war societies has not included this aspect in systematic ways. Three problems are relevant and need to be analyzed:

- Social change is not a one-dimensional process, but is influenced by internal societal foundations as well as by influences deriving from the international and global environment.

²⁸ In this context the consequences of war on social capital have been discussed, its reconstruction is seen as a central task in post-war societies; see Coletta/ Cullen 2000. Yet this approach uses a non-historical term of social capital and widely ignores its "dark sides" (see e.g. Putzel 1997).

²⁹ A "model" of this process can be observed in Colombia over the course of the past decades: War and violence have prevented the establishment of common interest based horizontal solidarities and have led to a permanent renewal and modernisation of vertical social structures of integration; see Kurtenbach 1999. On "Violent orders of armed groups" see the volume edited by Bakonyi/ Hensell/ Siegelberg 2006.

³⁰ The mechanisms on which these processes are based are exemplified by the Colombia case in Duncan 2005.

³¹ On the changes of these orders within the process of social change see Moore 1978, Eisenstadt 1979, 2006, Tilly 1993, 2007, Sen 1999, 2002, Ingelhart/Welzel 2005.

- The three orders change in parallel but in different velocities and dynamics. This can serve as a cause for the establishment and persistence of hybrid orders, where not only different features coexist at the same time but where these may form new and long-lasting structures.
- Social change is a conflict-prone process that might be more problematic in post-war societies than in societies without prior experience of organised violence.

This leads to the question of how feasible it is to analyze the complexity of these processes. The following considerations are based on the work of Pierson (2004) who points out two factors of social science research that are relevant to the post-war context: First of all, the importance of time. Social processes and arrangements are not established in a vacuum but grow and alter in historical periods of time even if abrupt changes are possible (e.g. in revolutions). Thus, a process-oriented approach needs to be the basis for the investigation. Second, Pierson points to the possibility of self-enforcing and path-dependent developments. With respect to the context of post-war societies, the central question is whether historical patterns leading to violent conflict can be overcome or interrupted to favour a transformation beyond superficial adaptation reaching the “deep structures” of society in many post-war societies dominated by violent and exclusive power relations.

Both factors prove to be fundamental to the analysis of transformation processes because the existing institutional or cultural arrangements can be more or less suited for transformation, leading either to self-enforcing dynamics or to blockades. Against the background of the debates on transformation and pacification it is thus necessary to identify typologies and patterns that allow for comparisons beyond the analysis of specific regional and cultural contexts.

2.2. Contemporary Post-War Societies – a Framework for Analysis

Due to the changing international environment contemporary post-war societies face a triple transformation process imposed by external actors (states and non-governmental, bilateral and multilateral alike):

- Pacification and containment of violence;
- Democratisation of the political system;
- Economic liberalisation and integration into world economy.

Problems resulting from these transformation processes strongly vary not only between different countries but within societies and between the processes themselves.³² As data collected by the Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index (2004, 2006, 2008) show, the factors democratisation and market-oriented economy show very different features in post-war societies: the best results are obtained by Croatia, Namibia and El Salvador, societies that widely differ according to their level of development, historical and regional environment as well as causes and structure of the preceding war. The lowest rankings are held by Cambodia

³² On transformation see Merkel 1999 and Merkel/Puhle 1999.


and Guatemala as well as some African countries which have experienced a backslide into war after a first peace accord (e.g. Angola, Rwanda).

The results become even more complex if the dimension of violence reduction is included, because even some of the most successful cases bear serious deficits. Looking at homicide rates (number of homicides per 100.000 inhabitants)³³ and/or the violence related to social and political protest, repression or coups d'états, violence considerably decreased in Cambodia and Mozambique while it increased in El Salvador and Guatemala (in part even beyond war time levels). It seems that progress in political and economic transformation does not necessarily lead to containment of violence. At the same time, deficits in these transformation processes do not automatically seem to lead to an increase in violence.

Ultimately, the societies concerned react quite differently to the transformation processes and the related challenges . The following framework aims at a comparative analysis of the related problems and constructs the social space of post-war societies in a dual area of tension (see graphic 1).

³³ Structural and domestic violence are not included here because neither reliable nor comparable data exist. Even at the level of homicide rates comparisons are difficult given that the underlying national data differ according to the interest of governments who manipulate the numbers in one direction or the other. However, homicide rates may at least function as indicator and are applied as analytical point of departure.

Graphic 1: Post-War Societies in a Dual Area of Tension



The vertical area of tension is relevant for the society's structure. This is determined by the influences of and the interaction between the internal societal foundations on the one hand and the challenges and interventions emanating from the external influences on the other. How these structures interact with each other (if they are compatible or incompatible, if they adapt to each other or if they entangle) determines whether the transformations are processed and adopted as well as the sustainability of the related changes.

As far as the external influences are concerned, norms and values are relevant as well as developments in the international economy, politics and culture. The implementation of norms and international conventions (e.g. human rights and social standards, trade regimes) is important given that these are specific forms of economic integration influencing internal structures. Hence, specific forms of resource use and resource control (e.g. rent-seeking economies versus labour intensive forms of world market integration) have implications for the capabilities of state and non-state actors. International and regional policy frames can favour or undermine the acceptance and legitimacy of societal structures. A case in point are the provisions to ostracise governments coming to power by unconstitutional means in the Democratic Charta of the Organisation of American States.

