

Beyond Numbers

*An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the
Turkish 'Settlers' in Northern Cyprus*

METE HATAY

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PRIO Cyprus Centre

P.O. Box 25157, 1307 NICOSIA, Cyprus

Tel. +357 22 456555/4

E-mail: prio@cytanet.com.cy

Institutt for fredsforskning

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)

Hausmanns gate 7, NO-0186 OSLO, Norway

Tel. +47 22 54 77 00

Fax +47 22 54 77 01

E-mail: info@prio.no

Web: www.prio.no

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CONTENTS

<i>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</i>	<i>IV</i>
<i>FOREWORD</i>	<i>V</i>
<i>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</i>	<i>VII</i>
<i>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</i>	<i>X</i>
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: SETTLERS, IMMIGRANTS AND TEMPORARY RESIDENTS.....	5
CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM	15
CHAPTER 3: 'SETTLERS' IN PARTY POLITICS AND THEIR VOTING PATTERNS.....	23
CONCLUSION	49
POSTSCRIPT	57
REFERENCES	59
<i>APPENDIX I: CITIZENSHIPS GRANTED, 1974–2003</i>	<i>63</i>
<i>APPENDIX II: REGISTERED VOTERS IN 26 SELECTED 'SETTLER VILLAGES', 1981–2005</i>	<i>64</i>
<i>APPENDIX III: REGISTERED VOTERS IN SELECTED 'NATIVE VILLAGES', 1981–2005</i>	<i>65</i>
<i>APPENDIX IV: ELECTION RESULTS IN SELECTED 'NATIVE VILLAGES', 1981–2005</i>	<i>67</i>
<i>APPENDIX V: ELECTION RESULTS IN SELECTED 'SETTLER VILLAGES', 1981–2005</i>	<i>68</i>

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*Mete Hatay
Nicosia, Cyprus
12 August 2005*

FOREWORD

THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OSLO (PRIO) has been engaged in the Eastern Mediterranean since late 1997. Initially, the institute's work focused on organizing and facilitating dialogue between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and between Turks and Greeks. In 1999, PRIO established an office on Cyprus, situated in the UN-administered buffer zone in Nicosia. In late 2003, a team consisting of two Turkish Cypriots and two Greek Cypriots initiated a 'Public Information Project' aimed at providing easily understandable, objective and accurate information on the so-called Annan Plan – a UN proposal for a settlement to the 'Cyprus problem' – to help the island's citizens make an informed decision on the proposal. The output of that project included leaflets, booklets, a website, newspaper articles, public meetings and expert appearances in the media. Ahead of the twin referenda in late April 2004, the project entered a very intense period. Substantial requests for information from both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots highlighted the need for non-partisan information on both sides of the divided island. PRIO itself, however, took no position on the Annan Plan.

In 2005, PRIO further expanded its activities through the establishment of the PRIO Cyprus Centre. Through this, we continue to facilitate dialogue, to organize seminars and to develop new projects, all led by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. We believe the strength of the PRIO Cyprus Centre lies in its bi-communal teams of highly qualified project consultants, combined with the experience and expertise found at PRIO in Oslo. The Centre's projects will address crucial aspects of the 'Cyprus problem', aiming to stimulate public debate and, in the long term, reconciliation on the island.

The need for independent information is important in all societies, but especially so in conflict areas, where information is crucial if mutual understanding is to be reached and contradictory views held by involved parties overcome. When public debate is heated, as in Cyprus, input from NGOs and academic institutions provides an important contribution to informed public debate. This report is an attempt to address such a need for information.

In *Beyond Numbers*, Mete Hatay examines an issue of considerable political sensitivity: the subject of the Turkish 'settlers' of northern Cyprus. On both sides of the divided island of Cyprus, the issue of these Turkish 'settlers' is reflected in the media on an almost daily level. However, little actual research has been carried out on

this heterogeneous group. As a result, the debate that surrounds the ‘settlers’ is often marked by stereotypes and myths. In his report, the author highlights the diversity that exists among the ‘settlers’, and presents new and unexpected results concerning the voting patterns of the ‘settler’ communities.

We hope the report will stimulate both debate and further research on the topic.

Gina Lende
Centre Manager
PRIO Cyprus Centre

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE PRESENCE AND ROLE of Turkish immigrants – generally referred to as ‘settlers’ – in northern Cyprus constitute one of the most debated issues on the island. Yet, the issue – which, owing to its relation to Turkey’s Cyprus policy, inevitably has international ramifications – has to date attracted little attention among researchers. Consequently, we have only scant knowledge of this section of the population of northern Cyprus. In an attempt to remedy that situation, this report presents an inquiry into the political integration of the ‘settlers’ within Turkish-Cypriot politics: it looks at their political organization and orientation, and gauges the weight of their political influence. In addition, it compares the politics of the ‘settlers’ to the politics of Turkish Cypriots in general.

As a backdrop to the analysis, the report discusses conceptual problems attached to the ‘settler’ label, concluding that the variations present within this grouping warrant more fine-grained distinction. Several subcategories are identified, with the most important distinction for the purposes of the present report being that between citizens and non-citizens, as only the former enjoy the right to vote. It is proposed that the ‘settler’ label be restricted to the subcategory of ‘agricultural labour’, whose migration to the island formed part of a deliberate settlement policy pursued by both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot authorities following the partition of the island in 1974. Other Turkish nationals have since migrated to the island on their own initiative, acquiring citizenship through either naturalization or assisted naturalization (e.g. through marriage to Turkish Cypriots).

In addition to the categories of ‘settlers’ and immigrants – which both, by virtue of citizenship, enjoy the right to vote – northern Cyprus is also host to a large (non-voting) population of temporary residents of Turkish origin. These can be divided into five main groupings: registered workers (i.e. workers with work permits); non-registered workers (i.e. those without work permits); tourists; university students and lecturers; and Turkish army personnel (including conscripts and family members).

The report also addresses the ubiquitous question of the number of Turkish immigrants in northern Cyprus. It argues that widely used estimations based on the net balance of arrivals and departures combined with projections of Turkish-Cypriot birth rates are flawed. Such estimations fail to take account of the fact that the arrival–departure balance also includes temporary residents (e.g. students, migrant workers, tourists, etc.), along with TRNC citizens – irrespective of ethnic origin – who travel using Turkish travel documents, while excluding persons who may have arrived as

Turkish nationals and, having received TRNC citizenship, departed with TRNC travel documents. Estimations ranging from 117,000 to 130,000 are therefore grossly exaggerated.

Using census data from 1996, with updates and electoral lists as alternative and more authoritative measures, the report estimates that the total number of TRNC citizens of Turkish-mainland origin currently residing in northern Cyprus is between 32,000 and 35,000 plus offspring – that is, between 16.8% and 18.4% of the total number of citizens of the TRNC (190,000).

The total number of Turkish-originated temporary residents (non-citizens) is estimated (for 2005) at about 102,000, distributed as follows: registered workers (16,277); non-registered workers (30,000); tourists (1,695 on average at any particular time); university students (18,398) and lecturers (500); and Turkish army personnel, including conscripts and family members (35,000).

The report then outlines the political and electoral systems of the TRNC and summarizes the evolution of its political institutions. The main political parties are also introduced.

As an introduction to the analysis of the politics of voters originating from the Turkish mainland, the report discusses a number of associated methodological problems. Here, it is noted that the prevalent mixed settlement pattern does not allow for the separation of this section of the electorate from the electorate at large. Moreover, historical data are lacking. Nevertheless, examination of recent electoral lists allows for an estimation of the size of the Turkish-originated electorate. Of the total electorate in 2003 (143,754), at least 23,315 registered voters were identified as having been born in Turkey. This figure does not include 4,530 persons who were born in Cyprus to parents of Turkish-mainland origin. It also excludes 8,913 persons whose birthplace could not be determined owing to the fact that some geographical place names are used both in Cyprus and in Turkey.

The report then presents the results of an in-depth case-study of 26 villages almost exclusively inhabited by ‘settlers’ (according to the proposed definition) and their descendants. The electoral outcomes in these villages in all elections between 1981 and 2005 are examined and compared to the electoral outcomes in 53 villages almost exclusively inhabited by ‘native’ (Turkish-Cypriot) citizens.

The analysis shows that, until 1993, the majority of the electorate in the ‘settler villages’ voted for opposition parties – that is, against the party that had been in government since 1976, the National Unity Party (UBP). This majority divided its votes between ethnic ‘settler parties’, such as the Turkish Unity Party (TBP) and the New Birth Party (YDP), and mainstream opposition parties, such as the Democratic Populist Party (DHP), the Democratic Struggle Party (DMP), the Communal Liberation Party (TKP) and the Republican Turkish Party (CTP). For their part, the ‘native’ Turkish-Cypriot villages overwhelmingly supported the UBP. In the period after 1993, opposition ‘settler’ votes were increasingly directed at the Democratic Party (DP), which was founded in 1992 with the aim of ousting the UBP from government, while ethnic ‘settler’ parties vanished from the political arena. This

support remained constant until 2002, after which time the DP started losing ground in the 'settler villages'. Since the 2003 elections, the CTP vote in these villages has been on the rise (14% in 2003, and 22% in 2005).

The analysis also shows that, in the period 1990 to 2005, the UBP had a stable and substantial following in the 'settler villages' of about 40%. However, it did not achieve the kind of massive electoral victory in these villages that it achieved elsewhere, notably in the 'native villages'. A majority in the 'settler villages' consistently voted for parties other than the UBP. This was not the case in the 'native villages', which provided a higher share of their votes for the UBP than the 'settler villages' in all of the following elections: 1981, 1985, 1990 and 1998. The highest levels of support for the UBP from the 'native villages' came in the 1990 elections (55.8%). It is only in 1993 and after 2003, when the UBP lost ground in the 'native villages', that the party received more support in the 26 'settler villages' than in the 53 'native' ones. The analysis thus suggests that, contrary to prevalent assumptions, the UBP's grip on power for much of this period was maintained not by Turkish 'settlers' but by Turkish Cypriots themselves.

In addition, the analysis suggests that, in the elections held between 1981 and 1998, the 'settler' vote was determined largely by factors such as the social and economic problems peculiar to this group, mundane daily problems and local politics, rather than by ideology or national issues, such as the 'Cyprus problem'. Furthermore, the findings question the often made assumption pertaining to the influence of the government of Turkey on the votes of this section of the community. On several occasions, the outcome of the elections contrasted sharply with Ankara's preferences. In the 1990 elections, the majority of the 'settlers' voted against both the ruling UBP and the incumbent president Rauf Denktaş, both backed by Turkey. More recently, in the referendum on the Annan Plan that was held on 24 April 2004, a majority (56%) in the 'settler villages' voted 'no', while the Turkish government openly advocated a 'yes' vote.

ABBREVIATIONS

BDH	Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi (Peace and Democracy Movement)
BP	Bizim Party (Our Party)
ÇABP	Çözüm ve Avrupa Birliği Partisi (Solution and European Union Party)
CTP	Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party)
CTP-BG	Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi ve Birleşik Güçler (Republican Turkish Party and United Forces)
DHP	Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic Populist Party)
DMP	Demokratik Mücadele Partisi (Democratic Struggle Party)
DP	Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)
HP	Halkçı Parti (Populist Party)
KAP	Kıbrıs Adalet Partisi (Cyprus Justice Party)
MAP	Milliyetçi Adalet Partisi (Nationalist Justice Party)
MBP	Milliyetçi Barış Partisi (Nationalist Peace Party)
MHP	Milliyetçi Hedef Partisi (National Goal Party)
TBP	Türk Birliği Partisi (Turkish Unity Party)
TFSC	Turkish Federated State of Cyprus
TKP	Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi (Communal Liberation Party)
TKP/BKP	Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi ve Birleşik Kıbrıs Partisi (Communal Liberation Party and the United Cyprus Party)
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UBP	Ulusal Birlik Partisi (National Unity Party)
UDP	Ulusal Diriliş Partisi (National Revival Party)
YBH	Yurtsever Barış Hareketi (Patriotic Peace Movement)
YDP	Yeni Doğuş Partisi (New Birth Party)
YKP	Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi (New Cyprus Party)
YP	Yeni Parti (New Party)

INTRODUCTION

SINCE 1974, a substantial number of Turkish immigrants have settled in northern Cyprus. There has been much speculation about their numbers, and numerous negative stereotypes, suspicions, fears and myths are attached to the Turkish ‘settler population’ among both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Many Greek Cypriots take the position that the presence of these immigrants on the island is illegal and have demanded their repatriation as part of any reunification agreement. The ‘settlers’ are also perceived by many as a security threat. As Claire Palley, former constitutional consultant to the president of the Republic of Cyprus (1988–98), put it:

As the Greek Cypriot side pointed out, the majority of such persons were male and were well-trained Turkish Army reservists, so that, despite demilitarisation, Turkey would have an army in waiting in Cyprus, merely requiring air drops of equipment and some target practice.¹

‘Native’ Turkish Cypriots also harbour conflicting sentiments towards the Turkish immigrants. While some consider the latter an inseparable part of their community, others resent their presence on the island and are reluctant to embrace them as true Turkish Cypriots.²

The Turkish immigrants constitute a heterogeneous population, with varying degrees of attachment to the island and integration into the Turkish-Cypriot community. Many left Turkey when they were very young; others were born on the island. The long duration of their presence on the island means that many today have only weak links with Turkey and tend to identify themselves as Turkish Cypriots.

The debate on the ‘settlers’ issue has revolved around the issue of their numbers, more often than not failing to go beyond it. It has been argued by some that, by encouraging immigration from Turkey, the Turkish-Cypriot authorities and Turkey sought to change the demographic balance on the island, to distort the democratic will of the ‘indigenous’ Turkish Cypriots, and to strengthen the position of parties supporting the regime of Rauf Denктаş, which had no problems with sustained dependence on Turkey.³

Although ‘the settler issue’ features high on the agenda of public debate within both communities on the island – as well as in international pronouncements on the

¹ Palley (2005: 71).

² An (2002: 318–327).

³ Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus (1995).

‘Cyprus problem’ – to date there has been no systematic study of the ‘settler population’ and its political orientation. As a result, public debate related to the issue, along with local and international policies, has suffered from a lack of accurate information, and has therefore often been based on stereotypes and prejudices, rumours and myths. An attempt has thus been made in this report to redress that imbalance through a more systematic analysis founded on election statistics, demographic reports, interviews and newspaper articles.

