

Memorandum

International priorities in ameliorating the problems caused by
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

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Introduction

This document is designed to be a companion to both the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs online collection of national reports¹ on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA); and the NGO produced *Implementing the Programme of Action 2003 Action by States and Civil Society*.

The focus of this paper is the national statements released by governments that attended the *First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action* that was held in New York during July 2003. These statements were unique in that they did not exclusively focus upon the provisions of the PoA. Rather, in many cases they provided a wide-ranging commentary on governments' views of the small arms problem and its solutions.

In many important respects the national statements touched on issues left out of the Programme of Action (PoA). For example, the 2001 conference decided not to address the issue of lawful possession of firearms by civilians. However, many governments (in their national statements) made specific reference to controlling civilian possession of firearms as a means of addressing the small arms problem.

Analysis of the national statements indicates the following governmental priorities:

The problem is characterised by:

- Violent crime, particularly associated with the drugs trade.
- Harm to economic and social development.
- The victims of armed conflict, particularly children.
- Terrorism.

Some governments wanted the UN process to go further than the PoA.

Preventative measures included:

- Developing a marking and tracing regime.
- Stricter normative criteria governing small arms exports; and transparency.
- Control over transfers to non state actors (NSA); and over arms brokers.
- Converting small arms production.
- Conflict prevention and building a 'culture of peace'.

Suggested cures to the small arms problem included:

- Capacity building of, and cooperation between, law enforcement officers.
- Intergovernmental cooperation.
- Engagement with civil society; and using media and public campaigns.
- Control over, and registration of, private ownership of small arms.
- Weapons collection programmes, particularly after a conflict.
- Ensuring the secure storage of small arms.

The problem

There was a clear understanding that small arms do not pose a traditional security threat. The concern expressed by governments focused upon the humanitarian consequences suffered by their citizens rather than fear that small arms might pose a direct threat to the states' institutions. Indeed, only three governments (Canada, Chile and Venezuela) highlighted the danger posed by small arms to government institutions, and these focused upon how armed violence can impede the provision of government services.

Furthermore, there is a widespread acceptance that while small arms do not *cause* violence, the proliferation of small arms dramatically increases the lethality of existing conflicts or criminal behaviour. For example, Ghana stated that:

The proliferation of light weapons and illicit arms trafficking in the world today constitutes a grave menace to stability, peace, and sustainable development in Africa, particularly in the West African sub-region. Although they do not in themselves cause the conflicts and criminal activities in which they are used, their wide availability, accumulation and illicit flows, especially in conflict zones, tend to escalate conflicts, undermine peace agreements, intensify violence, impede economic and social development, and hinder the development of social stability.

It was also recognised that the availability of small arms can prompt a vicious cycle. Trinidad and Tobago stated that 'in other countries':

the ease with which such weapons are available has resulted in an escalation of public fear and anxiety, so much so, that there has been an increase in demand for firearm user licenses and, where these demands are not met, an increase in demand for illegal firearms.

The preoccupation with suffering at an individual level (or perhaps a human level) is exemplified by crime being the issue of greatest concern. Some 31 governments expressed concern at the use of small arms by criminals. Governments shared this preoccupation across both the developed world (such as the Netherlands) and the developing (such as Bangladesh). In particular, the combination of organised crime and drug trafficking was highlighted as a problem. Ten statements specifically mentioned the dangers associated with small arms and drug related violence. Jamaica stated that:

the constant fight for turf and to secure the profits from the drug trade have witnessed significant growth in the use of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) by drug barons and their henchmen as a means of control, a process in which the lives of innocent citizens, particularly young people, have been snuffed out through wanton and indiscriminate acts of violence perpetrated by criminal gunmen.

Narco-traffickers from North, South and Central America often supply guns in tandem with the supply of drugs as part of the payment for their illegal cargo.

These weapons make their way into the hands of young people who wreck havoc on our citizens in an effort to gain control and financial power.