Depending on the specific societal foundations, culture and history, levels of development and social differentiation play an important role for the capabilities, possibilities and limits of managing the transformation processes. For instance, the implementation of human rights standards highly depends on the existence and diffusion of the idea of human equality and the acceptance of the idea of fundamental human rights in any given society. At the same time, the capacities of the state to actively guarantee and protect these rights pose an essential prerequisite. The implementation of social and economic rights highly depends on the ability of labour and employees to organise for conflict. Whether inclusive or exclusive power relations are dominant primarily depends on the existent resources and – to a much higher degree – on the particular power relations. However, there is no monocausal explanation for the specific interaction of different factors. What can be done is the identification of bundles of enabling or disabling factors. This holds true for research on transformation and peace processes alike.³⁴

The horizontal area of tension refers to the conflicting interests of actors that impede or promote reforms and changes by violent and/or non-violent means. Ultimately, this relates to the existing (and changing) relations of power and authority. This intersection can establish structures (e.g. in the case of lasting and widespread violence), but mostly this is relevant with regard to the perceptions, the options for action and the behaviour of the different actors. A central issue here are conflict related changes (who wins? who loses?) and the forms of conflict regulation (cooperative or exclusive) that are available and applied.

With respect to the dynamics of war and violence in the post-war context, a central question is which transformation related conflicts are dominant, and whether violence is exerted in these

³⁴ On success and failure of peace-processes see Ferdowsi/ Matthies 2003, Stedman/ Rothchild/ Cousens 2002, Doyle/ Sambanis 2006.

conflicts or not. How do these conflicts and the way they are resolved retroact with society? The consequences of violent conflict differ with regard to victims and perpetrators, losers and winners and thus hold diverse or ambiguous implications in different regions of a country. Violent conflict seems to lead to a resurgence of traditional forms of social cohesion and primary networks of social relation because it destroys existing forms of social relations (through escape, displacement, traumatising).

With respect to the dynamics for peace and civility, it is necessary to analyze the structures and actors that are summarised under the concepts of peace constituencies or peace alliances. Likewise, it is important to investigate if and how these actors can be protected from spoilers and how they can broaden their social basis.

Ambivalence is a central feature in the intersection of violence and civility: Neither is every non-violent actor characterised by its civil attitude, nor is every violent actor intrinsically opposed to reforms. The use of violence destroys changes and regulates the power relations in society. This can have positive as well as negative consequences for peace-building. Although during wartime those actors ascend that are called profiteers, war and violence can contribute to the destruction of reform-adverse structures or the debilitation of reform adversaries and thus have a positive impact on transformation. Furthermore, the question of whether a society deals with violence and in what way the violence is legitimated and/or sanctioned has to be addressed.

In dealing with these areas of tension, research and policy face the problem that the described developments and processes have neither the same velocity nor a common time horizon. While the processes favouring peace and development are characterised by their slow and long-term nature, violence has immediate and short-term effects destroying the achieved progress. Similar differences apply to global influences (e.g. the negative impact of economic shocks) and the societal foundations that change slowly (except for revolutionary changes).

The analysis of post-war societies in this dual area of tension has a series of advantages over other approaches:

First of all, the approach is not normative (and hence does not favour specific outcomes) but is oriented towards the identification and explanation of differences between transformations.

Second, the concept is capable of analyzing the retroactive relationship of the four fields of influence.

Third, the termination of war is not per se perceived as a fracture in previous developments and dynamics, thus introducing a broader societal perspective. This allows for the analysis of path-dependency as well as the question of ownership of the transformation processes, which in the end determines success or failure.³⁵

³⁵ There is an emerging debate on local ownership of peace-building processes. See e.g. the project financed by the German Foundation of Peace Research at the Centre for International Peace-Operations in Berlin (Kühne 2008).

Fourth, it allows for the distinction of different contexts between post-war countries, and it allows for the distinction of differences within one country's society. Intensity and features of war differ between regions within a given country according, for instance, to the availability of lootable resources serving as a financial basis for the armed actors, or to the social basis of the conflicting parties. Comparison of regions affected differently by war within a post-war country makes it possible to identify these differences. Hence, based on these considerations it is possible to elaborate different life-worlds based on the central elements of the concept of the dual area of tension.³⁶

2.3. *Violence Control in Post-War Societies*

The lack of security is a fundamental problem in post-war and post-conflict contexts beyond the demobilisation of former combatants and the „civilisation“ of their behaviour. Violence in post-war societies is neither identical with the violence in war nor does it always occur in the same geographical areas. Thus, it is important not only to look at the continuity between war-related and post-war violence, but at the same time it is necessary to identify the specifics and the new elements of this violence, its actors and functions.

In his study on the „Logic of Violence in Civil War“ Kalyvas (2006) shows on the basis of very different historical and regional contexts the mixture of privatised, economic and political forms of violence and the resulting diverse logic of violence between the macro and the micro levels. Hence, many forms of violence do not automatically end with a ceasefire and the end of war. Writing on Colombia, Waldmann (2002:2001ff) described this as a process of everyday violence institutionalisation.

Post-war violence takes place in a grey area, where different forms of violence coalesce while functioning mechanisms to provide security do not exist. The establishment of at least rudimentary forms of public security thus hinges on more than just the reform or reestablishment of the state's security forces. Yet academic and policy debates have predominantly focused on these problems.³⁷ Nonetheless, it is necessary to capture the complexity of post-war violence in order to identify continuities and fractures with the aim of developing strategies to cope with these problems.