After 1974, the ‘settler issue’ was added to the agenda of inter-communal peace negotiations. Various proposals relating to its solution have been discussed, but agreement has proven difficult.

It is a fact that people of Turkish-mainland origin form an important element of the ethnic diversity in northern Cyprus. Indeed, no draft proposal for a comprehensive Cyprus settlement (up to and including the so-called Annan Plan) has embraced the maximalist position of repatriation of all ‘settlers’. The criteria laid out in the Annan Plan, for example, would have enabled many of those today labelled as ‘settlers’ or ‘foreign elements’ to acquire either citizenship or permanent residence rights in a reunited Cyprus. According to the proposal, each side was to submit to the UN Secretary-General a list of 45,000 names that would include: (a) persons 18 years of age or older who enjoyed permanent residence in Cyprus for at least seven years before becoming 18 and for at least one year during the last five years, as well as their minor-age children who are permanent residents; and (b) other persons who have had permanent residence on Cyprus for at least seven consecutive years.

The fieldwork for this report was carried out between February 2004 and January 2005. The methods used include in-depth thematic interviews and regular conversations using an open-ended format. The study took place in the Yeni İskele and Famagusta districts, where the majority of the ‘settlers’ reside, as well as within the Turkish part of the walled city of Nicosia, which is inhabited mostly by workers from Turkey. Around 80 persons were interviewed for the study. Among them were several politicians (spanning the full range of political parties), an official from the State Planning Organization of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and individuals from relevant NGOs. Respondents were purposefully selected and were given the option of remaining anonymous.

The TRNC electoral list of 2003 was also used to determine the ‘ethno-demographic’ profile of the electorate. The 2003 electoral list provides detailed demographic information about each voter. For our purposes, the ‘place of birth’ and ‘address’ categories were the two most important variables in the list. The 2003 electoral list that was obtained from the High Electoral Council was transferred to the SPSS program, so that a detailed analysis could be carried out. At the first stage of this analysis, the entire population of voters was categorized according to place of birth.

This indicated that the total number of voters born in Turkey stood at 23,315.⁴ The analysis also enabled the identification of those villages that were populated exclusively by voters who may have been born either in Turkey or in Cyprus but whose parents were born in Turkey. Twenty-six such villages were found, with a total electoral population of 7,775. In the second stage of the analysis, the officially published results corresponding to those 26 villages were examined for general elections during the period 1981–2003, in order to identify the voting patterns of the populations of those villages, and in particular whether there was any indication of block or ‘ethnic’ voting.

⁴ One particular difficulty encountered here was that the same place names are sometimes found in both Cyprus and Turkey. Because of this, it was not possible to decide whether the birthplaces of some 8,913 persons were actually in Turkey or in Cyprus. This group, categorized as ‘unknown’, is not included in the figure of 23,315.

SETTLERS, IMMIGRANTS AND TEMPORARY RESIDENTS

THE DEBATE ON THE COMPLEX ISSUE of ‘Turkish settlers’ (who prefer to refer to themselves rather as ‘Turkish refugees’ or ‘northern refugees’ – *kuzeyli göçmen* in Turkish)¹ is marred by propaganda, lack of data and a concurrent, pronounced tendency among participants to disregard available information when it contradicts conventional wisdoms.

Significantly, the debate often fails to distinguish between *temporary residents* and *citizens* of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).² Of these, of course, only the latter (by virtue of their TRNC citizenship) have voting rights. Furthermore, in the group consisting of TRNC citizens, further distinction needs to be made between those who came to the island in the early years after partition as part of a joint Turkish/Turkish-Cypriot settlement policy (and who, were it not for the term’s dehumanizing connotations within the Cypriot context, could therefore with relatively good reason be called ‘settlers’) and those, more substantial in number, who immigrated on an individual basis later or were born on the island to families in which

¹ It should be noted that the Turkish term *göçmen* has a double meaning: it can be used to designate both a refugee and/or an immigrant

² The TRNC was proclaimed as an independent secular republic on 15 November 1983. However, the TRNC has failed to gain international recognition from any country other than Turkey, and the UN Security Council pronounced its proclamation in 1983 invalid and called upon member-states ‘not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus’ (Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, 1997). Since the TRNC has not achieved international recognition, neither the TRNC’s government nor its parliament are seen as legal entities internationally, and are instead regarded as subservient to the Turkish ‘occupation’ authorities. Consequently, the only state to recognize the validity and legitimacy of the TRNC and its political institutions (along with elections to those bodies) is the one that the rest of the world views as an illegal occupying power. Meanwhile, the only internationally recognized political administration on the island is that of the Republic of Cyprus, which was established as a bi-communal partnership state upon the island’s independence from Britain in 1960. Hence, although the government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise *de facto* control over the northern part of the island, its *de jure* jurisdiction encompasses the island as a whole. The Greek-Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus also enjoys international recognition as the representative of the Turkish-Cypriot community, despite the absence (since December 1963) of the constitutionally mandated Turkish-Cypriot representation in its executive and legislative bodies, along with the non-participation of the Turkish-Cypriot community in elections to those institutions.

either both parents are from mainland Turkey or one is from Turkey and the other is Turkish Cypriot.³ Such distinctions are important, as they can be expected to influence the identity and loyalties of individuals, including the degree of their attachment to the island of Cyprus.

Non-Citizen Residents

To determine how many mainland Turkish nationals have come to Cyprus since 1974, we might begin by examining figures for the numbers of arrivals and departures of Turkish nationals since that time (see Table 1.1). This exercise produces a positive net balance of 84,591 (as of 31 December 2000).⁴ This is the figure that many have used, in combination with an estimated birth rate, to determine the number of 'settlers' in northern Cyprus (such estimates range from 117,000 to 130,000). However, the error in such calculations is obvious: the figure of 84,591 does not reveal the actual number of Turkish nationals who have settled in Cyprus on a permanent basis since 1974, because it also includes tourists, other visitors, students and seasonal workers, as well as non-registered workers and their families. Consequently, it cannot be used as an indicator of the total population of 'settlers' in the TRNC.

A further difficulty with the figure is that it is likely to also include 'native' Turkish Cypriots who have used Turkish passports to travel abroad. (Since passports issued by the TRNC cannot be used to travel abroad, except to Turkey, the USA and the UK, Turkish Cypriots have been allowed to use Turkish passports for international travel.) Moreover, the figures do not take into account individuals who arrived as Turkish nationals but, after receiving TRNC citizenship, departed with TRNC travel documents.

Using statistics from the Labour and Education authorities of the TRNC, it is possible to divide Turkish nationals who are not citizens of the TRNC but may be present in northern Cyprus at any given moment into five main categories:

- workers with work permits (16,277 plus their families);
- workers without work permits (estimated at 20,000–30,000 plus their families);
- tourists (annual average per day is 1,695);
- students and lecturers (18,398 students and around 500 teaching staff);⁵
- Turkish army personnel, with families and conscripts (35,000).

³ Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have acted jointly to bolster the population of the north, both by welcoming settlers from the Turkish mainland and through efforts to create a viable economy in northern Cyprus independent of the Greek-Cypriot south; see Bahçeli (1990: 111).

⁴ Since 2000, no distinctions have been made in the lists of arrivals in the *TRNC Statistical Yearbook* regarding country of origin. This makes it impossible to discover the arrival and departure figures for Turkish nationals.

⁵ These figures are for the year 2005 (TRNC State Planning Follow-Up Coordination Department, private communication).

Table 1.1. Arrivals and Departures in the TRNC, 1974–2000*

Year	Arrivals	Departures	Balance
1974	5,573	4,193	1,380
1975	73,831	51,465	22,366
1976	83,440	80,347	3,093
1977	108,016	97,142	10,874
1978	104,738	103,128	1,610
1979	95,115	92,956	2,159
1980	69,808	68,727	1,081
1981	62,660	63,913	-1,253
1982	65,018	66,166	-1,148
1983	78,649	76,386	2,263
1984	93,333	90,403	2,980
1985	103,698	102,754	944
1986	105,729	105,492	237
1987	147,965	†	-4,514
1988	173,351	169,501	3,850
1989	214,566	209,837	4,729
1990	243,269	241,764	1,505
1991	179,379	178,770	609
1992	210,178	209,045	1,133
1993	281,370	281,160	210
1994	256,549	252,813	3,736
1995	298,026	291,058	6,968
1996	289,131	286,691	2,440
1997	326,364	321,208	5,156
1998	315,797	†	7,227
1999	334,400	†	5,795
2000	347,712	†	-789
TOTAL			84,591

* This table was extracted from a more extensive table in a report prepared in November 2002 by the Demographic Statistics Division of the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus (2002: 7). That report was based on a demographic analysis of the Statistical Service's most recent data as of the end of 2001. The sources used were official data of the Republic of Cyprus and data published by the TRNC authorities. It is important to note that the Republic of Cyprus based its statistics on information prepared by the TRNC authorities.

† Figures missing in the original table.

Workers with Work Permits

According to the TRNC Ministry of Labour, in March 2005 the number of registered mainland Turkish nationals working in northern Cyprus stood at 16,277 (see note 13 on p. 9). The law in the TRNC requires that any person who wishes to obtain a permit to work in northern Cyprus must go through a number of procedures, including health and security checks. In addition, only those who entered northern Cyprus with a passport are entitled to apply for a work permit; persons who arrive with only an identity card may not apply for a work or resident permit.⁶

The majority of these registered workers are employed in tourism (hotels, casinos and restaurants), industry, banks, universities and other sectors requiring skilled labour. With the exception of the state-owned hotels (three hotels, with a total of 650 beds), almost 90% of those currently employed in the hotel sector are from Turkey (many with work permits). The total immigrant labour force in the hotel sector is estimated at 4,000, of whom about 3,500 are believed to be Turkish nationals.⁷

Workers Without Work Permits: Non-Registered Workers

The expression 'non-registered workers' refers to mainland Turkish nationals who come to the island to find work but do not find it expedient to register with the labour office. This population is generally seasonal and has a high turnover. However, a significant number of workers bring their families and remain for long periods without fulfilling any of the labour office's criteria.⁸

No research has been carried out to establish the numbers involved, but a report written in 2000 stated that there were approximately 21,000 persons in this category.⁹ However, a recent boom in the construction industry and tourism sector may have increased that figure to around 30,000.¹⁰

Fieldwork carried out for this report within the walled city of Nicosia and other areas indicates that the majority of non-registered workers hail from the Hatay region of Turkey (near Turkey's border with Syria) as well as some districts of southeastern Turkey. Many have Kurdish (*Kırmança*) or Arabic as their mother tongue. Most are Sunni Muslims, although a significant number are also Alevites. They constitute a cheap labour source, working mainly on construction sites, at petrol stations, in the catering industry, as domestic servants, and as gardeners. They live and work under such primitive conditions that it would not be far-fetched to describe them as modern 'slaves'.¹¹

⁶ For further information, see the Law To Amend the Aliens and Immigration Law of the TRNC (Law No. 32/2004).

⁷ Author interview with Bayram Karaman, President of the Tourism Workers Union, 4 April 2005.

⁸ During my fieldwork, I came across many such cases.

⁹ Güray (2000).

¹⁰ According to a statement made by TRNC Minister of the Interior Özkan Murat; see *Kıbrıs*, 5 May 2005, p. 8.

¹¹ They tend to live in urban areas or on the construction sites where they are employed. In Nicosia, those who have come to the island without their families tend to reside in hostels within the

Recently, in 2005, the TRNC government has sought to regularize the situation with regard to unregistered workers through domestic legislation and the signing of a protocol with Turkey that makes it compulsory for those wishing to come from Turkey to work to enter the island using passports rather than identity cards. Once granted entry, workers are obliged to obtain a work permit within three months or be deported.¹² According to the new legislation, anyone who has not applied for and received a work permit (or a residence permit in the case of family members) by 1 July 2005 will be fined 66 New Turkish Lira (equivalent to about 28 pounds sterling) for every day in Cyprus after the expiry of his/her entry visa (the duration of which is three months).¹³ Some of the opposition parties, however, oppose the idea of registering these individuals: they fear that such a move will give the latter legal claims to stay on the island, and that they may then acquire citizenship through naturalization and serve as part of the constituency for the parties that helped them to stay.

Tourists

The tourism industry in northern Cyprus has a bed capacity of 13,000. The annual occupancy rate is around 40% (2004), which equals 5,200 persons per day. The number of Turkish-mainland tourists who stayed in the hotels of the TRNC in 2004 was 162,790, and the average duration of their stays was 3.8 days. Accordingly, there were on average 1,695 Turkish-mainland tourists on the island on any given day.¹⁴ It is important to note that the arrival and departure data presented in Table 1.1 (above) end on 31 December 2000. Thus, the figures may be somewhat misleading: they include a significant number of incoming tourists for the New Year celebrations that

walled city, often sleeping up to 20 people in one room. In Güzeyurt, during the orange-picking season, workers live in nylon tents within the plantations. In Kyrenia and Famagusta, they live on construction sites and in workers hostels. Some are forced to sleep on the ground. They can even be seen sleeping after hours on chairs in restaurants where they work. Those who come with their families tend to stay in derelict and often dangerous old buildings. Commonly, four or five families reside together. Their children are permitted to attend school. According to one teacher, around 80% of the children at Nicosia's Atatürk primary school are children of unregistered workers. Despite their unregistered status, such workers and their families are afforded free but basic medical treatment, though prolonged treatment is not provided. Relations with the local population are often strained, with Turkish workers often being made the scapegoats for all sorts of crimes. They are often the targets of police raids aimed at finding the culprits of petty crimes. Individuals who stay on the island for longer periods often set up their own unregistered workplaces, such as garages, barbershops and small businesses. These people are generally also resented by the 'settlers', who both share the general population's views of unregistered workers and regard them as a threat to their own job prospects.

¹² Statement by Minister of Interior Özkan Murat; see *Kıbrıs*, 4 May 2005.

¹³ Between 1 and 7 July 2005, as many as 10,000 persons are reported to have left the island, many with their families, while the number of registered workers had increased from 16,277 in March 2005 to 23,000 by 7 July 2005.