Development was highlighted by some 27 governments expressing concern that the proliferation of small arms plays a part in hampering development. For instance, Kenya noted that:

The region has witnessed some of the most despicable humanitarian consequences in recent times, including senseless loss of life, destruction of infrastructure and property and large scale displacement of people. ... The proximity of the affected areas, principally the Northern Districts of Kenya, to the regional trouble spots has made availability of small arms easier. The net effect has been devastating economic consequences arising from insecurity, hence inability of affected areas to attract developmental opportunities.

Associated issues such as democracy and Human Security were highlighted by, respectively, five and eight statements. Concerning Human Security, Switzerland stated that:

Switzerland urges that security should no longer be considered as merely an inter-state matter. It should also include a human security centred perspective that takes into account the security needs of individual people and of particularly vulnerable groups. Switzerland firmly believes that Human Security is an appropriate way of addressing the problem of small arms, as it combines aspects of security policy, development, peace promotion, human rights and humanitarian needs.

Given the prominence of organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, it is perhaps surprising that only five statements expressed concern for the threat to human rights posed by the easy availability of small arms.

Armed conflict also featured prominently in states' concerns. Some 26 governments emphasised the damage that continuing supplies of small arms to existing conflicts could wreck. South Africa noted that, "it is again sobering when one continues to receive reports of large numbers of small arms and light weapons circulating in Africa, fuelling conflicts throughout the region." Frequently emphasis was placed on the civilian victims, particularly women, of contemporary civil wars. Furthermore, fifteen statements paid particular attention to child soldiers and child victims of conflict. Mali stated that:

Selon certaines estimations deux millions d'enfants auraient été tués et six millions traumatisés ou handicapés par l'usage des armes légères et de petits calibres pendant la dernière décennie et compte tenu du fait que l'usage d'armes légères provoque une culture de violence, il est crucial de renforcer le lien entre la protection des droits des enfants et la lutte contre l'utilisation et le trafic illicite de ces armes.

The use of small arms by terrorist organisations was highlighted by twenty-one governments. In this regard Israel made one of the most forceful statements when it stated that:

It is self evident that the international fight against terrorism and illicit trade in SALW must begin at home: it can only succeed if every individual state makes a sincere commitment to prevent terrorists from obtaining SALW.

Finally, six governments outlined the problem of transit countries that funnel SALW into their region. In this regard Kazakhstan noted that, “Afghanistan has been one of the largest drug producers and a centre of concentration of the unaccounted small arms due to the inflow of weapons to this region.”

The process

Thirteen statements expressed regret that the PoA had not covered sufficient ground, or that it should be developed in future conferences. These statements ranged from Switzerland’s specific desire to develop controls over transfers of SALW to Non State Actors, to Canada’s statement that:

We must take the first steps towards considering ways in which we might amend and improve the *Programme of Action* ...

Prevention

Governments considered a variety of means to prevent new small arms from reaching the hands of those that misuse them. Most preventative measures suggested involved greater control over the authorised trade (as opposed to the black market) in SALW.

Twenty-four statements supported current initiatives to improve the marking of firearms, so that it is easier to trace the route taken by a weapon to its final user. France and Switzerland are currently sponsoring international efforts to develop a global marking and tracing regime; their initiative is supported by a wide variety of other governments, including Italy (also speaking on behalf of the EU), which stated that:

Marking and tracing bear primary importance in the action to eradicate illegal trade’s channels. It is therefore essential to develop common marking standards as well as to agree on common procedures ... to track small arms and light weapons or ammunition from their point of origin to the last identified user.

Twenty-one governments mentioned stricter export control criteria as a means of preventing the further proliferation of SALW. While the PoA called upon states to ensure that they had adequate legislation in force to regulate the international trade in small arms (and that the exports should be congruent with existing responsibilities under international law), many of these governments stressed the importance of going much further and developing stricter normative standards concerning the proper recipients of their small arms exports. For example, the UK indicated that at a

conference it held prior to the Biennial, “[m]any, but not all, participants supported the idea of developing common guidelines on small arms exports.”