The perspective on changes of societal orders is useful given that the different forms of violence have repercussions on the legitimacy of these orders. Democratisation for example leads to the delegitimisation of political forms of violence without necessarily changing their root causes (see Kurtenbach 2006). Changes in the economic order can lead to new forms of violence. In this context, Lock (2003, 2004) discusses “regulatory violence” in shadow econo-

³⁶ For the concept of everyday life-worlds see Schütz/ Luckmann 2003. This seems to be a promising approach for post-war societies as it addresses the issue of collective experiences and their influence on the symbolic order, the structure of the life-worlds and their historicity.


³⁷ On different „markets of security“ in post-war societies see Lambach (2008). On transformation processes and security sector reform see Cawthra/ Luckham 2003, on post-war contexts Holm/ Espen 2000, Call/ Cook 2003, Call 2007.

mies, where the lack of a universally valid rule and civil regulation is compensated by the use and diffusion of violence-based mechanisms of conflict resolution.

The transformation processes affect state and non-state mechanisms of violence prevention and control. Political science and peace research only recently have begun to address the related problems in discussing fragile states and their governance problems, but without connecting these to processes of social change and regime transformations. Such a broader perspective is necessary given that options and capabilities for violence control and prevention substantially differ according to the political regime. Authoritarian regimes are likely able to repress violence at least for some time, because they tend to have a certain – although unstable – control over the repressive state apparatus compared to democratizing regimes.³⁸

Violence control and conflict resolution under the conditions of democratic rule of law are at least theoretically based on the equality of all citizens before the law.³⁹ Violence control occurs through prevention, civil mechanisms of conflict resolution and through the rule of law, thereby sanctioning those who violate these rules. The following graphic illustrates this.

Graphic 2: Violence Control in the Context of Democratic Rule of Law



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Under the conditions of a (fragile) democratisation, the establishment of new, democratically controlled and accountable state organisations of security and an independent judiciary are not

³⁸ See Tilly (2003:55ff) for the importance of state capacities and political regimes for violence control. On fragile states in post-war societies see Kurtenbach 2004a.

³⁹ Even in the OECD world this principle is harmed when e.g. torture is allowed in order to prevent other „dangers“, for example in the „war against terror“.

feasible on a short-term basis. This is one of the reasons for the relatively high level of violence that quantitative research has found in transformation countries. This is mostly described as reversed U (see Hegre 2004): Violence increases when existing forms of violence control and containment are destroyed before new and functioning mechanisms are established. Processes of informalisation and criminalisation have an additional negative effect undermining or blocking the necessary process of reform through either the threat and practice of violence or corruption.

Therefore, even supposed “non-political” forms of violence do not only cause high social and material costs but undermine the establishment of new democratically controlled security organisations and rule of law-based institutions, which would sanction and control violence. Compared to war-related violence, violence might be selective – either used against reform-oriented policemen, judges, and prosecutors – but it leads to the perpetuation of a climate of fear and distrust and thus favours asymmetrical social relations. In many post-war societies the existing power vacuum is used by groups related to more or less organised forms of crime that enter into alliances with spoilers to maintain the status quo of fragility and insecurity. Where these influences gain control over state structures and society, orders of violence come into existence that make peace-building a very far reaching goal and undermine any intentions to reform or re-establish police forces and judiciary systems.

Nevertheless, not each post-war society is equally violent. Viewed from the societal perspective, violence control in post-war societies can be based on three different foundations:

1. The reconstruction of traditional forms of violence control, e.g. through authoritarian regimes. This seems to be the case in Cambodia and Mozambique, where a comparatively low level of violence is accompanied by more or less failed processes of democratisation.
2. The modernisation of public security systems and the adaptation of the political regime to war-related changes. Success of violence control in this context depends on the integration or marginalisation of potentially violent actors (spoilers or new actors of violence). Nicaragua is an interesting case in point, where a change of the political regime destroyed the pre-existing repressive security apparatus and established a new one without fundamentally changing the societal and social foundations.
3. The break with the existing order and the establishment of a fundamentally new and different system. Here, two versions can be distinguished:
 - a) the establishment of new states through independence or secession as was the case in Timor L’Este or Namibia; or
 - b) long lasting systems of protectorate or mandate; Haiti and the Balkans are interesting examples.

However, development under these conditions will ultimately depend on the question whether long term path-dependent developments recur or whether the changes acquire self-dynamics. In Haiti the UN mission seems to have made a lot of progress in the destruction of armed groups but it remains to be seen if this process is stable enough

when the UN-troops leave the country. The fragile situation in Timor L'Este regarding violence control is obvious.

The following chapter will now apply the approach on violence and violence control to youth as specific social group and will further provide criteria for comparison.

3. Youth and Youth Violence in Post-War Societies

The definition of the age cohort, the mere existence and significance of youth as a social group varies according to the temporal and historical context. As a social category youth became important during the process of social change when urbanisation and industrialisation ended the unity of life and work. In traditional agrarian societies the transition from childhood to adulthood is more or less fluent; children work side by side with their parents and families on the field and continuously take over more tasks and responsibilities. Yet even there was a phase of adolescence between childhood and complete independence from the family with the achievement of the status as an adult. The role of youth in a society depends on the existing political, economic and symbolic order as well as on processes of social change. Therefore, the analysis of youth in a society must be reflected in the specific social context.

The beginning of youth is mostly characterised by the following rites of passages: end of primary education, the physical maturing to woman or man (puberty), growing independence from the family. This concerns mostly the age cohorts between childhood and the age of 18, which is the international threshold for the implementation of child protection norms. The end of youth and the beginning of adulthood is marked by the passages of political participation and the attainment of basic civil and political rights (such as the right to vote and being elected), economic independence from the family, settling down, parenthood. Overall, this phase significantly varies according to context and political regime amongst others.⁴⁰ Furthermore, this phase is different or shorter for young women than for their male peers given that their youth mostly ends with the first pregnancy. All these differences need to be taken into account when analyzing youth violence.