¹⁴ This figure is calculated by multiplying the number of tourists from the Turkish mainland who visited Cyprus in 2004 by the average duration of their stays, and then dividing the result by the number of days in the year.

year, but fail to show their departure. A better picture might have been possible had the data ended not on 31 December but 1 or 2 January. The number of Turkish mainland tourists staying in the hotels of the TRNC on 31 December 2004 was 6,798.¹⁵

Students and Lecturers

North Cyprus has five universities and 30,605 students (expected to reach 45,000 – nearly one-fourth of the TRNC's population – when certain facilities are completed), 20,683 of whom are non-Cypriots, mainly from Turkey (18,398).¹⁶ University education is a key part of the economy, and educational establishments on Cyprus provide job opportunities for many academics from Turkey. Students and academics constitute a significant proportion of the temporary residents in the TRNC. They usually reside in the student or staff hostels of the universities or in rented houses in the urban areas.

Turkish Army Personnel with Their Families and Conscripts

Since 1974, a contingent of Turkish troops has been stationed in northern Cyprus. The contingent consists of army personnel (officers) and conscripts. The former usually bring their families for the duration of their service in Cyprus, which generally lasts for two years. Their exact number fluctuates, but is estimated at around 35,000. It should be noted that the arrivals and departures of officers and soldiers are registered separately; they do not appear in the regular arrival and departure lists.

Citizens

TRNC citizenship is acquired in three ways: by birth, when one of the parents is a TRNC citizen, or through naturalization. In addition, individuals who are deemed to be 'of benefit to the state' can be awarded citizenship by government decree. Turkish nationals who currently hold TRNC citizenship can be divided into four main groups, according to their status when they arrived in the TRNC:

- white-collar workers, technical staff and skilled workers;
- soldiers and their families;
- agricultural labourers; and
- persons who migrated on an individual basis.

¹⁵ Ministry of Tourism, direct communication, February 2005.

¹⁶ See TRNC State Planning Follow-Up Coordination Department, *Economic and Social Indicators 2003*, Nicosia, December 2004.

White-Collar Workers, Technical Staff and Skilled Labour

Immediately after the 1974 war and the partition of the island, some non-military Turkish nationals began arriving to assist in reconstructing the infrastructure of the Turkish Cypriot/Turkish-controlled areas of the island. These were mainly workers and administrators who came to fix or build communication and transportation networks, electricity plants and the like. Some of them were also involved in capacity-building: they helped instruct and train both local people and Turkish-Cypriot refugees from the southern part of the island in tourism, textile manufacture, agriculture and other industries.¹⁷ After the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) in 1975, those of these early immigrants who still remained were offered citizenship and allowed to bring their families.¹⁸ Some accepted the offer and became part of the population of the newly founded TFSC.¹⁹ They mainly live in mixed neighbourhoods in urban areas and are often married to Turkish Cypriots.

Soldiers and Their Families

Following the adoption of a resolution by the Council of Ministers of the TFSC concerning its Citizenship Law,²⁰ the extended families (wives, children, parents and siblings) of 498 Turkish soldiers killed during the 1974 war became eligible for TFSC citizenship.²¹ However, most of the latter chose not to come to Cyprus. The same provision of the Citizenship Law allowed former members of the Turkish 'Peace Forces'²² and all Turkish soldiers who had served in Cyprus up until 18 August 1974 to become citizens. It is well known that some officers chose to live in Cyprus after their retirement.²³ All of these military personnel were allocated homes and other fixed property (from properties abandoned by Greek-Cypriot refugees). There presently exists a Turkish Army Veterans Association with around 1,200 active members, the majority of whom are married to Turkish Cypriots (75%).²⁴

¹⁷ There were altogether 60,000 Turkish-Cypriot refugees (some from the 1960s).

¹⁸ Ioannides (1991: 28–31).

¹⁹ In February 1975, the provisional Turkish-Cypriot administration declared itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), although it stated that its intention was to move toward a federal solution with the Greek Cypriots and pledged not to seek recognition as an independent state. In October 1983, when UN efforts toward a settlement had reached a stalemate, Turkish Cypriots renamed their state the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and sought international recognition.

²⁰ TFSC Citizenship Law Act No. 3/1975 (the Citizenship Law of 1975 was amended in 1993 by Law No. 25/1993).

²¹ Günsev (2004: 195–212).

²² The Turkish troops in the intervention of 1974. All ranks were included.

²³ Some of these retired officers set up businesses or became managers of state-run enterprises for a short period. Very few of them, though, ended up settling permanently in northern Cyprus.

²⁴ Author's interview with Dr Nuri Çevikel, then president of the Turkish Immigrants Association, September 2003.

Agricultural Labourers

The greater part of the immigrant population from Turkey who currently work in the agricultural sector is made up of former farmers in Anatolia. Having begun to arrive on the island in February 1975, they now constitute a large group among the Turkish nationals in northern Cyprus. The majority came to Cyprus between 1975 and 1977 from the regions around Trabzon (East Black Sea), Antalya, Mersin, Adana (Southern Turkey), Çarşamba, Samsun (West Black Sea), Konya (Central Anatolia) and southeastern Turkey. According to the Ministry of Interior of the TRNC, between 1974 and 1981, a total of 21,851 citizenships were offered to Turkish nationals, the largest part of which was to these early ‘settlers’.²⁵ It is known, however, that a significant number of those eligible did not take up TRNC citizenship and returned to Turkey.

Most of these agricultural immigrants were from regions in Turkey where the living conditions were difficult. For example, the people who currently inhabit the village of Kayalar in the Kyrenia district of Cyprus came from Çarşamba, a district in northwest Turkey. When a dam was built that flooded their village, they were offered a choice between being resettled in another part of Turkey or in Cyprus. Some chose to come to Cyprus and were given the Kayalar village as their new home. Some of the older people of the village who were interviewed insisted that they did not know where Cyprus was before they actually arrived on the island. Many such stories can be cited. Indeed, Christos Ionnides, who wrote a book on Cyprus in which he referred to ‘settlers’ as colonizers, agrees that the people who came or were brought to Cyprus by Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot authorities had no political motivations for coming:

Cyprus has certain relevance for settlers whose relatives were killed during the invasion and for retired officers and demobilized soldiers who served in Cyprus and later settled here. For the Anatolian farmers, however, Cyprus has no particular meaning. It is quite plausible that a substantial number of them had little or no clear idea of where Cyprus was located before their departure from Turkey. This could be particularly true with regard to farmers coming from central, eastern or northern Turkey.²⁶

These farmers were recruited through the consulates of the TFSC in Turkey. Radio announcements informed the Turkish population that individuals who wished to go to Cyprus as agricultural workers should apply to the consulates of the TFSC. Similar announcements were made in Turkish village coffee-shops by *muhtars*.²⁷ Once their applications had been approved, volunteers were transferred to the port of Mersin by specially arranged buses. One passport was issued per family. After a short journey by ferryboat to Cyprus, the immigrants were put up briefly in empty schools or hostels in Famagusta and taken from there to the abandoned Greek-Cypriot villages in which

²⁵ See Appendix I.

²⁶ Ioannides (1991: 28–48).

²⁷ The *muhtar* is the elected administrative authority in a village, the village head.

they were to settle.²⁸ The houses were distributed among the families by lot. Farmland was also distributed on the basis of the number of persons in each household. Households with five members received between 100 and 150 donums. For each extra child, there was a 10% increment, but this was not to exceed 50% of the original land allocation.²⁹ For many years (until 1995), ‘settlers’ were not granted title deeds to these properties, however.³⁰ It has been suggested that this was because the Turkish-Cypriot government feared that most of the Turkish ‘settlers’ would then put their properties up for sale and return to Turkey with the proceeds.³¹

Persons Who Migrated on an Individual Basis

After 1974, links between northern Cyprus and Turkey were strengthened. As part of this process, many Turks also came to northern Cyprus on their own initiative, seeking work or engaging in trade. According to the Citizenship Law of 1992, anyone who has remained legitimately on the island for five years or more was entitled to citizenship, though the five-year requirement could be waived for those deemed by the Council of Ministers to be ‘of benefit to the state’. Opposition parties often noted that there was a tendency for the number of those deemed ‘beneficial’ to rise prior to elections.³² The sum total of individuals remaining on the island also increased from 1990 onwards, owing to a number of students from Turkey who remained on the island once their studies were completed, many of them marrying local Turkish Cypriots. Similarly, many Turkish Cypriots who went to study in Turkey married there and returned to Cyprus with their spouses.

How Many Are They? (How Many Mainland Turks with TRNC Citizenship Reside on the Island?)

Of the 53,000 persons who were declared eligible for citizenship between 1975 and 2003, 45,689 were of Turkish-mainland origin; 4,650 were second- and third-generation Cypriot descendants born abroad; 1,094 were from Bulgaria;³³ and 1,825 were from third countries (see Appendix I).³⁴ It should be emphasized that many of those who received TRNC citizenship have since left the island, so the number of new

²⁸ Interviews with the villagers in Bahçeli, Kayalar and Kaplıca (September 2004–March 2005).

²⁹ Morvaridi (1993).

³⁰ After an amendment to the Resettlement, Land Distribution and Equivalent Property Law in 1995, the ‘settlers’ were allowed to apply for the title deeds for the properties they were currently using (No. 52/1995 amendment).

³¹ Morvaridi (1993).

³² See *Kıbrıs*, 8 October 2003; *Kıbrıs*, 9 October 2003.

³³ The vast majority of the Bulgarian immigrants were political asylum-seekers who arrived in the late 1980s or early 1990s after fleeing the repression of the Zhivkov regime.

³⁴ This includes persons from Romania, Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Pakistan, the Turkic states of Central Asia, and some EU countries.

citizenships cannot be used directly to ascertain the number of ‘settlers’ today. An example of this is provided by 24 families of Kurdish origin who settled in the village of Dipkarpaz in the late 1970s, gained citizenship during the 1980s, and in 1996 sought political asylum in the UK.³⁵ According to a report prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, in 1996, during a meeting with the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, the British High Commissioner in Nicosia raised the issue of the increasing number of TRNC passport-holders seeking asylum in the UK. Among those asylum-seekers were included Turkish ‘settlers’.³⁶

The most recent TRNC census (conducted in 1996) found that there were 55,000 permanent and temporary residents of Turkish origin in the TRNC.³⁷ Of those, only 24,000 held TRNC citizenship, which is a requirement for the right to vote in elections (in addition, one must be 18 years of age or older). A more recent analysis, conducted by the CTP party newspaper *Yenidüzen* ahead of the December 2003 election, offers a picture of the ethnic makeup of the Turkish-Cypriot citizenry (with no regard for those who are not citizens).³⁸ The analysis showed that, of an estimated citizen population of 182,000 (the final list was slightly higher):

- 120,302 (66.1%) were born in Cyprus and were of Cypriot descent;³⁹
- 32,396 (17.8%) were born in Turkey;
- 25,662 (14.1%) were born in Cyprus to parents who were either born in Turkey or are of mixed Turkish/Turkish-Cypriot origins;
- 3,094 (1.7%) were Turkish Cypriots born in a third country (UK, Canada, Australia, etc.); and
- 546 (0.3%) were of Bulgarian-Turkish origin.

³⁵ The information was obtained during an interview with a local resident in Dipkarpaz village.

³⁶ See <http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/cyprus/cypt-immigr.htm>.

³⁷ See Statistics and Research Department of the State Planning Organization of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, *Census of Population: Social and Economic Characteristics of Population, December 15, 1996*, Nicosia, July 1999.

³⁸ Taseli (2003).

³⁹ In 1974, the number of Turkish Cypriots stood at around 118,000. This figure is a strong corroboration of Turkish-Cypriot emigration, which has been taking place since 1974. The average growth rate of the Greek-Cypriot community since 1974 was around 40%. If it is assumed that similar growth occurred among the Turkish Cypriots, their numbers should have risen to 165,000 by 2004. So, it can easily be assumed that, since 1974, at least 40,000 Turkish Cypriots migrated overseas.

THE POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The Political System in the TRNC

ITS DISPUTED INTERNATIONAL STATUS notwithstanding, the TRNC has served as the framework for the exercise of the political rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community since 1983,¹ and the elections that took place on 20 February 2005 were the sixth parliamentary elections to be held since the proclamation of the state.²

The TRNC is a unitary state with a mixed presidential–parliamentary system. Its political system thus differs from that of the Republic of Cyprus, which has a presidential system of government. The president of the TRNC is elected directly by the people for a five-year term of office. He or she first appoints the prime minister from among the deputies in the legislature and then appoints other ministers in accordance with the recommendations of the prime minister. The subsequent cabinet – the Council of Ministers – has to be approved by a majority within the national Legislative Assembly. This Legislative Assembly of 50 members is elected in general parliamentary elections every five years.

Presidential candidates must fulfil the following requirements:

- they must be qualified to be elected as a deputy to the Legislative Assembly (see p. 20 below);
- they must have received higher education;
- they must be at least 35 years of age;
- both parents must be Turkish;
- they must be a citizen of the TRNC;
- they must have resided in ‘Cyprus’ (*sic*) for a minimum of five years immediately preceding the elections.³

¹ The constitution of the TRNC was adopted on 12 March 1985 and approved in a referendum held on 5 May 1985. It was carried with a 70.2% ‘yes’ vote (against 29.8% voting ‘no’). The number of votes cast was 91,810, which represented 78.3% of those eligible to vote.

² Elections were held in 1985, 1990, 1991 (by-elections), 1993 (early elections), 1998, 2003 and 2005. In 1990, the elected members of two parties (CTP, TKP) of the opposition alliance DMP (Demokratik Mücadele Partisi/Democratic Struggle Party, consisting of the CTP, the TKP and the YDP) refused to take their seats in the National/Legislative Assembly, claiming that there had been irregularities during the elections. They also boycotted the subsequent by-elections for the vacant seats in 1991. In 1993, early elections were called after the resignation of nine UBP deputies, who subsequently went on to form the Democratic Party (DP).

In addition to the Council of Ministers, the TRNC also has a Security Council, whose role is to assist the Council of Ministers with regard to security policy.⁴

As noted above, the unicameral TRNC Legislative Assembly is composed of 50 deputies, elected on a five-year ticket. Legislative control over the executive is secured through the requirement that the government must obtain a vote of confidence before it can be installed in office. Under certain extraordinary circumstances, the president can dissolve the legislature and call fresh elections.