Seven governments mentioned the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers. Both members, and non-members, of the EU, stated that they follow its various normative criteria. For example, Romania stated that:

The implementation of the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports overcame the declaratory phase. The whole licensing process is tailored in accordance with the content and export criteria of this very important political document.

In addition, Austria and Germany echoed the cry of NGOs campaigning for an Arms Trade Treaty when they declared that there should be ‘no arms for atrocities’. Five governments more explicitly supported the development of an international legal regime to govern the arms trade. This call ranged from Colombia’s admission that the “creation of an international organ” governing normative mechanisms concerning marking and tracing, broking, and international transfers was its “most cherished dream” to Lithuania’s direct statement:

Lithuania supports a non-governmental organizations initiative to begin preparatory work on adoption of an Arms Trade Treaty.

Ten governments mentioned transparency as a means of encouraging responsible arms transfers. Germany made the blunt declaration that:

We consider strict export criteria and transparency in arms transfers as legitimate and essential standards that can and should be met by all exporters of weapons on whatever continent. ... We are convinced that legal transfers governed by an unequivocal set of criteria need no hiding.

Ten governments called for a ban on, or better control over, transfers to non state actors (NSAs). Some twenty-two governments emphasised the importance (as recommended by the PoA) of introducing legislation to regulate arms brokering. Norway and the Netherlands are leading international initiatives to assist governments considering introducing such legislation. Italy, speaking on behalf of the EU, stated that:

Ensuring effective control over brokering is considered a high priority by the European Union. Illicit brokering and trafficking are recognised as among the main factors fuelling the illegal trade worldwide. Strict domestic legislations on brokering ... should be complemented by transparent exchange of relevant information. The European Union strongly favours the adoption of a legally binding multilateral instrument on this issue as soon as possible.

Four governments expressed support for the UN Firearms Protocol, an instrument that governs the process by which how firearms should be exported (rather than being concerned with to whom they are sold). Moreover, both Brazil and Mali emphasised the importance of enforcing arms embargoes.

Nine statements mentioned either converting small arms production, or introducing increased control over that production. China argued that:

some enterprises cannot adapt themselves to the civil market in a short time due to their long history of military production. If such a situation continues it may, among other things, have a negative impact on China's control over SALW.

The final, and perhaps most profound, preventative measure echoed the PoA's call for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Building a 'culture of peace' and investing in conflict prevention were emphasised by seventeen governments. For example, South Africa stated that its aim was to:

build our continent's capacity to manage these conflicts by strengthening our existing ... institutions to deal with conflict prevention, management and resolution; peacemaking; peacekeeping and peace enforcement; post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction ...

Cure

As important as preventing the further proliferation of new arms is removing (and destroying) those that have been misused, or ensuring that those small arms that are in circulation are used and transferred responsibly.

Many governments emphasised the need to increase the capacity and training of, and cooperation among, law enforcement personnel. Improving the use of firearms by security forces was emphasised. Three governments stressed the importance of the *UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force With Firearms*; and three other governments emphasised security sector reform. Five governments emphasised the importance of training public officials.

Fifteen governments recommended increased cooperation between law enforcement personnel (both domestically and internationally) and the sharing of information on national legislation. Fourteen governments emphasised the importance of strengthening border controls. Jamaica stated that:

As an island state, Jamaica is vulnerable to traffickers penetrating our extensive coastline, despite the best efforts of our security forces. Even when official ports of entry are used for this traffic, the methods used are extremely ingenious, making detection difficult at times.

... Jamaica has been attempting to strengthen its borders by first tightening security at the major Ports of Entry. New surveillance equipment has been installed at our ports to monitor the movement of both cargo and persons.

The theme of international cooperation was highlighted by the fifty-three governments, which emphasised regional cooperation and international information exchange. Such cooperation among governments was the most popular measure

highlighted at the conference. As an example, the Philippines stated that some of the proposals recommended by participants for consideration of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) at a regional seminar co-sponsored by the Philippines were:

the establishment of a regional point of contact, the establishment of a regional data base to monitor criminal activity, intensified implementation of the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, development of an ASEAN instrument against the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in firearms, explosives and other related materials, strengthening of existing relevant regional structures and cooperation such as the ASEAN Police (ASEANPOL), etc.