3.1. Youth, Youth Violence and Social Change

Transformations of the societal order due to social change have important consequences for the role of young people, because they change their status, options and future perspectives. Within the interplay between culturally related definitions of social role models and the cultural and political program of modernity intergenerational conflicts emerge. Youths may be stylised as agents of change or keepers of tradition. At the same time, relevant rites of passage change and social role models multiply (see Eisenstadt 2003). Technological and medical progress is important to this process because it changes the society's demographic structures. Transformation processes have their impact on youth, too. In politics the rules of the game are

⁴⁰ The World Development Report 2007 distinguishes between five passages: learning for work and life, beginning to work, growing up healthy, founding a family, and achieving civil rights.

changed by democratisation and the introduction of general elections in favour of youth even if the processes are not fully democratic. At least on a legal basis, youths become equal citizens before the law (mostly at the age of 18). With regard to economy, globalisation dramatically changes the perspectives for youths. On the one hand, due to their education they have more possibilities of participation than their parents. On the other hand, however, Sassen (2007) presumes that the consolidation of new labour regimes is marginalizing young people. While for many decades low paid jobs had provided options to move socially upwards, today this process is highly dependent on education and leaves many young people looking for identity beyond formal labour. Access to formal education is thus a central mechanism of integration or exclusion for today's youth. At the same time, the cultural and symbolic orders have considerably changed over the last years. Modern communication has globalised culture and supported the diffusion of norms and values, and it accelerated the dissolution of traditional orders.

Youth violence, its role and the forms of containment vary in the process of social change and social differentiation as well: In traditional societies with a high level of integration, firm norms and nets of socially controlled ritualised forms of youth violence are not only tolerated but have a fixed place in celebrations or as initiation rites (see Dubet 1997, pp.221ff). This is not only valid for non-European contexts but can be studied in European history, too. Relicts of such traditional forms of violence control – functioning until the beginning of the 20th century – were the duelling fraternities and duels that were only prohibited at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century (see Frevert 1991); ritualised sword fights with the aim of drawing blood are still legal in some German fraternities.

During the process of social change youth violence withdraws from existing patterns of social control and thus does not contribute to social integration anymore. Consequentially, it continuously becomes perceived as “deviant” behaviour. Apart from this youth violence is channeled into forms of organised violence, for example in the form of compulsory military service or in interstate wars. This holds true for Europe's colonialist expansion and most of its interstate wars, but has become apparent in many modern interstate wars as well – e.g. the war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s. The massive involvement of young men in these wars can be interpreted as one form of instrumentalisation and functionalisation of youth violence. The related nationalism and patriotism is an important mechanism of integration as well as a source of upward social mobility.

Youth violence seems to have three structural context factors that are quite independent from the historical and cultural environment: the society's demographic structure, processes of urbanisation and migration, as well as the existence of state and non-state mechanisms of integration and control of youth violence.

The demographic context – and not just the mere existence of a youth bulge – is important for the future perspectives of young people, because they have different options to influence political decisions and priorities according to their share of the population (see Larson 2002). Developing countries experiencing the process of demographic change (that is a decreasing mortality rate and a constantly high or rather slowly decreasing fertility rate) have a disproportionately high ratio of youth. The World Bank's World Development Report 2007 refers to

a number of 1.5 billion people between the ages of 12 and 24, of which 1.2 billions live in the developing countries of the global south (Worldbank 2006). This is not only a challenge for the affected societies but for international cooperation as well, given the limited capabilities of developing countries to integrate youth into politics, economy and society. The changing age structure of developing countries makes it necessary to adjust the basic social infrastructure (e.g. education, health system). The different world regions differ substantially according to the progress of the demographic change and handling of the corresponding problems.⁴¹

Urbanisation and migration are fundamental phenomena of social change with important repercussions for youths. They improve their opportunities by providing the possibility to escape violence and the lack of perspectives. Migration always has been a chance of upward social mobility and an improvement of future perspectives. But contemporary migration is much more regularised and restricted than in other historical contexts. The World Population Report 2006 (UNFPA 2006 p. vi) estimates that out of the 191 million people migrating from their country of origin in 2005, a third were young people between ages of 15 and 30. The number of internal migrants to the cities is probably much higher. The rapid growth of the world's cities during the last decades shows characteristics different to the historical processes of urbanisation in the industrialised countries. Most of these processes lack the diffusion of urban patterns of life, economy and behaviour as well as a qualitative change in social relations. On an empirical basis, it becomes apparent that the outskirts and marginalised quarters of the cities are dominated by the prevalence of traditional social relationships and networks that play an important role in the daily survival of the population. The global city is thus the most important environment for the emergence of youth gangs (Hagedorn 2007).

Rapid urbanisation and migration thus favour the establishment of networks based on traditional social relationships. These networks fulfil important social functions where the state cannot enter or is just too weak; but on the other hand they are a central basis for the recruitment of criminal and mafia-like networks thus leading to a further debilitation of the state and its claim to territorial control and monopoly of violence.⁴² These life-worlds are the central context and risk factors for youth violence.

A third structural factor is related to the capacities and the political willingness within state and society to confront the challenges of social change. The central question is in what ways young people are treated, whether there are mechanisms of integration, in what ways these mechanisms function or whether young people are marginalised. Education systems and the

⁴¹ See UN-DESA 2007 and Brown/ Larson/ Saraswathi 2002.