Before assuming their duties, deputies take the following oath:

I do swear upon my honour and dignity that I shall preserve the existence and independence of the State, the indivisibility of the homeland and its people and the unconditional sovereignty of the people; that I shall be bound by the principle of the supremacy of law and by the principles of a democratic secular and social State under the rule of law and the principles of Atatürk; that I shall work for the welfare and happiness of my people; that I shall not depart from the ideal that every citizen must benefit from human rights and fundamental rights and liberties, and that I shall remain loyal to the Constitution. (TRNC Constitution, Article 82)

Turkish-Cypriot Political Parties

Background

Both prior to and since independence, politics in Cyprus has always been a communal affair, with parties and the electorate predominantly organized along ethno-national lines.⁵ This system was entrenched in the 1960 constitution, which was drafted along

³ See Article 99 of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

⁴ The TRNC's Security Council is composed of the president of the Legislative Assembly, the prime minister, the ministers of interior, foreign affairs and defence, and the commander of the armed forces and the police, under the chairmanship of the president (TRNC Constitution, Article 111). The military presence in the Council, its non-elected nature and the requirement that its decisions are to 'receive priority consideration by the Council of Ministers' are, of course, derogations from a democratic point of view. Another structural democratic shortcoming of the state is that the TRNC police are not accountable to the Ministry of the Interior or any other elected body. Instead, they are under the command of the head of the Turkish-Cypriot security forces, who reports to the commander of the resident Turkish-mainland forces, who in turn reports directly to the chief of staff in Ankara.

⁵ Until the formation of a Turkish trade union federation (in 1943), some Turkish Cypriots had been members of the early labour unions, with links to the island's communist party. The communist party AKEL (founded in 1941, but with roots in the communist movement of the 1920s) initially – and with some small degree of success – set out to organize on a cross-community basis. As the idea of *enosis* (union with Greece) gained in popularity, however, AKEL felt increasingly obliged to rally behind Greek-Cypriot national demands, forfeiting in the process the prospect of Turkish-Cypriot support. For an account of the communist movement's relationship with the Turkish-Cypriot community, see Adams (1971).

consociational lines. The constitution of the Republic of Cyprus provided for separate electoral lists, whereby voters in each community could only elect representatives who belonged to their particular community.⁶

The existence of Turkish-Cypriot political parties thus preceded the island's partition in 1974.⁷ It was only with the establishment of the Turkish-Cypriot Federated State in 1975, however, that the political life of the Turkish Cypriots found expression in a separate political system. For several years after the breakdown of the power-sharing regime in December 1963, neither community was able to exercise its democratic rights.⁸

Turkish-Cypriot politics in the post-1974 period have been dominated by four parties: the UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi/National Unity Party), the CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi/Republican Turkish Party), the TKP (Toplumçu Kurtuluş Partisi/Communal Liberation Party) and – a more recent addition – the DP (Demokrat Parti/Democratic Party). In the 2003 elections, a significant input was also made by the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH), which incorporated the TKP under its umbrella but then formally became a party in its own right.

The National Unity Party (UBP)

A conservative party, the UBP was founded in 1975. It has controlled the government for most of the period since then, sometimes in coalition with other parties (most recently with the TKP in 1998–2001 and with the DP in 2001–03). President Rauf R. Denktaş (who in recent years has had no formal party affiliation) was among the party's founding members and its first chairman. Since 1983, however, the party has been led by Derviş Eroğlu, the only candidate who was able to mount a serious challenge to Denktaş in presidential elections during the Denktaş period. (After 20 years as president, Denktaş chose not to run in the April 2005 elections, in which the reformist Mehmet Ali Talat was elected president.)

The UBP's support has been consistently high: at times (in 1976 and again in 1990) reaching above 50% of the votes. Subsequent splits – most notably the formation of the DP in 1992 – have encroached on its traditional constituency. Splitting the conservative vote with the DP in 1993 (with the UBP attracting 29.8% and the DP 29.2%), the UBP made a strong but temporary comeback in the 1998 elections,

⁶ See Articles 1 and 62–63 of the adopted Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1959).

⁷ There is a dearth of published material on Turkish-Cypriot politics and political parties, particularly for those who do not read Turkish. The best introduction to various aspects of Turkish-Cypriot society (political, economic and social) in the post-1974 period is a volume edited by Clement Dodd (1993a). An overview of the various political parties – unfortunately somewhat dated – can be found in Soysal (1992). For statistical data pertaining to elections, we must refer to reports published by the TRNC State Planning Organization and the website www.cm.gov.nc.tr.

⁸ The Greek-Cypriot community held parliamentary elections again in 1970, by which time Turkish-Cypriot participation in the political life of the Republic of Cyprus had ceased. To exercise their voting rights, Turkish Cypriots then had to wait until 1976, when elections to the parliament of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus were held.

securing 40.4% of the votes, nearly twice as many as the second largest party, the DP (which received 22.6% of the votes).

In the December 2003 elections, the UBP was challenged, though less successfully, by another breakaway grouping: the MBP (*Milliyetçi Barış Partisi/Nationalist Peace Party*), formed in July 2003. One of the MBP's two leaders, Ertuğrul Hasipoğlu, had two years earlier mounted an unsuccessful challenge to Derviş Eroğlu for the leadership of the UBP. In the December 2003 elections – and for the first time in its history – the UBP (with 32.9% of the votes) lost its position as the largest party.

In the period leading up to the referendum of 24 April 2004, the UBP conducted a 'no' campaign against the Annan Plan. It thus found itself, for the first time, openly at odds with the policies of the Turkish government, which backed the Annan Plan. Despite this, and despite being out of power, it managed to hold on to its position as the second-largest party in the parliamentary elections of February 2005.

The Republican Turkish Party (CTP)

Founded in 1970, the CTP is the oldest of the Turkish-Cypriot parties. It has a traditionally left-wing socialist orientation, though it now espouses the market economy and caters to a predominantly white-collar constituency. The party is currently led by Ferdi Sabit Soyer, who took over from Mehmet Ali Talat following the latter's election as president in April 2005. With the exception of a brief period in the mid-1990s (the party formed a coalition government with the DP in 1993–96) and the period since 2003, the CTP has been an opposition party.

For a long time, the CTP maintained close links with its 'comrades and compatriots' in the Greek-Cypriot communist party AKEL (*Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou/Progressive Party of the Working People*). However, during the 1990s, relations between the two became increasingly strained. For AKEL, the CTP's willingness in the mid-1990s to abandon its position as an opposition party and enter into the government of what Greek Cypriots in general see as a 'pseudo-state' on 'Turkish-occupied territories' – and, moreover, in coalition with the adamantly pro-Denktaş DP – was hard to stomach. The CTP had similar digestive difficulties when AKEL formed a coalition government with the right-wing DIKO (*Dimokratiko Komma/Democratic Party*), led by Tassos Papadopoulos, following the latter's election as president of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2003.

The CTP suffered a serious electoral setback in the 1998 elections, when its share of the vote fell from 24.2% in 1993 to 13.4%. It regained some ground in the local elections in 2002, but the real turnaround in its fortunes came in the following year. The CTP contested the December 2003 elections under the umbrella of CTP–BG (*Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi–Birleşik Güçler/Republican Turkish Party–United Forces*), which emerged triumphant as the largest party, winning 35.2% of the votes.

Following the victory of the 'yes' campaign on the Turkish-Cypriot side in the April 2004 referendum, in which the CTP played a leading role, the party won 44% of the votes in the February 2005 parliamentary elections, securing 24 out of the 50 seats in the

legislature. However, its biggest victory came in the presidential elections in April 2005, when 55% of the valid votes went to the party's leader at the time, Mehmet Ali Talat.

The Communal Liberation Party (TKP) and the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH)

The TKP was established in 1976 as a social democratic party. Between 1987 and 2001, the party was led by Mustafa Akıncı, who – in a rare example of inter-ethnic cooperation after 1974 – as mayor of the Turkish-Cypriot municipality in Nicosia, worked with his Greek-Cypriot counterpart to establish and implement the Nicosia Master Plan, involving joint projects such as the restoration of the medieval walls of the capital city and a common sewage system.

The TKP had its heydays in the early 1980s, when it was for a while the largest opposition party. In the 1981 parliamentary elections, it attracted 28.5% of the votes. Such results have not been equalled since: until recently, the party's electoral support remained steady at 13–15%.

After the 1998 election, the TKP (with 15.4% of the votes) entered into a coalition government with the right-wing UBP: a cooperation with precedent in the 1980s (1985–87). This coalition came to an abrupt end in 2001, when the TKP leader publicly fell out with a Turkish general and his party's position in government lost the blessing of Ankara, crucial for any Turkish-Cypriot government.

The TKP contested the December 2003 elections under the umbrella of a newly formed movement, the BDH (Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi/Peace and Democracy Movement), under the leadership of Mustafa Akıncı himself. The BDH – made up of political parties, trade unions and representatives of civil society – aimed to mobilize support both among the traditional following of the TKP and beyond. However, attracting only 13.1% of votes, the BDH ended up failing even to reach the level of the TKP vote in the 1998 elections.

After the December 2003 elections, the TKP (under the leadership of Hüseyin Angolemlı) and two other small parties split away from the BDH. The latter then transformed itself into a political party under the leadership of Akıncı. In the February 2005 election, the TKP won no seats and was excluded from parliament for the first time since its establishment in 1976. The BDH received 5.5% of the votes and a single seat in the legislature.

The Democratic Party (DP)

The DP was founded in 1992. Like most other recent (but less influential) additions to the Turkish-Cypriot political landscape, the DP originated in a breakaway from the UBP. In 1993, the DP merged with a party formed by immigrants from Turkey, the Yeni Doğu Partisi (New Birth Party). The DP is led by Serdar Denktaş, one of its founding members, who is the son of former TRNC president Rauf R. Denktaş. It is no secret that Denktaş senior yields considerable influence within the party and has even favoured it over his own former party, the UBP.

All the same, the DP's support has been in decline ever since the first elections it contested in 1993, when it received 29.2% of the votes. In the 1998 elections, its share fell to 22.6%. In the December 2003 elections, it received only 12.9% of votes cast and was one of the election's biggest losers. In February 2005, however, the DP, like the UBP, managed to maintain its share of the votes in the previous election.

The Electoral System

Elections for the Legislative Assembly are held every five years. Citizens above 25 years of age are eligible to stand as candidates, provided that they have resided in northern Cyprus for three years and, in the case of male candidates, have completed their military service.⁹

The electoral law provides for universal suffrage of adults over the age of 18. Voting is not compulsory, but turnout for elections is generally high, frequently exceeding 80%. Despite weariness among the public, which had been called to the ballot boxes three times within the space of one year, voters again turned up in large numbers for the parliamentary elections of February 2005, when an 80.5% turnout was registered for an electorate of 147,471 registered voters. However, the turnout was significantly down in the presidential elections of April 2005, barely reaching 70%.

The TRNC employs a party-list proportional representation system, with seats allocated according to the d'Hondt formula.¹⁰ An electoral threshold of 5% is applied. In exercising their right to vote, voters have three choices:

- to vote for one party across the board;
- to split their vote between candidates within their electoral district (cross-party preference votes); or,
- to cast their vote for a single party, but rearrange the preference of their representatives within their district (within-party preference votes).¹¹

Elections are held under the general administration of the Higher Electoral Council, which is made up of judges. The Higher Electoral Council is responsible for the orderly administration and fairness of the elections, as well as for the examination of

⁹ See Article 23 of the TRNC Constitution.

¹⁰ According to Wikipedia, 'the d'Hondt method is a highest averages method for allocating seats in party-list proportional representation. Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey are among the places that use this allocation system, as do elections to the European Parliament in some countries. This system favors large parties slightly more than the other popular divisor method, Sainte-Laguë, does. The method is named after Belgian mathematician Victor d'Hondt. The system was also used in Northern Ireland for allocating the ministerial positions in the Northern Ireland Executive. It is also used in some of the region's district councils'; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D'Hondt_method (accessed 11 August 2005).

¹¹ There is only one ballot. Each party has one column with the names of its candidates listed in an order determined by the party.

any complaints or objections. There is a three-day period following elections during which parties may dispute the result.

The 'Settlers' as Electorate

Although figures for 'settler' voters in the earlier elections are not known, it is conceivable that their numbers could be estimated by comparing the numbers for the electorates in each election with the lists of new citizenships granted to Turkish-mainland nationals between each election, paying attention to the dates when these citizenships were issued (see Appendix I). However, one problem with such an approach is that individuals who acquired citizenship were not always over 18, the age of eligibility to vote. Given that Turkish nationals who arrived in Cyprus as agricultural labourers often came with large families (the average household had five children), the number of citizenships granted is a problematic source of data for calculating the number of 'settler' voters.¹² Fortunately, after the 1996 census, and beginning with the 1998 election, the Higher Electoral Council of the TRNC has been handing out lists of the eligible voters for each election, including details of the individual voter's birthplace, enabling us to differentiate between those born in Cyprus and those born in Turkey.

Although the 2003 electoral list contains detailed demographic information, there are nevertheless a number of deficiencies associated with the data that hinder a comprehensive politico-demographic analysis. One of these is related to the quality of the data input. Unfortunately, it seems that insufficient care was taken by the data-processors during the data-input stage, leading to erroneously spelled names of persons or places. Wherever possible, I have corrected such errors. An additional difficulty derives from the fact that some geographical names in the data are not exclusive to Cyprus, but also can be found in Turkey. Therefore, it was difficult on occasion to determine whether a given person was born in Cyprus or in Turkey. Such doubtful cases were placed in a separate category entitled 'unknown'. According to the present study, the picture of the ethnic makeup of the Turkish-Cypriot electorate in 2003 was as follows. Out of a total electorate of 144,030:¹³

- 108,654 (76%) were born in Cyprus (4,530 were born in Cyprus to parents from the Turkish mainland);¹⁴

¹² Morvaridi (1993).