The provision of assistance, both financial and technical, was emphasised by a further twenty-seven governments. Specifically, five governments recommended the creation of best practice guides, and one emphasised developing model legislation.

Engagement with civil society and the citizens suffering from, and perpetrating, armed violence was another popular theme. Twenty-nine governments stressed the importance of cooperating with civil society organisations and engaging in education and advocacy concerning small arms. One of the most active governments has been Hungary, which stated that:

We believe that the involvement of civil society in our efforts is crucial to success. Non-governmental organisations and civil society provide valuable contribution to our work. Therefore, we initiated the Szeged Small Arms Process. This is a programme of work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons that has occurred in the South East European region. It was launched in Szeged in November 2000 at a meeting of representatives of governments, international and civil society organisations. Since the Process began over two hundred individuals have taken part in meetings and projects organised within this framework.

Furthermore, fifteen statements emphasised the importance of public awareness campaigns, and four recognised the role played by the media.

Although private lawful ownership of small arms was not included in the PoA, many governments reported that they viewed controls over civilian possession to be an important measure in their attempts to ameliorate the problems associated with small arms. Twenty-eight governments made reference to domestic firearms legislation and to controls over the legal possession of small arms. These comments ranged from Palau which stated that in 1979 it, “banned the possession of firearms by civilians”, to Malaysia which mentioned that it:

has strict domestic laws and regulations relating to all aspects of firearms control including ownership ... Article 106 of the Arms Act, provides that no person could carry or use arms or ammunition with a licensed permit. Licenses are issued on a yearly basis. Upon application for renewal, all arms will be inspected to ensure that owners do not misuse the purpose of the license. My

delegation believes that the Act has proven to be an effective means to control the use of firearms in Malaysia.

The importance of establishing national registers and databases (which may include information on the possession, manufacture and trade in small arms) was also highlighted by twenty-one governments; four governments also mentioned controls over firearms dealers.

Another prevalent theme concerning private possession of firearms was that of removing small arms from civilian ownership. In general these emphasised amnesties and weapon collection programmes in which would recover both legally and illegally held weapons (which would then be destroyed). Four governments also emphasised programmes exchanging small arms for development projects. Pakistan noted its initiatives to counter the illegal possession and transfer of small arms, which started in April 2001, and produced:

Until April 2003, around 250,000 illicit small arms and light weapons of different categories and types have been recovered/confiscated in addition to large quantities of ammunitions. After maintaining records of these weapons and ammunitions, a number of them were destroyed publicly.

Removing weapons from combatants after conflicts have ended was also emphasised. Eleven governments noted the importance of supporting Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives. It is also important to note that twenty-one governments stressed that stocks of small arms deemed to be surplus to the requirements of national security, or weapons seized or collected from civilians, should be destroyed.

The last theme mentioned was that of improving the storage and security of firearms stockpiles. Twenty two governments mentioned arsenal security as an important means of preventing SALW owned by security forces, and civilians, from being stolen or otherwise diverted into the black market. In this regard, Australia stated:

Firearms storage and armoury security is also a key issue for Australia. Authorities continually review the adequacy of safe storage compliance and audit arrangements and emphasise firearms' owners' obligations to safely store firearms. Dealers are subject to strict limits on the numbers of handguns they can keep in stock, to reduce the risk of theft from commercial stockpiles.
...

Furthermore, the Australian Defence Force has been assisting Pacific Island countries to implement more effective stockpile management practices and to improve the physical security of armouries.

Appendix.

Government statements that mentioned issues outlined above.

Problem

Provision of government services

Canada, Chile, Venezuela.

Crime

Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Venezuela.

Drugs

Bangladesh, Chile, Guyana, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Venezuela.

Development

Algeria, Austria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Ghana, Guyana, Gabon, Haiti, Holy See, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Mali, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom.