⁴² Money transfers of (legal and illegal) migrants to their home communities play an important role for survival in South and Southeastern Europe, in India, China, Turkey, the Philippines, Egypt, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mexico and Central America (see Orozco 2003). The social relationships based on kinship networks served the Italian mafia in the United States during the 20th century as well as today's criminal networks, see Naylor 2002. On the relationship between gangs and politics see Brotherton 2007. The Chicago school on gang research began to investigate the role of youth gangs as strongmen for the political machineries during the 1920s. The integration of children and adolescents into organised crime is not new either, if considering that the novel *Oliver Twist* by Charles Dickens holds a certain amount of historical authenticity. For the discussion on changes on gangs in the time of globalisation see Hagedorn 2007a, 2008.

labour market are of fundamental importance not only due to their integration function but also because they communicate fundamental norms and values that determine the socialisation of youth into society. In a context of fragile state structures and weak civil society organisations young people are primarily left to themselves. This is a breeding ground for youth violence and for peer groups and other networks (e.g. in the environment of organised criminality or politics), which then serve as substitutes to state functions.

As a consequence, there are some more or less universal explanatory factors for youth violence: These are among others rapid social change, experiences of exclusion and marginalisation as well as the destruction of primary social relationships and of traditional forms of social control and integration. This is the breeding ground where young people organise collectively or in gangs, from which some of their members “grow out” when they pass certain stages (such as finding regular work or starting a family).⁴³ The following graphic illustrates the relevant factors with respect to the emergence of youth violence.

⁴³ On the institutionalisation of gangs see Hagedorn 2008:9ff, who insists that even an institutionalisation does not necessarily lead to criminal acts (Hagedorn 2007b: 310).

Graphic 3: Factors in the Emergence of Youth Violence



3.2. *Youth in Armed Conflicts*

Independent of their role as victims, perpetrators or autonomous actors, war and widespread violence have serious consequences for youth and their possibilities (and options). War and violence change existing power relations, hierarchies as well as the access to and use of resources. Three processes are of importance here:

First of all, war and widespread violence lead to the militarisation of political regimes which in turn can cause the functionalisation or instrumentalisation of youth in the war effort, e.g. by enforced or overlong periods of generalised conscription. At the same time, forms of civil political participation are restricted or prohibited. On the other hand, violence can be used by young people as mechanism to change existing political regimes (either by the means of threat and intimidation or the effective use of violence). This is the background of many internal wars, where youth have shown a disproportionately high involvement in the files (to a much lesser degree in the ranks) of armed opposition groups. One example is the young Che Guevara and his influence as global icon in the quest for social and political change. War and widespread violence cause youth to experience violence personally, either as victims or as perpetrators. This may lead to traumatising or to the removal of the taboo of using violence in conflict resolution. Richards (2007) interprets violence as behaviour children and adolescents learn in war and armed conflict which has to be “unlearned” in the post-war period.

Second, during war resource use is subjected to the war effort and not to the construction of infrastructure necessary for health, education and other sectors that are vital for the development of young people.⁴⁴ In addition to the physical destruction of formal and informal systems of education these can be functionalised for conflict and the recruitment of children and adolescents. Formal education is an essential mechanism for social cohesion, where norms and values are disseminated that can either escalate violent conflict or promote civil forms of conflict resolution.⁴⁵ This does not only hold true for interstate conflicts, where schools have often served for the perpetuation of stereotypes and indoctrination, but also for internal conflicts when group identities are shaped or consolidated. Ethnic conflicts are an obvious case in point, but schools do reproduce social conflicts as well.

Third, the massive destruction and change of the social fabric due to widespread violence and war affects young people to an even higher degree than this would be the case in other sectors of society. War and widespread violence destroy primary social networks, which are the primary reference point for children and to a lesser degree for adolescents. War and post-war societies have a high percentage of widows and orphans. While those under the age of 18 are at least theoretically protected by international law, adolescents over the age of 18 are de facto left to themselves.

⁴⁴ Evidence for this is given by the analysis of military spending (see Brzoska 1994) and by various macro-quantitative investigations from the World Bank, see Collier et al. 2003.

⁴⁵ See Davies 2004, Tawil 2001. Current examples for this discussion are Koran schools (e.g. the Madrassas in Pakistan) that are said to have a fundamental role in the recruitment of fighters for the Jihad. Nonetheless, schools in many contexts are places where violence is either legitimised or de-legitimised.

These processes do not only have psychological consequences enabling violent behaviour. Since a significant share of the population is affected, this also has implications for the society given that a whole age cohort or generation grows up in a precarious, rapidly changing environment. Therefore, in many post-war societies youth are considered a “lost generation”.

However, war and violence do not exclusively have negative effects on youth (or on women⁴⁶), but they may also enable them to break away from traditional role models or provide new opportunities for economic progress, social mobility or political participation.⁴⁷ These changes can be caused by different developments: Youths have an important share in many groups directly involved in armed combat, most of all in paramilitary organisations that in most post-war contexts are not formally demobilised. Possessing a weapon, young people can acquire power and influence they did not have before, whether they took up arms “voluntarily” or through forced recruitment. During war, youths have to survive on the streets due to the destruction of families or they assume family roles otherwise occupied by mother or father.

In spite of their role in many wars, youth is only recently perceived as an important target group for peace-building (see McEvoy-Levy 2001, 2008, Kemper 2005). While the psychological rehabilitation of child soldiers is high on the agenda of many international organisations such as UNICEF and international NGOs, youths over the age of 18 are often left out in their programmes. Peace agreements do not address the specific needs of youth, and neither do the agendas of most civil society organisations.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, youth-related peace-building needs should be integrated into strategies of rehabilitation and recovery in post-war contexts. This holds true for the treatment of the psychological and physical effects of war and for the creation of future perspectives.