¹³ Another recent analysis arrived at a somewhat different result. This was based on a survey conducted by Naci Taseli for the CTP party newspaper *Yenidüzen* ahead of the December 2003 elections, based on 1,000 persons who were randomly selected from the electoral list. This survey offered a picture of the ethnic makeup of the Turkish-Cypriot electorate. The analysis showed that, of the estimated 140,799 voters (the final official list was slightly higher): 97,600 were born in Cyprus and were of Cypriot descent; 30,800 were born in Turkey; 9,400 were born in Cyprus of mixed Cypriot-Turkish parentage; 2,450 were Turkish Cypriots born in a third country (England, Canada etc.); and 550 were of Bulgarian descent.

¹⁴ The 1982 *Demographic Report* prepared by the State Planning Organization of the TRNC

- 23,315 (16%) were born in Turkey;
- 8,913 (6%) were unknown; and
- 3,148 (2%) were residing in a third country (UK, Canada, Australia, etc.), born mostly to Turkish Cypriots.

Figure 2.1: Ethnic Composition of the Electorate in 2003




Table 2.1. Number of Voters According to Electoral Districts

	Born in Cyprus	Born in Turkey	Born in a Third Country	Unknown
Güzelyurt	16353	1910	198	1342
Kyrenia	20155	4055	1043	889
Famagusta	28063	6604	662	2409
Nicosia	35454	6202	1232	2769
Yeni İskele	8629	4544	173	1504
Totals	108654	23315	3148	8913

(published December 1983) was used to ascertain the numbers of offspring of 'settlers' who were eligible to vote in the 2003 elections (i.e. those who were 18 or over on the day of the elections). This report provides data on the number of children born in northern Cyprus during 1978–82, together with information concerning parents' places of birth. For years for which data are missing (i.e. 1976–77 and 1983–85), an average figure was utilized, based on the assumption of a constant fertility rate. According to this, the number of offspring who were eligible to vote in 2003 is estimated at 4,530.

'SETTLERS' IN PARTY POLITICS AND THEIR VOTING PATTERNS

IN THIS PART OF THE REPORT, all of the 26 'settler villages' that have been exclusively inhabited by 'settlers' since 1976 (see Appendix II) are analyzed. The election results in these villages for the period 1981–2005 are presented and compared with the results for northern Cyprus in general, as well as with the election results in 53 villages inhabited exclusively (minimum 90%) by 'native Turkish Cypriots' (see Appendix III).

The June 1976 Parliamentary Elections (TFSC)

On 3 February 1975, Rauf Denktaş announced the formation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC). Its first elections were held in June 1976. In the period during which the constitution was drafted by the Constitutional Assembly, debates on the nature of the draft constitution mobilized many members of the Assembly to form political parties. The Populist Party (HP) was the first to appear (4 August 1975), and was shortly followed by the National Unity Party (UBP) (11 October 1975) and the Communal Liberation Party (TKP) (18 March 1976).¹

The debates before the 1976 elections were more about internal matters than the 'Cyprus problem'. There were thousands of refugees arriving from the south and a substantial number of mainland Turks arriving from Turkey. Naturally, it was not easy for the newly established Turkish-Cypriot state to absorb them all. The introduction of the Turkish currency to replace the Cyprus pound brought inflation. Labour unions also contributed to the chaos by holding strikes, sometimes in crucial sectors, such as healthcare (including strikes by doctors and nurses).²

¹ The 50-member Constitutional Assembly was formed to draw up a constitution and to assume the duties of the existing assembly. The assembly included the 25 members of the existing assembly plus four members chosen by the chairman (Rauf Denktaş), together with one member each from existing unions, NGOs (teachers, public servants, architects, lawyers, farmers, etc.) and political parties. At that time, only one political party existed: the CTP, which had been founded in 1970.

² Dodd (1993b).

Table 3.1. Registered Voters and Turnout, 1976

Region	Ballot Boxes	Registered Voters	Actual Votes	%	Valid Votes	Invalid Votes	%
Nicosia	158	37,147	26,917	72.5	24,817	2,100	7.8
Famagusta	135	26,691	20,110	75.3	18,491	1,619	8.1
Kyrenia	66	11,986	9,319	77.7	8,572	747	8
Total	359	75,824	56,346	74.3	51,880	4,466	7.9

Four political parties participated in the elections: the TKP, the HP, the UBP and the Republican Turkish Party (CTP).³ The election was held together with the presidential elections. There were three electoral districts: Nicosia, Kyrenia and Famagusta, with a total of 359 ballot boxes. The number of registered voters was 75,824, but only 56,346 turned out to vote in the elections (74%). The percentage of invalid votes was high (7.9%).

Table 3.2. Election Results, 1976

UBP	TKP	CTP	HP	Independent
53.7%	20.2%	12.8%	11.7%	5.5%

The results permitted all four parties contesting the elections to be represented in the TFSC parliament. The UBP won 30 seats out of the total of 40 on the basis of 53.7% of the votes. Opposition parties received almost 44% of the votes: the TKP 20.2%; the CTP 12.9%, and the HP 11.7%.

Voting Patterns in the 'Settler' and 'Native Villages'

The participation of 'settlers' in this election was relatively modest. Only a small number had received citizenship before the elections and were able to vote. As most of the 26 'settler villages' studied in this report had no voters at all at this time, no comparison can be made between the votes of these villages, the 'native villages' and the TFSC total.⁴

The June 1981 Parliamentary Elections (TFSC)

In the 1981 elections, the main charges made against the UBP by the opposition parties were lack of dynamism, inefficiency in managing issues of land settlement and distribution, and leaning towards the interests of the new bourgeoisie. Some measures

³ The Populist Party (HP), led by former minister for planning Alper Orhon, emerged on 5 August 1975. It announced a social-democratic programme based on Kemalist principles. The HP lost most of its leading members after the formation of another social-democratic party, the TKP, on 18 March 1976.

⁴ Aydođdu (2005).

introduced by the government between 1976 and 1981 to prevent civil servants from being active within political parties also provoked regular strikes by public servants and created virulent opposition.

Since the government in power in Turkey in 1974 was a Kemalist social-democratic one, the development of the economic system in northern Cyprus was guided by social-democratic ideals. State-run economic sectors were set up. State-run farms, state-run hotels, state-run banks, state-run factories, etc. were established.⁵ These sorts of arrangements, however, could also be abused to create jobs for the supporters of the party in government, something the UBP did not hesitate to exploit.⁶ A number of groups – particularly young university graduates, as well as some Turkish ‘settlers’ – complained that UBP was reserving state jobs for its own indigenous supporters.⁷ At the same time, though, this type of regime also allowed many trade unions (these were mainly neutral and pro-government, though there were also many leftist ones) to organize labour movements within the state-run sectors and sometimes to channel some of the votes to opposition parties. Thus, on the one hand, the UBP controlled the state and was securing voter support by distributing ‘favours’, while on the other hand it was creating its own opposition through its inability to stop the strengthening of the trade unions and its failure to prevent the unions from mobilizing votes to the leftist parties.

Among the ‘settlers’ were various groups with a range of political outlooks. Upon arriving in Cyprus, these initially approached different political parties depending on their pre-existing political leanings. Some, mainly among those from southern and southeastern Turkey (including Alevites), were inclined to the left (socialist or social-democrat). These tried to align themselves mainly with the TKP, the HP and the Democratic Populist Party (DHP), while a small number of more ideologically oriented individuals favoured the CTP. Others who before coming to Cyprus were supporters of the centre-right in Turkey joined the UBP. Finally, those who might best be described as ultra-nationalists (a rather small group) opted for the National Goal Party (MHP).

It was not long, however, before some ‘settlers’ began to express disappointment with what they felt was reluctance by these Cypriot parties to address the concerns of people from Turkey. Eventually, this led them to form a party (the Turkish Unity Party, or TBP) that would defend their own more particular interests. Their choice for the leadership of the party was İsmail Tezer, a retired air force officer turned businessman with abundant political ambition, who tried to capitalize on the fact that he was a former classmate of General Kenan Evren, the head of the military government in Turkey at the time.

The UBP’s introduction of liberal market-economic reforms at the beginning of 1980s in line with the policies of the new Turkish government did not help the party

⁵ Dodd (1993b: 114–119).

⁶ Olgun (1993).

⁷ Interviews with former executives of the New Birth Party (YDP), January 2005.

increase its level of support. Indeed, the move was not popular among the UBP's potentially large constituency of state employees. Meanwhile, the leftist parties were becoming increasingly socialist in their demands. They advocated the nationalization of banks, insurance, commerce, industry and even the tourist business. In the opposition's election campaigns, the UBP and Denktaş were regularly presented as a band of 'capitalist exploiters'.⁸ In addition, young Turkish Cypriots studying in Turkey represented another significant source of support for the leftist parties. These students were deeply influenced by the socialist ideology dominating many universities at the time. Turkish-Cypriot student associations were used as recruiting agencies for left-wing parties. After their graduation, many students came back to the island with the aim of launching a struggle against 'the capitalists'.⁹

External politics, including questions related to the solution of the 'Cyprus problem', did not play a significant role in these elections. All parties publicly agreed on the principle of seeking a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. The left-wing parties, though, were careful not to appear too enthusiastic about reconciliation with Greek Cypriots during the election campaigns, knowing how strongly the majority of the electorate still distrusted the Greek Cypriots.

Seven political parties participated in the 1981 elections: the UBP, the CTP, the TKP, the DHP, the TBP, the Social Justice Party (SAP) and the MHP. The size of the electorate had risen from 76,000 to 84,721. The main reason for the substantial rise in the electorate was no doubt the participation of the new citizens (the 'settlers'). Turnout was also much higher than in the 1976 election: it went up from 76% to 88.6%. It should also be noted that the number of invalid votes was now even higher; 8.7% as opposed to 7.9% in 1976.

The Total Results of the 1981 Parliamentary Elections

Although the UBP lost its parliamentary majority in 1981, it succeeded in winning 18 of the 40 seats. However, the results were still alarming for the UBP, since its share of the votes declined from 53.7% in 1976 to only 40.5% in 1981. The left-wing parties took almost 44% of the votes: the TKP received 28.5% of the votes and 13 seats; the CTP 15.1% and six seats; and the DHP 8.1% and two seats. The new 'settler' party, the TBP, also managed to secure 5.5% of the votes and to be represented with one seat in the TFSC parliament.¹⁰

⁸ Olgun (1993).

⁹ Kızılyürek (2005: 253).

¹⁰ The first party that aimed to get 'settler' votes was established in 1978 by a retired air force officer, Selahettin Öztokatlı, who had settled in Cyprus. This was known as the Democratic Party. However, before, it had any success in any election it was replaced by the Reform and Progress Party. Both parties were short-lived. The Turkish Unity Party (TBP) was the first to successfully participate in elections. It was founded by another retired army officer, Ismail Tezer, who also settled in Cyprus after 1974.

Table 3.3. Registered Voters and Turnout, 1981

Region	Ballot Boxes	Registered Voters	Turnout	%	Valid Votes	Invalid Votes	%
Nicosia	162	39,920	34,920	89.0	31,774	3,146	9.0
Famagusta	153	31,116	27,578	88.6	25,246	2,332	8.5
Kyrenia	74	14,374	12,583	87.5	11,504	1,079	8.6
Total	389	84,721	75,081	88.6	68,524	6,557	8.7

Table 3.4. Election Results, 1981


UBP	TKP	CTP	DHP	TBP	Others
42.5%	28.5%	15.1%	8.1%	5.5%	0.3%

Voting Patterns in the 'Settler' and 'Native Villages'

In the 1981 elections, the UBP's share of the votes in the selected 'settler villages' was around 34%. The remainder of the votes were distributed among the four opposition parties, namely the TKP (17%), the TBP (32%), the DHP (12%) and the CTP (4%). Interestingly, the 'settler villages' thus showed a more diverse voting pattern, and gave substantially less support to the UBP than our selected 'native villages', where the UBP got almost 46%. The UBP vote in the 53 selected 'native villages' was quite similar to the national average (42.5%). The most obvious difference between the voting patterns of the 'native' and 'settler' villages is the results achieved by the TBP, a party with an exclusively 'settler' background. None of the 'native villages' cast any votes for this party, but it attracted almost one-third of the votes in the 'settler villages' (32%). There were also significant differences in the number of votes that the CTP and the TKP attracted from the 'settler' and 'native villages', respectively. The support of the 'native villages' for the TKP was almost the same as the TRNC total (27.1%). In the 'settler villages', however, the TKP received around 17% of the vote. The difference was even greater in relation to the CTP. While 19.1% of the electorate in the 'native villages' voted for the CTP, only 3.7% in the 'settler villages' did the same.

These results show that, in the 1981 elections, the 'settler' votes were almost equally split into three main categories: 34% went to the party in government (UBP); 31% to left-wing parties (TKP, DHP, CTP); and 32% went to the 'fellow-countrymen's party' (TBP). As noted above, the different political leanings that existed among the 'settlers' was one reason for this. The CTP's low score among the left-wing parties was to some extent due to the absence of 'settlers' in the public sector and therefore in the trade-union movement, which was largely controlled by this party. On the other hand, the low turnout for the UBP could be seen as being partly due to a reaction by the 'settlers' to their exclusion by this party from the 'favours' it was distributing (secure government jobs, etc.), which was also one of the reasons behind the votes for the TBP.

Figure 3.1. Relative Distribution of Votes in the 'Settler Villages', 'Native Villages' and the TRNC as a Whole, 1981



The Parliamentary Elections of 23 June 1985

Most of the debate during the last two months before the elections of 1985 was a continuation of the debate leading up to the referendum on the constitution on 5 May (only 48 days before the first general election of the 50 members of the new TRNC parliament). The CTP was now more vocal than previously in its criticism of Denktaş and his foreign policies. It claimed that Denktaş was not paying attention to the views of the other parties. The TFSC parliament's approval of Denktaş's decision to proclaim the TRNC on 15 November 1983 was unanimous, but the CTP held that there was no need for a new constitutional assembly or a new constitution.¹¹ On the other hand, Alpay Durduran (at that time assistant general secretary of the TKP) claimed that he had been assured that there was no intention to prepare a new constitution, and that this was why the TKP had approved the establishment of the new state.