Democracy

Algeria, Austria, Chile, Croatia, Nicaragua.

Human Security

Austria, Chile, Croatia, Mali, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Venezuela.

Human rights

Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Haiti, Switzerland.

Conflicts

Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Cambodia, Chile, Congo, France, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Morocco, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nigeria, Palau, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Uganda, Venezuela.

Children & Child Soldiers

Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Chile, Germany, Guyana, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mali, Morocco, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sweden.

Terrorism

Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Chile, Cuba, Germany, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela.

Transit countries

Bangladesh, Belgium, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey.

Process

Want the PoA to go further

Algeria, Belgium, Congo, Cuba, EU, France, India, Lithuania, Mali, Netherlands, Switzerland (NSAs), Uruguay, Holy See

Prevention

Marking and tracing

Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Congo, France, Germany, Ghana, Holy See, India, Italy (EU), Jamaica, Jamaica, Japan, Pakistan, Morocco, Netherlands, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey.

Improved export control

Algeria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, France, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Italy (EU), Kazakhstan, South Korea, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom.

EU Code of Conduct

Belgium, Croatia, France, Hungary, Italy (EU), Norway, Romania.

No arms for atrocities

Austria, Germany.

International legal instrument

Benin, Chile, Colombia, Holy See, Lithuania.

Transparency (exports)

Australia, Chile, EU, France, Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Romania, Turkey.

Ban transfers to NSAs, or control transfers to NSAs

Brazil, Canada, Cuba, India, Israel, Italy (EU), Kenya, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Switzerland.

Brokering

Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, EU, France, Germany, Hungary, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Sweden, United Kingdom.

UN firearms protocol

China, Cuba, Jamaica, Mali.

Enforcement of arms embargoes

Brazil, Mali.

Converting military production & increased control over production

Algeria, Benin, China, Colombia, Gabon, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Uruguay.

Conflict prevention & building a culture of peace

Bangladesh, Canada, France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Holy See, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

Cure

Cooperation by law enforcement personnel & share examples of National legislation

Algeria, China, Congo, Indonesia, Malaysia, Namibia, Nigeria, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United States.

UN Basic Principles

Austria, Canada, Mali.

Security Sector reform

Benin, Gabon, Kenya, Mali.

Training of officials

Bangladesh, Chile, Mali, Nigeria, Uruguay.

Improved border controls

Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Senegal, Slovenia, Turkey, Uruguay.

Regional organisations, cooperation & information exchange

Algeria, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Congo, Croatia, Colombia, Czech Republic, France, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy (EU), Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Serbia

and Montenegro, South Africa, South Korea, Slovenia, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Assistance

Austria, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy (EU), Jamaica, Kenya, Pakistan, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia, Uganda, United States, Uruguay.

Best Practice Guides

Austria, France, Italy (EU), Netherlands, Nicaragua.

Developing model legislation

Australia

Cooperation with civil society, education & advocacy

Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Haiti, Hungary, Italy (EU), Jamaica, Kenya, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Mali, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom, Venezuela.

Public awareness

Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Croatia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Haiti, Pakistan, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Media

Austria, Croatia, Jamaica, Venezuela.

Domestic firearms legislation & controls over legal possession

Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Cuba, Gabon, Haiti, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Morocco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Palau, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Domestic firearms registers & national databases

Argentina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, China, Cuba, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Jamaica, South Korea, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Controls over firearms dealers

Australia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Uruguay.

Removing access to firearms & collection and destruction of privately held stocks (legal and illegal)

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Benin, Cambodia, Congo, Croatia, Georgia, Ghana, Haiti, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palau, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Arms for development

Cambodia, Japan, Philippines, Venezuela.

Destruction of surplus & seized stocks

Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, India, Italy (EU), Jamaica, Kenya, South Korea, Malaysia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Palau, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Tanzania, United States.

DDR

Algeria, Congo, Haiti, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom.

Storage & stockpile security

Argentina, Australia, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Gabon, Morocco, New Zealand, Philippines, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United States.

¹ Available at <http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/salw-nationalreports.html>