The changes in the personal and societal environment of youth through war and violence and their interplay must be a focal point in the analysis of youth violence in post-war societies.

3.3. The Post-War Society as a Life-World for Youth

For youth and society at large, more or less formalised terminations of armed conflict or war are not a new start or a year zero. Rather the social space of post-war societies is a dual area of tension that shapes the youths’ life-worlds (see Chapter 2).

After the end of a war – or already during the slowdown of violence or peace negotiations – external influence increases substantially. The mere presence of many foreigners (either in the field of humanitarian or development cooperation or via United Nations peace-keeping mis-

⁴⁶ In most wars and immediate post-war contexts women are able to enhance their autonomy, mostly because this is necessary for the survival of society. The famous German “Trümmerfrauen“ after the Second World War are a case in point as are women Sandinista in Nicaragua. However, as soon as the post-war situation reaches close to normal, women are mostly pushed back into their traditional roles. Unsurprisingly, this shows a great deal of path-dependency as gender roles are deeply ingrained in existing cultural patterns.

⁴⁷ See Brett/ Specht 2004.

⁴⁸ See McEvoy-Levy (2008) for a comprehensive list of youth specific needs in the immediate post-war context.

sions) introduces diverse cultural life experiences and consumption patterns amongst others. This attracts youth in a very specific way. For instance, the dissemination of US culture and consumption patterns in post-war Europe is repeated with globalised speed in Timor L'Este, Aceh, Cambodia, Central America and many African post-war societies.

Beyond this, youth face specific problems related to the triple transformation processes promoted by the liberal peace-building paradigm:

Democratisation leads to a readjustment of the rules and mechanisms for participation (see above). Coming of age and being allowed to vote, youths encounter new forms of participation which are at least theoretically based on the equality of all citizens before the law. Depending on the historical and cultural patterns of political governance and the effects of war and violence this can constitute a radical rupture with the past. Thus, the analysis needs to be focused on the specific possibilities of participation of youth inside and outside the political systems. In what ways is this prohibited or promoted by the design of war termination? Do elders and former combatants dominate the political system? What role do the war and its termination play in the political conflicts? In what ways are youth included or excluded from the political decision-making process?

One further question closely related to and influenced by transformation processes and the experience of war is the nature of conflict resolution. Although war might have come to an end, society is not pacified. Specifically youth rehabilitation and patterns of integration into civilian life need to be protected because in many of these situations armed groups do not cede to recruit adolescents. Furthermore, youths may attach themselves to these groups as the only means of survival.

Moreover, not only the socialisation of youth into violent behaviour poses an important factor but the legitimacy of violence in society. Coping with the past is of utmost importance here not only due to its significance for victims and perpetrators but as a preventive measure for civil conflict resolution. Independently of the specific penalty, prosecution is a significant marker of change with symbolic as well as educational value. Only if there is at least a symbolic rupture with the violent past, this can have a positive and preventive impact for the future. Otherwise the termination of war will simply be a short break in the execution of violence. How can young people learn that violence is not an appropriate way to solve conflicts, that there exist unalienable human rights, when they live in a society that leaves gross human rights violations exempt from punishment? The lack of coping with past atrocities legitimates violence as a means in politics, to enrich oneself or climb up the social ladder. This does not only ridicule the victims but simultaneously undermines efforts for democratisation. Democracy and civil conflict regulation depend on a minimum of trust in the fellow citizens and relevant institutions as well as capabilities to sanction offences through the rule of law.

An equally relevant factor for violent youth behaviour and its analysis is the validity of norms and values. Educational systems and schools have to be analyzed as a crucial bridge between state and family. In how far are war and the related violence discussed (or treated as a taboo)? What are the relevant conflicts to youth and in which way are these resolved? How do youths cope with the change of values related to the war termination (devaluation of militaristic values and appreciation of civil values)?

Ultimately, the processes of economic liberalisation and the persistence of war-economy structures affect the life-worlds of youth. The termination of war and the marketisation of the economy for the most part do not provide jobs in the formal sector of the economy and therefore do not provide a perspective for civilian survival. Most post-war societies are characterised by a high level of informality, criminalisation and fragmentation. Against the background of personalised war and violence experience, these three elements have even more serious implications in a post-war context than their occurrence in other contexts. Education and economic independence are fundamental rites of passage, the realisation of which in many post-war societies is not possible or only viable in informal or criminal relations.

Summarizing, we can state that the consequences of war and widespread violence reinforce the individual and structural risk factors of youth violence while the processes of war termination and the transformation may change the capabilities of state and society to integrate and control youth. In order to explain different levels of youth violence in post-war societies we have thus to focus on differences in these patterns and mechanisms, their change, continuity or adaptation due to war and war-termination.

4. Causes and Forms of Youth Violence in Post-War Societies

Youth violence in post-war societies is the result of a specific interplay between the processes of rapid social change with the effects and dynamics of war and widespread violence. We do not insinuate beforehand that youth violence differs essentially from overall patterns of violence. But we do assume that youths in post-war societies are exposed to special risks and that they resemble the ambiguities of the transformation processes from war to non-war contexts. An analysis aiming at the explanation of the different levels of post-war youth violence has to address two sets of questions: differences in the form and legitimation of violence and the context of youth violence.