The referendum resulted in an result of 70.1% for and 29.8% against the new (or the decision to have a new) constitution. A comparison between this and the outcomes of the two elections that followed in the year – the presidential elections and the parliamentary election – reveals an interesting picture. In the presidential elections, Denktaş, who stood as an independent candidate against two other candidates from the two left-wing parties, won by a vote of 70.2%. In the parliamentary elections, the combined vote of the same two left-wing parties was 37.2% (8% more than the 'no' votes in the referendum, and 12% more than the votes cast for the candidates of those

¹¹ Dodd (1993b).

parties in the presidential elections). So, if – as generally assumed – we are to accept that those who voted ‘no’ in the referendum were the same as those who later voted for the left-wing parties, then it follows that a considerable part of the electorate that supported these parties diverged from their parties’ views concerning ‘national issues’ (in this case, in the form of the new TRNC constitution and independence, both symbolized in the personality of Denktaş).

Seven political parties fielded candidates for the 1985 general elections: the UBP, the CTP, the TKP, the DHP, the New Birth Party (YDP), the Social Democrat Party (SDP) and Communal Progress Party (TAP). The number of registered voters had risen from 84,721 to 95,124. The turnout was almost as high as in the 1981 election: 87.4% as opposed to 88.6% four years earlier. And the percentage of invalid votes had now dropped to 4.0%. This indicates that the voters had grown more accustomed to the one-ballot electoral system.

Table 3.5. Registered Voters and Turnout, 1985

Region	Ballot Boxes	Registered Voters	Turnout	%	Valid Votes	Invalid Votes	%
Nicosia	180	44,278	38,234	86.3	36,776	1,458	3.8
Famagusta	158	34,837	31,083	89.2	29,638	1,445	4.6
Kyrenia	77	16,009	13,858	86.6	13,398	460	3.3
Total	415	95,124	83,175	87.4	79,812	3,363	4.0

The Total Result of the 1985 Parliamentary Elections

The UBP’s decline, which started in the 1981 elections, continued in 1985. Its votes dropped from 42.5% to 36.7%. Although it was the biggest loser in the election, it still secured 24 of the 50 seats. Among the left-wing parties, the CTP was the most successful: it received almost 21.4% of the votes, securing 12 seats in the parliament. The TKP was the biggest loser in this election: it won only 10 seats, and its share of the votes dropped from 28.5% in 1981 to 15.8%, representing a loss of almost half of its support. A key party in the 1981 elections had been the DHP, which now got only 7.4% of the votes. The DHP thus failed to pass the 8% threshold and lost its representation in the parliament. On the other hand, the new umbrella party of the ‘settlers’, the YDP, managed to get 8.8% of the votes and four seats in the newly formed TRNC parliament. Two other new political parties also fell below the 8% threshold and did not make it into the parliament.

Table 3.6. Election Results, 1985

UBP	TKP	CTP	DHP	YDP	TAP	SDP
36.7%	15.8 %	21.4 %	7.4 %	8.8 %	6.1%	3.8 %

Voting Patterns in the 'Settler' and 'Native' Villages, 1985


In the 1985 general elections, the percentage of votes for the UBP in the selected 'settler villages' was around 23%. Expectedly, almost half of the settlers' votes (47%) went to the New Birth Party (YDP). Smaller shares of the vote were distributed among the other four opposition parties, namely the TKP (5.28%), the DHP (12.1%) and the CTP (5.79%). The support for the ruling UBP in these 'settler villages' saw a further big drop from 34% to 23%. The same did not happen in the 'native villages'. Here, the UBP was able to secure almost 40% of the votes. This means that the UBP scored well above average in these 'native villages'. It received 36.7% of the total TRNC votes, and almost 40% of the 'native village' votes. It seems clear that the main support for the UBP in this election came from the 'native' Turkish-Cypriot rural areas.

The other main difference between the voting patterns of the 'native' and 'settler' villages was, of course, the results obtained by the YDP. As explained above, the YDP was established essentially as an umbrella party for the 'settler' constituency. The introduction of the 8% threshold in the parliamentary elections was the primary factor triggering this mobilization among the 'settlers' to increase the consolidation of their forces under the new formation of the YDP, which also absorbed the TBP.¹² The votes cast for the YDP in the 'native' Turkish-Cypriot villages were very few. On the other hand, the party attracted almost half of the votes in the 'settler villages' (47.3%). There were again significant differences between the voting patterns of the 'settler villages' and the 'native villages' when it came to support for the CTP and the TKP. The degree of support for TKP in the 'native villages' was almost the same as in the TRNC in general (17.3%). On the other hand, the TKP received only 5.3% of the votes in the 'settler villages', where it had received 17% in 1981. Given that one of the four members of parliament for the YDP was a former TKP member, it is quite likely that most of the former TKP 'settler' votes were lost to the YDP in these elections. As for the CTP, while the 'native villages' gave 21.9% of their votes to it, only 5.8% of the voters in the 'settler villages' gave it their support. The DHP maintained its votes, receiving 12% in the 'settler villages' and 7.7% in the 'native villages'.

¹² According to a former YDP member of parliament, Emin Uzun, the YDP was a very heterogeneous party, encompassing people with a wide range of political leanings: socialist, nationalist, liberal, Islamist, etc. In addition, it advocated economic and social policies that were not very different from those of the mainstream parties, such as the UBP and the TKP (see *Yeni Doğu* (YDP newspaper), 20 September 1989). Its main difference from these parties, however, was that it was set up to promote the 'interests of the Turkish immigrants'. One of these 'interests' concerned their demand for more certainty with regard to their rights in relation to properties they had been allocated.

These elections showed a further aggregation of the 'settler' votes as 'fellow-countrymen votes' cast this time for the YDP (almost 50%), and hence a reduction in 'settler' votes for the UBP and the TKP. The main reason for this was the persistence of the widespread perception among 'settlers' that they were excluded from 'privileged' public-sector jobs, forcing most of them to take up seasonal jobs in the agricultural and construction sectors.¹³ The continuing ambiguity concerning their rights in relation to properties they had been allocated appears to have been another major cause of their dissatisfaction with the UBP.

Figure 3.2. Relative Distribution of Votes in 'Settler' and 'Native' Villages and the TRNC as a Whole in the 1985 Parliamentary Elections



The May 1990 Parliamentary Elections

Interestingly, in the run-up to the 1990 elections, the CTP, the TKP and the YDP formed an alliance, the Democratic Struggle Party (DMP). The background for this alliance was a common desire to change the election system, which had been modified by the UBP prior to the 1990 elections. The changes were devised by the UBP to create a strong government. A high threshold would prevent the smaller parties from entering parliament, and abolition of the 'split vote' system would mean that it was no longer possible for a voter to distribute his or her support between several parties and to vote for individual members of different political hues. In addition to the above changes, the UBP also wanted to institute a new rule stating that any party that received more than one-third of the total votes in a district would receive extra seats at

¹³ *Özgürlük*, November 1986

the rate of one per extra percentage point, up to a maximum of one-third of the seats available in the district.¹⁴

Initially, the main aims of the DMP alliance were to win the election, to change the electoral system and then to hold another election with a more ‘democratic’ system. However, once the election campaign was under way, these goals were readjusted: the aim was no longer just to form a new government, but also to get rid of Denктаş, who according to the opposition was the main maestro of the mismanagement and nepotism that allegedly ‘paralysed’ the country.

Mass rallies were held, and a huge mobilization campaign took place to convince the people that the ‘clientelistic system created by Rauf Denктаş and the UBP’ was nearing its end. When the ballot boxes were opened, however, Denктаş had gained 65% of the votes in the presidential elections and the UBP 54.7% in the parliamentary elections, so Denктаş emerged as the clear winner of this important battle.

The opposition reacted strongly, particularly to the outcome of the parliamentary elections, accusing both the government and Turkey of interference in the elections in favour of the UBP. They alleged, for instance, that the Turkish national television company TRT broadcasted in a biased fashion during the weeks prior to the election. Another claim was that civil servants from Turkey had been present in Cyprus during the pre-election period to lobby for the UBP, mainly in ‘settler’ villages.¹⁵

Only three political parties had contested the 1990 general elections: the National Unity Party (UBP), the Democratic Struggle Party (DMP) and the recently formed New Cyprus Party (YKP). The number of voters had now risen to 103,218 (from 95,124 in 1985). The turnout was the highest so far: 91.5%. And the number of invalid votes had dropped further, now standing at only 2.7%. With only three parties, it was easier to fill out the ballot properly. Another reason for the low number of spoiled votes was the adoption of the UBP’s proposal to remove the ‘split vote’ system. This forced people to cast their votes for a specific party, rather than for a variety of individual candidates from different parties. The new system further polarized the party system.

Total Results of the 1990 Parliamentary Elections

As predicted before the election, voters cast their votes for the two main parties. The UBP got almost 55% of the votes, while the DMP alliance – made up of the CTP, the TKP and the YDP – failed to oust the UBP from power, securing only 44.5% of the votes. The YKP, which had been formed by former TKP leader Alpay Durduran, proved insignificant, securing only 0.8% of the votes.

¹⁴ Warner (1993).

¹⁵ A 1994 parliamentary investigation report (M.A. No. 1:1.1.94, Library of TRNC Parliament, Nicosia), which was endorsed by the parliament, confirmed most of the allegations of interference. Some ‘settler’ candidates for the DMP interviewed during the fieldwork for this study also supported the above allegations.


Table 3.7. Registered Voters and Turnout in the 1990 Parliamentary Elections

Region	Ballot Boxes	Registered Voters	Turnout	%	Valid Votes	Invalid Votes	%
Nicosia	191	47,762	43,762	92.0	42,871	1,068	2.4
Famagusta	170	37,885	34,771	91.8	33,785	986	2.8
Kyrenia	82	17,571	15,693	89.3	15,243	450	2.9
Total	443	103,218	94,403	91.5	91,899	2,504	2.7

Table 3.8. Election Results

UBP	DMP	YKP	Independent
54.7 %	44.5 %	0.8 %	0.0 %

Figure 3.3. Relative Distribution of Votes in the 'Settler Villages', 'Native Villages' and the TRNC as a Whole in the 1990 Elections



Voting Patterns in the 'Settler' and 'Native' Villages, 1990

More interestingly, and somewhat ironically, the majority in the 'settler villages' – who it was constantly alleged represented a secure electoral basis for Rauf Denktaş and the UBP¹⁶ – voted more strongly in support of DMP candidates despite open interference from Turkey to prevent such a development. In the presidential elections, the DMP candidate İsmail Bozkurt, who received 32% of the overall vote, received a significantly higher level (48%) in the 'settler villages'. In the parliamentary elections,

¹⁶ Zaman (1992).

while 44% of the ‘native villages’ had voted for the DMP, 58.2% of voters in the ‘settler villages’ voted for the alliance. Of course, this reflects the fact that the ‘settler party’ (the YDP) was part of the alliance. In the ‘settler villages’, the UBP got 41% of the votes. The ‘native villages’, on the other hand, gave stronger support to the UBP, which received 55.9% of their votes, slightly more than in the TRNC as a whole (54.7%).

What we see here is a polarization between the more nationalist ‘native’ supporters of the status quo, on the one hand, and an alliance of leftists and ‘settlers’, on the other, with the former still constituting a surprisingly comfortable majority of the votes.

The December 1993 Parliamentary Elections

Early elections were called in 1993, after the resignation of nine UBP deputies, who subsequently went on to form the Democratic Party (DP). Following the Gulf Crisis and the collapse of the so-called Asil Nadir Empire,¹⁷ the TRNC was in turmoil. Many workers employed by Nadir lost their jobs. In this situation, the CTP and the DP were seen as potential liberators by many of those who were unhappy with the UBP’s one-party government. The DP was emerging as a party in opposition to the UBP and managed to attract several groups that had earlier joined the DMP alliance. Among these there were two newly formed parties¹⁸, as well as – and more importantly – the YDP.

The YDP, essentially a ‘settlers’ party strongly opposed to the UBP government, decided to continue to work within an alliance structure, rather than fighting on its own, and consequently merged with the DP. In this way, it hoped to also fend off allegations made against the party that it was ‘separatist’.¹⁹

By 1993, the CTP had also undergone considerable changes. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it turned away from Moscow, beginning instead to regard the EU and some of its member-states as models of inspiration. An ideological transformation took place within the party. The relationship with AKEL was re-evaluated and

¹⁷ ‘A potentially serious problem for the Turkish Cypriot economy at the end of 1990 was the apparent collapse of the economic empire of Asil Nadir, the only major foreign investor in the “TRNC.” Nadir was a native-born Turkish Cypriot long resident in London. As chairman of a large multinational company, Polly Peck International, Nadir had taken advantage of the government’s “free economic zone” policy and invested heavily in industry, citrus production, and tourism. He was surpassed only by the state as an employer in the “TRNC,” with as many as 8,000 people, by some estimates, earning their livings from his varied enterprises. Late in 1990, however, Nadir’s international empire suffered reverses and faced possible bankruptcy and liquidation.’. See http://www.photius.com/countries/cyprus/economy/cyprus_economy_the_state_and_econom~7645.html.

¹⁸ These were the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Free Democratic Party (HDP). The former, which had been ‘dormant’ for a while, was reorganized under the leadership of Ergün Vehbi, a deputy who resigned from the CTP. The latter party was established under the leadership of İsmet Kotak, a deputy who resigned from the TKP.

¹⁹ Interviews with the former YDP members and executives, December 2004.

downplayed. In the process, the party was gradually transformed from a radical socialist to a centrist or moderate position, and was able to increase its support among both the 'native' Turkish Cypriots and the 'settler' population.