4.1. Forms and Legitimation of Violence

Disaggregating youth violence according to its goals and its relations to other forms of violence allows for identifying continuity and change. In order to achieve that, one should distinguish not just between political violence and violence for personal enrichment⁴⁹ but also between goals, levels of organisation and time horizons. Although boundaries are fluent, the following types of youth violence can be constructed:

- **situational violence**, that is, violence dependent on specific situations – such as the influence of alcohol and drugs during weekends – but not on the societal context. It

⁴⁹ There are other possibilities to distinguish between different forms of violence, see Tilly 2003a for a different approach. Moser 2001 distinguishes between political, economic and social violence. For the question of continuity and change related to youth violence we think that the differentiation along the goals and organizational structures is appropriate as it covers most of the empirically described forms of violence perpetrated by and against youths.

occurs in war, non-war and post-war contexts; it is mostly related to testing existent limits as is typical of puberty. Situational violence is aggravated by the lack of leisure facilities and other forms of integration. A post-war example is Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement where the term *recreational rioting* was created for youth violence that obviously lost its connection to the political struggle of the conflict between Sinn Fein and the British state (Jarman 2008).

- **ritualised violence** serves mostly as proof of masculinity in the process of growing up and is closely linked to a specific phase in life or a certain age but not to a specific societal context. It can take place in individual and collective forms. Ritualised violence can be a marker of a rite of passage either in traditional societies or as an initiation ritual to a gang or criminal organisation. These forms of violence can be converted into non-violent mechanisms in the process of social change or they can be instrumentalised by other actors.
- **violence for personal enrichment**⁵⁰ can have individual and collective forms; its time horizon can be short-termed or spontaneous as well as mid-termed. Besides different forms of everyday criminality this includes violence from organised crime like drug trade. Except in its institutionalised form, this type of violence occurs in different contexts. Depending on the form of the political regime and the capabilities of the state, different mechanisms of sanction and prevention apply.
- **social violence** can constitute a rebellion against a status quo or a means to maintain it. In many cases it is closely tied to political violence, yet it can take either individual or collective forms and is mostly directed against specific situations, events, etc. Social violence has a short to medium-term horizon and it needs at least a rudimentary form of connection to the societal context. Social violence often occurs in more or less spontaneous riots. These can be directed against a political regime, target racial discrimination such as riots in some US cities, or express opposition to trade agreements such as the riots in Latin America against free trade agreements with the United States. A central question here is how state and society cope with these forms of violence and whether they become more organised and institutionalised.
- **political violence** covers the transformation or maintenance of the societal status quo. This type needs a relatively consolidated form of organisation, a mid- to long-term project and at least some form of ideological relation to discourses in society. Examples are classical guerrilla groups as well as youths being used as strongmen by authoritarian regimes against oppositional politicians.

The problem that occurs when trying to analyze specific cases of youth violence along these categories is that this analytically sensible differentiation is not quantifiable either because statistics do not differentiate between forms of violence, or because police and judiciary do not make this distinction. Yet, a qualitative-oriented process analysis detects patterns of violence.

⁵⁰ This term seems to be more precise compared to economic violence as this also includes forms of structural violence.

Closely related to the goals of violence are its acceptance, justification and legitimisation by state and society. Politicisation plays a significant role here: Youth violence that effectively or by claim only articulates itself in a political way has taken place in the most diverse historical and cultural contexts. Besides the two World Wars, youths have played a fundamental role in many revolutionary movements of the 20th century.⁵¹ Political violence is closely bound to discussions on the legitimisation of violence as a political resource and for many decades has been perceived as a more or less legitimate or last resort method of resistance. This has changed significantly during the last decades. Especially the third wave of democratisation seems to have caused a rupture here. Under globalised conditions of at least formally democratic political regimes violence is continuously eliminated from the sphere of politics and has lost an ideological reference point for its legitimisation. Youth violence is no exception here. The Middle East and the legitimisation of violence by youth as a central mechanism in the Jihad is one of the regional exceptions.

In contrast to political violence, youth violence for personal or collective enrichment is usually not accepted and criminalised as deviant behaviour. Exceptions are forms of “distributional justice” that are linked to a political discourse. Youth connected to organised forms of criminality are mostly perceived as a problem of public security. This group is a main challenge for a democratic state as youth until the age of 18 falls under regulations for the protection of children. Hence, not surprisingly transnational organised crime uses children and youth specifically for their operations. In connection with international drug trade, this has become a problem of global dimension.

Much more ambivalent is the question of legitimacy of ritualised and situational youth violence, which manifests itself and is dealt with differently across very diverse historical, social and cultural settings. For instance, violence committed by youth of wealthier backgrounds is often trivialised and excused citing the influence of accepted drugs such as alcohol, which minimises penalties. However, these excuses along the lines of “they just sow their wild oats” are not applied to youth from marginalised groups and minorities. Empirical evidence from the United States shows this pattern in the treatment of black and Latino juvenile delinquents. In Europe, this pattern is evident in the treatment of youth from Turkish, Algerian or Eastern European backgrounds. In developing countries these processes are substantially aggravated by corruption in the justice and prosecution systems. This allows the rich to buy out their kids while others are left without any protection in the arms of an often violent system.

⁵¹ See the study of Wickham-Crowley 1992 on the Latin American guerrilla movements.