Seven political parties contested the 1993 general elections: the UBP, the CTP, the TKP, the DP, the New Cyprus Party (YKP), the Nationalist Struggle Party (MMP) and the Unity and Sovereignty Party (BEP). The size of the electorate had risen from 103,218 in 1990 to 108,867. A new record turnout occurred: 92.9%. However, the number of invalid votes increased again to 4.8%. This may be explained both by the increased number of parties appearing on the single ballot and as a result of the reintroduction of the 'split vote' system.²⁰

Table 3.9. Registered Voters and Turnout, 1993

Region	Ballot Boxes	Registered Voters	Turnout	%	Valid Votes	Invalid Votes	%
Nicosia	197	50,452	46,917	93.0	44,870	2,047	4.4
Famagusta	170	39,211	36,544	93.2	34,681	1,863	5.1
Kyrenia	89	18,959	17,406	91.8	16,460	946	5.4
Total	456	108,867	100,867	92.9	96,011	4,856	4.8

Total Results of the 1993 Parliamentary Elections

The UBP suffered its biggest defeat ever. While it had got 54.7% of the votes in 1990, it received only 29.9% now. All the same, it remained the largest party in parliament, with 17 of the 50 seats. The new DP, which had been founded only a year earlier, achieved the most substantial success in the elections, with 29.2% of the votes, and it became the second largest party in parliament, with 15 seats. Among the left-wing parties, the CTP was the most successful, with 24.2% of the votes and 13 seats. The TKP won only five seats, having dropped from 15.8% in 1985 (the most recent election it had contested as a separate party) to 13.3%. The other three parties failed to pass the 5% threshold and thus did not achieve representation in parliament. The MMP received only 2%; the YKP ended up with roughly the same number of votes as in 1990 (1.2%); and the BEP received only 0.3% of the votes. In 1993, a new voting pattern emerged: there was no single dominant party, but instead three almost equally large ones, the UBP, the DP and the CTP, representing the right, centre and the moderate left, with the moderate-left TKP coming in as a fourth party some way behind the others.

²⁰ With this system, it is possible for a voter to divide his or her support between the parties and to vote for individual members of different political hues.

Table 3.10. Election Results

UBP	TKP	CTP	DP	YKP	MMP	BEP
29.9 %	13.3 %	24.2 %	29.2 %	1.2 %	2.0 %	0.3 %

Voting Patterns in the ‘Settler’ and ‘Native’ Villages, 1993

In the absence of any clear ‘settler party’, the level of support for the UBP within the ‘settler villages’ was much higher than the national average. While the ‘settler villages’ had been much less favourable to the UBP than the TRNC as a whole in 1990 (40.9% as opposed to 54.7%), this time they were more supportive of the UBP than the national average (38% as opposed to 29.9%). This may imply that UBP voters in the ‘settler villages’ were more loyal than elsewhere, or it could reflect political changes within ‘settler politics’. Another possible explanation is a policy adopted by the UBP since 1990 aimed at increasing the involvement of the ‘settlers’ within the TRNC. This included the allocation of quotas to ‘settler’ candidates (or candidates likely to be favoured by this group), as well as programmes to help bring the ‘settlers’ into the ‘system’ (e.g. developing agricultural policies with subsidies, offering government jobs, etc.).


Before the 1990 elections the ‘settler party’ YDP had joined the DMP alliance, which, as explained above, did extremely well in the ‘settler villages’, securing 58.2% of the votes. In 1993, however, the ‘settler villages’ had no party that clearly represented their own particular interests, but had to choose instead between seven parties dominated by ‘native’ Turkish Cypriots. In the end, the majority of them divided their votes between the DP (44%) and the UBP (38%), both of which scored higher than the national average. Interestingly, the support for the UBP in the selected ‘native villages’ was also higher than the national average (37.0%).²¹ On the other hand, it must be noted that while the UBP’s support in the ‘settler villages’ was stable, in the ‘native villages’ it had declined from 55.9% in 1990 to 37% in 1993. The reason for this decline can be explained by the DP’s appearance as the main challenge to the UBP. The ‘native villages’ cast almost 25% of their votes for DP. However, the ‘native village’ support for the DP’s challenge was small in comparison with the ‘settler villages’, where the DP scored almost 44%. The main explanation for this is that a huge chunk of the constituency of the former YDP and the DMH alliance joined the DP before the elections, as did candidates who were more popular among the ‘settler villages’ (both mainland origin and native).

The CTP also won more support in the ‘settler villages’ than previously, receiving 9% of the vote. This can be interpreted as part of a general appreciation for the move the CTP had made towards the centre. This appreciation can be seen even more clearly in the ‘native villages’, where the CTP got 26.6% of the vote. The TKP, on the other

²¹ This seems to indicate a rural–urban divide, with UBP support being stronger and more loyal in rural areas. The biggest constituency of the UBP – evident from results in all elections from 1981 to 1998 – was clearly in the more rural parts of northern Cyprus.

hand, lost support both in the 'settler villages' (less than 5%) and in the 'native villages' (9.4%).

Figure 3.4. Relative Distribution of Votes in the 'Settler Villages', 'Native Villages' and the TRNC as a Whole in the 1993 Elections



The December 1998 Parliamentary Elections

For the UBP, 1998 proved to be a 'comeback' year. After the 1993 elections, a coalition government consisting of the CTP and the DP had been formed. In its election campaign, the UBP concentrated on showing how the CTP had proved to be incompetent while in government in 1993–96. Indeed, the CTP had been constantly accused of a lack of efficiency, partisanship and lack of knowledge in how to run a state during its first stint in government. Internal conflicts within the DP–CTP coalition government – and within the party itself – provoked anger, disappointment and suspicion not only among the CTP's opponents but also within its main constituency. Most of the reforms the CTP had promised to carry out were not realized, or else failed during implementation. The DP also received its share of criticism, both from the UBP and from the TKP.

Seven political parties participated in the 1998 election: the UBP, the CTP, the TKP, the DP, the Patriotic Unity Movement (YBH), Our Party (BP) and the National Revival Party (UDP). The YBH was the new name for the YKP, which now re-emerged in a new guise. The new party name was chosen after some former CTP supporters joined up with the former leaders of the YKP. The BP was an Islamist party with a very small following. The main newcomer to the political scene in 1998 was the UDP. This party was founded by Enver Emin, who lost the party congress election when he tried to challenge Eroğlu for the leadership of UBP. Following the defeat,

Emin resigned from the UBP, of which he had once been party general secretary, and established his own party.

During the five years since the previous election, the size of the electorate had risen substantially – from 108,867 to 122,574. On the other hand, turnout this time was somewhat lower: 86.6%. The increase in the number of parties is reflected in a further increase in the number of invalid votes to 6.2%.

Table 3.11. Registered Voters and Turnout in the 1998 Elections

Region	Ballot Boxes	Registered Voters	Turnout	%	Valid votes	Invalid votes	%
Nicosia	143	38,747	32,735	84.5	30,601	2,134	6.5
Famagusta	130	31,732	28,466	89.7	26,592	1,874	6.6
Kyrenia	96	21,882	18,202	83.2	17,256	946	5.2
Guzelyurt	69	17,842	15,862	88.9	14,862	1,000	6.3
Iskele	63	12,371	10,911	88.2	10,257	654	6.0
Total	501	122,574	100,867	86.6	99,568	6,608	6.2

The Total Results of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections

The UBP won the 1998 election with 40.4% (up from 29.9% in 1993). As a result, northern Cyprus once again had one dominant party and many smaller ones. The UBP actually got almost twice as many votes as the second party, the DP, which, together with the CTP, suffered a major defeat. The DP lost a substantial part of the votes it had won in 1993, and went down from 29.2% to 22.6% of the votes cast. The CTP's loss was even greater. Its support declined dramatically from 24.2% to 13.4%. The TKP, on the other hand, won back some lost terrain, receiving 15.3% of the votes. Thus, the political landscape of northern Cyprus was now characterized by one big party (UBP), three medium-size parties (DP, TKP, CTP), and three small ones (UDP, YBH, BP).

Table 3.12. Election Results

UBP	TKP	CTP	DP	YBH	UDP	BP
40.4%	15.3 %	13.4 %	22.6 %	2.5 %	4.5 %	1.2 %


Voting Patterns in the 'Settler' and 'Native' Villages, 1998

UBP voters in the 'settler villages' once again displayed loyalty. Then again, the UBP increased its share of the votes in these villages by only 2% – from 38% to 40% – while in the northern-Cypriot population as a whole the UBP increased its share by as much as 10.5%. Since the UBP had lost few votes in the 'settler villages' in 1993, there were also few votes to win back. This seems to indicate that the UBP was

generally unable to secure more than around 40% of the votes in the 'settler villages'. This was certainly not the case in the 'native villages', where the UBP had increased its support from 37% in its worst year, 1993, to 53.1% in its best, 1998. Thus, while the UBP's potential support in the 'native villages', as well as in the general population, was clearly higher than in the 'settler villages', the UBP's supporters in the 'settler villages' were more *loyal*. In the 1998 election, the same seems to have been the case for the DP, the new party from the 1993 elections, which could boast a number of important 'settler politicians'.

In the 'native villages', the DP was the greatest loser of all in the 1998 elections. It gained only 8.4% of the 'native village' vote, whereas in 1993 it had won 24.7%. No similar decline can be observed in the 'settler villages'. Here, the DP got close to 44% in 1993, and it retained as much as 40% in 1998, thus receiving the same level of 'settler village' support as the UBP.

Figure 3.5. Relative Distribution of Votes of the 'Settler Villages', 'Native Villages' and the TRNC as a Whole in the 1998 Elections



This should not be taken as a sign that voters in the 'settler villages' were generally loyal to their party of choice, since this was certainly not the case for CTP supporters. In the 'settler villages', the CTP suffered an even more serious decline than within the general population. While it had received 9% of the 'settler village' votes in 1993, it got only 3.4% in 1998. This loss was much more serious in terms of proportion than in the 'native villages', where support for the CTP went down from 26.6% in 1993 to 16.1% in 1998 (within the general population, the CTP got 13.4%).

The differences in the voting patterns of the 'settler villages' and 'native villages' in 1998 are very interesting. The UBP made a dramatic comeback in the 'native villages', but only maintained its loyal following in the 'settler villages'. The DP

suffered a momentous defeat in the ‘native villages’, but retained its following in the ‘settler villages’. The CTP remained a relatively important party in the ‘native villages’, but became insignificant in the ‘settler villages’. Another noticeable difference can be seen in the support for the TKP. While this party proved unable to increase its following in the ‘settler villages’, where it received only 4.2% of the votes cast, the ‘native villages’ gave it 16.7%, which was a significant increase from the 1993 elections, when the TKP had won only 9.4% of the ‘native village’ vote.

The December 2003 Parliamentary Elections

The pre-election agenda in 2003 was dominated by disagreement between the UBP–DP government and the opposition parties concerning the merits of a November 2002 UN draft proposal for a settlement to the Cyprus conflict (the ‘Annan Plan’) and the island’s upcoming EU accession. In a separate protocol to the Treaty of Accession (signed by the Greek-Cypriot government on 16 April 2003), the application of the European Union’s ‘acquis’ in the northern part of Cyprus had been suspended pending a settlement of the Cyprus issue. If an agreement on political reunification could be reached prior to 1 May 2004, the two communities could accede jointly to the EU. This was the aim of the Annan Plan.

In early March 2003, Turkish-Cypriot chief negotiator Rauf Denктаş, who had previously refused to put his signature to a framework agreement containing the main principles of the UN proposal, rejected a personal plea from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to submit the plan to a referendum. Backed by the conservative coalition government of the UBP and the DP, he subsequently ruled out further negotiations on the basis of the plan. The Greek-Cypriot side in the meantime, although unwilling to sign the peace proposal as it stood, nevertheless pronounced it acceptable as a point of departure for future negotiations. Against this background, the December elections to the TRNC’s Legislative Assembly were destined to become a Turkish-Cypriot pre-referendum on the way ahead.

The run-up to the 14 December 2003 elections saw a reconfiguration of the political landscape. The main opposition parties (the CTP and the TKP) were determined to stage the elections as a pre-referendum. They anticipated the election day as the moment of revelation when the masses of people who had taken to the streets demanding ‘Solution and the EU’ earlier in the year would reveal their true preferences and eliminate the obstacles blocking the way to their fulfilment: the ‘pro-status quo’ UBP–DP government and the rejectionist president and chief negotiator.

The opposition set out to take control of the assembly, to oust the ruling coalition, to replace the chief negotiator with one of its own, to resume peace negotiations, to finalize a deal on the basis of the Annan Plan, and to secure accession to the EU of a united Cyprus in May 2004. The opposition was confident in its ability to capitalize on its increased mobilization potential, stemming from the opportunities that had opened

up both for acceding to the EU and for resolving the Cyprus issue. There was, however, considerable reluctance to forgo individual party interest along the way.

The CTP's confidence had been boosted by opinion polls predicting a landslide victory for the opposition, of which it appeared to stand a chance of being the main beneficiary. The TKP, meanwhile, decided to relinquish the party mantle in order to form the backbone of a new movement under its former leader Mustafa Akıncı. This was the BDH (Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi/Peace and Democracy Movement), which announced that it had been formed in accordance 'with the will of our people who turned up four times at İnönü Square [the scene of the mass rallies in Nicosia earlier in the year] in numbers never witnessed in our history before' in order to enable all 'pro-solution and pro-EU forces to act together, win the elections and reach the objectives of peace and EU with a pro-solution negotiating team'.²²

Initially, the BDH harboured hopes of rallying all opposition forces under its umbrella, and in particular of bringing the CTP into the fold. The BDH's courtship of the CTP, however, received a lukewarm response and was eventually turned down altogether. Along with the TKP, the movement was joined by two minor political parties (the Socialist Party/Sosyalist Parti and the United Cyprus Party/Birleşik Kıbrıs Partisi), the leaders of some of the trade unions, some NGO leaders and a number of unaffiliated individuals.

The CTP, equally anxious to reach out beyond the confines of its traditional constituency but reluctant to share the spoils with its main contender as the leading opposition party, restaged itself as an alliance, the CTP-BG (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi–Birleşik Güçler/Republican Turkish Party-United Forces). Like the BDH, the CTP-BG alliance included trade union and NGO representatives, as well as unaffiliated individuals.

A third party subscribed to the 'solution–EU' programme, the ÇABP (Çözüm ve Avrupa Birliği Partisi/Solution and European Union Party), a newly formed party under the chairmanship of Ali Erel, president of the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. The ÇABP sought to capitalize on its leader's credentials within the business community and was hoping to attract support from the liberal-democratic pro-EU strata that might hesitate to support the left-wing opposition parties.

In early September 2003, the three opposition parties (CTP-BG, BDH, ÇABP) agreed on a protocol that announced their intention to form a coalition government after the election. Ambitions entertained in some quarters of forming a pre-election alliance in order to maximize the challenge to the ruling parties, however, came to naught.