4.2. *Youth Violence in Different Life-Worlds*

Based on the concept of the dual area of tension, at least three life-worlds for youth in post-war societies can be differentiated, showing different patterns of how youth violence is caused and how youths are integrated and/or controlled. Our hypothesis is that the latter is essential for the explanation of differences in the level of youth violence:

1. The capital city, where

- external and international influences are most prominent because state and non-state international organisations are present; independently from their specific mandate, their mere presence influences existing patterns of culture and consumption.
- the national institutions (government, parliament, judiciary, entrepreneurs, media and churches amongst others) are based and where the crucial decisions are taken; therefore, mechanisms of violence control should be relatively strong here.
- the different dynamics of violence and civility clash as the decision-making processes of local and external actors occur here and may also be influenced here.

As a consequence, a relatively high level of youth violence is to be expected in the capital city, because different patterns of causation collide. These include processes reinforced by war and widespread violence like rapid social change, destruction of primary social relations, and low levels of social control. The possibilities of intervention by state and non-state actors should be relatively high compared to the other life-worlds, but the different influences could be contradictory or impede each other.

2. Regions where war and violence played an important role (the “battlegrounds“), where

- there is a high level of destruction and/or change of social relations, a process bearing implications for integration and control of youth.
- there is the biggest share of external funds for recovery and rehabilitation, but which in many cases cannot be absorbed on the ground. Therefore, these regions are highly susceptible for corruption and shadow economy structures.
- the biggest share of refugees and displaced people originate or return to. This leads to a high level of social conflict surrounding issues of land, property, or coping with past atrocities.

In this context it is to be expected that war-related causes of violence (escape, displacement, personal experiences of violence) are most important. The level of violence is shaped by the power relations on the grounds that determine concrete forms of integration and control of youths. The way past violence and human rights violations are treated is of central significance. Thus, an analysis will have to focus on the political, economic and social position of former violent actors and their relations to state and non-state actors as well as to youth and youth violence.

3. Regions where war and violence were of minor importance.

These do not necessarily need to be “islands of civility” but regions where war and violence played a marginal role for various reasons. Youth violence will be present and the causes will probably be found in processes and dynamics of social change influenced by war, albeit to a much lesser degree when compared to the other two life-worlds. Traditional forms of integration and control of youths and dealing with violence and violence control should play a prominent role here.

Analyzing youth violence in specific post-war societies will probably allow for even more distinctions, for example when a specific region has been under successive control of different violent actors.

The considerations presented above can be summed up in the following chart:


	Capital city	Battlegrounds	Regions with minor war influence
External influence	High	high	low
Stability of societal foundations	Low	low	high
Influence of violence	Medium	high	low
Influence of peace-building	Medium	medium	low

4.3. Potential explanations for Youth Violence in Post-War Societies

Post-war societies are a fertile breeding ground for youth violence because – at least theoretically – a series of enabling factors come together that make a high level of youth violence plausible. However, youth violence does not occur on the same level in all post-war societies. Rather, the empirical evidence for youth violence in post-war countries reflects a combination and interplay of different sets of factors. Below are some assumptions on why different levels of youth violence occur in different post-war societies. These will be illustrated in graphic 4 further below:

1. The structural causes of youth violence in different contexts are related to rapid social change, urbanisation, migration and globalisation. The experience of war and widespread violence reinforce these structural causes directly. Nevertheless collective forms of youth organisations have a low level of institutionalisation at the beginning and most youths grow out of these organisations as soon as they have reached specific rites of passage – for instance, starting a family or going to work on a regular basis. The organisations show a low level of continuity and adaptation to changes in their immediate environment. But youths in today's post-war societies confront difficulties to make the relevant rites of passage due to the lack of education, availability of jobs and political visions.
2. Differences in the level of youth violence between countries can be explained according to the capabilities to integrate or control youth. In traditionally structured societies as well as in those with a functioning rule of law youth can either be integrated or their violence can be sanctioned. In most post-war societies the situation is much more complex owing to the destruction of traditional mechanisms of integration and control and the lack or weakness of new ones.
3. This enables other actors to co-opt and instrumentalise youth and their organisations. In times of war, those are usually political actors, in post and non-war situations youth violence is either not integrated at all or bound or subordinated to criminal networks. In life-worlds characterized by a low level of social differentiation this is more probable due to lacking alternatives.
4. The definition of youth violence as a political or a non-political phenomenon is decisive for the dynamics that unfold when dealing with youth violence. The main difference between political and economic forms of collective violence is not their causation but their justification and legitimisation. While political violence is accepted in some contexts, violence for economic motives is mostly criminalised when not included into a broader accepted structure. However, the boundaries between the two forms are fluent, change over time and sometimes exist in a symbiotic relationship.
5. The treatment of violent youth is a decisive factor in the institutionalisation and dynamics of violent youth groups. Repressive responses to youth violence support the establishment of individual and collective connections to organised crime and thus narrow down options for juvenile delinquents to leave these criminal networks. This is especially the case when the only response of state authority to youth crime consists in jailing the offender.

Graphic 4: Impacts of War and War Termination on Youth Violence



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A differentiated analysis of the causes of youth violence is a necessary foundation for the development of appropriate strategies for internal and external actors. Youths are decisive actors that shape the future of a society; their specific experiences with state and society shape their attitudes for the rest of their lives. Therefore, youth are fundamental for peace-building, their exclusion and marginalisation is not only short-sighted but may jeopardise the transformation processes to a more peaceful development.

The specific societal context of the life-worlds for youth determines what mechanisms and processes are activated for the organisation of young people and for their behaviour. Far more research needs to be done on related issues, such as the role and impact of cultural and historical context factors, or the influence of specific forms of political regimes and economic orders on youth, their organisations and their propensity to apply violence. Having identified the main fractures that influence different levels of youth violence the perceptions and perspectives of youths themselves are another important topic for further research.

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