For their part, the parties in government, the UBP and the DP, also refrained from forming a pre-election alliance and contested the elections independently. They were joined in their stance of defending the sovereignty and continued existence of the TRNC, to keep the chief negotiator in place and to reject UN proposals for reunification of the island by two conservative newcomers: the MBP (Milliyetçi Barış Partisi/Nationalist Peace Party) and the KAP (Kıbrıs Adalet Partisi/Cyprus Justice

²² Undated BDH declaration.

Party). With 3.2% of the votes in the December 2003 elections, the MBP was the most successful of the newcomers. Nevertheless, the party failed to gain representation in the assembly and thus mainly contributed to splitting the conservative vote further.

The December 2003 elections took place under unprecedented international attention. The outcome was seen as having the potential to break the impasse in the inter-communal peace process and to enable the accession of a reunited Cyprus to the European Union on 1 May 2004. Seven political parties took part in the elections: The UBP, the DP, the CTP-BG, the BDH, the ÇABP and the KAP. The size of the electorate had risen from 122,574 five years previously to 141,596. The turnout was the same as in 1998: 86.0%. This time, though, the number of invalid votes was lower: 4.9%.

Table 3.13. Registered Voters and Turnout, 2003

Region	Ballot Boxes	Registered Voters	Turnout	%	Valid Votes	Invalid Votes	%
Nicosia	163	44,197	38,159	86.3	36,631	1,528	4.0
Famagusta	143	37,273	32,256	86.5	30,601	1,655	5.1
Kyrenia	109	26,148	22,073	84.4	21,015	1,058	4.8
Guzelyurt	74	19,381	16,850	86.9	15,922	928	5.5
Iskele	65	14,597	12,402	85.0	11,654	748	6.0
Total	554	141,596	121,740	86.0	115,823	5,917	4.9

Total Results of the 2003 Parliamentary Elections

In total, the opposition (CTP-BG, BDH, ÇABP) attracted 50.3% of the votes, against the ruling UBP–DP coalition's 45.9%. Given that the remaining parties (MBP, KAP) had rallied behind the government's stance, however, the opposition's lead was less than 1%: 50.3% as against 49.7%. Only four of the seven parties managed to pass the 5% electoral threshold required for seats in the assembly: the CTP-BG with 35.2% (19 seats), the UBP with 32.9% (18 seats), the DP with 12.9% (7 seats), and the BDH with 13.1% (6 seats). Thus, opposition and government parties mustered an equal number of seats: 25–25. Of the remaining parties, the MBP came closest to the threshold with 3.2% of the votes, followed by the ÇABP with 1.9% and the KAP with 0.6%.

Table 3.14. Election Results

UBP	BDH	CTP	DP	ÇABP	MBP	KAP
32.9 %	13.2 %	35.2 %	12.9 %	2.0 %	3.2 %	0.6 %

Voting Patterns in the 'Settler' and 'Native' Villages, 2003

Once again, the UBP voters in the 'settler villages' displayed their loyalty to the UBP, who gained more votes in these villages than ever before (45%). It is remarkable how stable the support for the UBP was from 1993 to 2003 in the 'settler villages', while it vacillated elsewhere. This time, as in 1993, the 'native villages' deserted the UBP, giving it only 33.7% support. This was a big decline from the 1998 result of 53.1%, and it seems to indicate that those who had voted UBP in 1998 in the 'native villages' were more favourably inclined towards the Annan Plan than their counterparts in the 'settler villages'.

While the relatively positive response to the Annan Plan in the 'native villages' had the effect of weakening the conservative UBP in those villages, the UBP's vote in the 'settler villages' went up, although only moderately (by about 5% compared to 1998). It is noticeable that the CTP, a heavily pro-Annan Plan party, succeeded in getting as much as 14% in the 'settler villages'. This was not only a tremendous increase from the 3.4% the CTP had got in the 1998 elections, but was also the highest it had ever received from this section of the population. One explanation for this is the effort made by the CTP to reach out to this group. Prior to the election, numerous interviews and articles were published in the CTP daily newspaper *Yenidüzen* about the life of 'settlers'. Moreover, several of the CTP candidates were of Turkish-mainland origin, two of whom eventually became deputies.²³ Among the 'native villages', there was an even more eager switch to the CTP-BG alliance, which got 36.2% of their votes, more than twice as many as in the 1998 elections (16.1%).


As for the DP, in the 'native villages' its support increased from 8% in 1998 to 11%, but it lost a lot of ground in the 'settler villages', dropping from 40% in 1998 to 28% in 2003. This is likely to be connected primarily with the rise of the CTP, though some of the votes probably also went to the UBP. The very low percentage of votes for the BDH from the 'settler villages' (2.3% as compared to the 14.3% vote from the 'native villages'), on the other hand, could be explained by this party's almost total neglect of this element of the community.

The MBP, which was a strange coalition between the ultra-nationalist MAP (a nationalist party strongly against the Annan Plan) and the ABP (the short-lived Justice and Peace Party, which advocated negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan) succeeded in getting a vote of almost 7% from the 'settler villages'.

²³ Four of the deputies in the 2003 parliament were of Turkish mainland origin: two from the CTP, one from the DP and one from the UBP.

The KAP, which was led by a retired Turkish army officer known for his success in defending Famagusta against the Greek-Cypriot siege in 1974, was a total failure in ‘native villages’, but managed to attract a few votes from the ‘settler villages’ (3.4%).

Figure 3.6. Relative Distribution of Votes in ‘Settler Villages’, ‘Native Villages’ and the TRNC as a Whole in 2003



The February 2005 Parliamentary Elections

The CTP-BG and DP coalition government, founded after the 2003 elections, was in a very uncomfortable situation in the Legislative Assembly by 2005. Within the 50-seat parliament, 26 seats were only just enough to secure a vote of confidence, and its majority was based on a coalition of parties with many individualists among its members. Following the referendum in April 2004 – when Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of reunification on the basis of the Annan Plan, while the Greek Cypriots voted against, thus barring access of the Turkish-Cypriot community to the EU – the governing coalition lost its majority in parliament when three of its members of parliament withdrew their support from the government (one from the CTP and two from the DP). Though the government was not voted down in a vote of no confidence, it ultimately opted to resign. This followed from the fact that it was unable to get any new legislation through parliament, and even failed to get the 2004 budget approved. As a result, new parliamentary elections were held in February 2005.

The election campaign was less colourful than that of 2003, and the discussion was mainly about personalities. The parties concentrated more on ‘dirty politics’ than on national and international issues. The UBP tried to establish a connection between a murdered runaway businessman who had been killed in the southern part of Cyprus

and CTP members or executives. The CTP tried to demonstrate how ‘corrupt’ the UBP was by publicizing alleged official documents. For its part, the BDH contributed to the general tone by directing public attention to DP leader Serdar Denktaş’s convicted father-in-law, who was sent to Istanbul for medical treatment and stayed longer than he was meant to.

Once again, there were seven political parties contesting the 50 seats of the parliament: the UBP, the DP, the CTP-BG, the BDH, the Communal Liberation Party and the United Cyprus Party Alliance of Leftist Forces (TKP/BKP), the New Party (YP) and the Nationalist Justice Party (MAP). The size of the electorate had gone up from 141,596 two years earlier to 147,249. The turnout was lower than before, but still more than adequate at 80.7%.

Table 3.15. Registered Voters and Turnout

Region	Ballot Boxes	Registered Voters	Turnout	%
Nicosia	170	46,308	36,869	79.62
Famagusta	147	38,681	31,590	81.67
Kyrenia	115	27,255	21,468	78.77
Guzelyurt	76	19,823	16,758	84.54
Iskele	67	15,182	12,227	80.54
TOTAL	575	147,249	118,912	80.75

Total Results of the 2005 Parliamentary Elections

The elections did not this time bring much change. The basic voting pattern remained the same. The CTP-BG alliance retained its position as the largest group in the assembly. Its votes increased from 35.2% to 44.5%. The UBP managed to hold onto its core constituency and got 31.7% of the votes. The DP slightly increased its number of votes from 12.9% in 2003 to 13.5%. The losers this time were the BDH, the TKP and other small parties on the left. By contesting the elections separately rather than forming a united force, these all ended up being marginalized within a polarized political atmosphere. In the 2003 elections, these parties had entered the elections under the umbrella of the BDH and were then able to collect together almost 13.2% of the votes. However, in 2005, two of them failed to pass the 5% threshold and thus failed to gain representation in the assembly. The BDH itself only barely managed to pass the threshold: with 5.8% of the votes it managed to secure just one seat (Mustafa Akıncı). This poor performance on the part of the small left-wing parties had the positive effect of making the political situation in the Legislative Assembly more manageable. The CTP-BG alone won 24 of the 50 seats. The UBP was happy to get 19

seats. And the DP secured six seats. Thus, there was a 50–50 division between the right- and left-wing parties: 25 for the CTP-BG and the BDH, on the one side, and 25 for the UBP and the DP, on the other. This made it natural for the left–right coalition government of the CTP-BG and the DP to continue in power. Although the left-wing CTP-BG had improved its parliamentary support, the DP retained its key role in the government.

Table 3.16. Election Results, 2005


UBP	BDH	CTP	DP	TKP	YP	MAP
31.71 %	5.81 %	44.45 %	13.49 %	2.41 %	1.60 %	0.52 %

Voting Patterns in the ‘Settler’ and ‘Native’ Villages, 2005

The support for the UBP in the ‘settler villages’ was maintained once more, although there was a slight decline from 45% in 2003 to 42%. This continued ‘settler’ support for the UBP can be understood when one takes into account the fact that 56% of the ‘settler villages’ voted against the Annan Plan in the referendum (in defiance of the Turkish government of Prime Minister Erdoğan). The same tendency was observed in the ‘native villages’, where the UBP dropped only slightly from 33.7% to 31.7%. The CTP-BG as a government party succeeded in getting 22.4% in the ‘settler villages’, up from 14% in 2003. The ‘native villages’ supported the CTP-BG alliance in an even bigger way, giving it 44.5% of their votes. The DP, which tried to take a ‘neutral’ stance towards the Annan Plan, ended up losing a little ground in the ‘settler villages’, from 28% to just under 26%. As for the trends in the ‘native villages’, the DP continued to increase its support from 11% to 13.5%. The BDH and the TKP, expectedly and for reasons similar to those in the previous election, received very little support in the ‘settler villages’ (2.3%). This time, however, they also lost most of their support in the ‘native villages’, where they received only 5.8% and 2.4%, respectively (down from the 14.3% they had received together in the previous election).

A more interesting result in these elections concerns the YP, which received 6% of the ‘settler villages’ votes, and almost none from the ‘native villages’. This party was formed by a former CTP-BG deputy of Turkish-mainland origin, Nuri Çevikel. An outspoken pro-settlement politician known for his stance against the UBP and Denktaş, Çevikel entered politics in 2003 by reviving the Turkish Immigrants Association and supporting the Annan Plan. After falling out with the CTP-BG executive because the latter failed to present to him the list of ‘settlers’ included in the list of 45,000 to be delivered to the UN Secretary-General under the Annan Plan, he left the CTP-BG and established his own party, appealing now exclusively to the ‘settler’ constituency.

Figure 3.7. Relative Distribution of Votes of the 'Settler Villages', 'Native Villages' and the TRNC as a Whole in the 2005 Elections



CONCLUSION

IN PREVIOUS CHAPTERS, it has been demonstrated that the voting pattern of the ‘settlers’ (to the extent that the ‘settler villages’ represent a general tendency among the ‘settlers’ in general) is not uniform. Though predominantly conservative, the ‘settlers’ tend to distribute their votes among many parties (and candidates in presidential elections), just like the rest of the electorate.

‘Settlers’ and the UBP

At the beginning of their political journey in Cyprus (from 1981 to 1990), the ‘settlers’ tended to give less support to the UBP than the rest of the electorate. Later, the UBP increased its support among the ‘settler villages’, and it has since had a remarkably stable constituency of around 40%. Indeed, support for the UBP fluctuated much more in the ‘native villages’ and the rest of the population than it did in the ‘settler villages’.

However, although the UBP had a stable and substantial following in the ‘settler villages’, it never achieved the kind of massive electoral victory in these villages that it did elsewhere, most notably in the ‘native villages’. There was always a majority in the ‘settler villages’ that voted for parties other than the UBP. This was not the case in the ‘native villages’, which allocated a higher share of their votes to the UBP than the ‘settler villages’ in the following elections: 1981, 1985, 1990 and 1998. The highest percentage of support for the UBP in the ‘native villages’ occurred in the 1990 elections (55.8%). It was only in 1993 and after 2003, when the UBP lost ground in the ‘native villages’, that the UBP received a higher level of support in the 26 ‘settler villages’ than in the 53 ‘native’ ones.

Interviews conducted for this study indicate that class, origin, geographical segregation, property ownership and the ability to enter into both mainstream politics and the job market have played significant roles in determining the political alliances of the ‘settlers’.

Most ‘settlers’ came from a rural background. Their level of education was much lower than that of the average Turkish Cypriot (at least in the beginning), and it was difficult for them to obtain any of the privileged government jobs that were offered by the ruling party as part of the ‘patronage system’ set up after 1974.¹ On the other hand,

¹ In northern Cyprus, the prevailing clientelist political culture of the region is reinforced by the small size of the polity (200,000). Altogether, this makes it next to impossible for office-holders to separate formal relationships from informal and personal ties, nor are they expected to so.

as one interviewee said, 'It was true that we came to Cyprus as an agricultural labour force, but this did not mean that we intended to continue to pick oranges for the rest of our lives'.

The 'discrimination' they experienced and their inability to compete in the job market strongly influenced the voting patterns of the 'settlers'. Interviews conducted for this study suggest that a main focus of discussion among the 'settlers' was the treatment meted out to them by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. Some of them had close social networks. Within these networks, news and rumours of incidents involving an element of 'discrimination' would rapidly circulate, and would probably be exaggerated along the way. Such incidents again formed part of the background for the electoral behaviour of the 'settlers'.

Time and time again, the political elites promised to grant title deeds to the 'settlers' for properties in their possession, yet it was only in 1995 that it became possible for 'settlers' to purchase or sell any of the property they had been allocated. Until then, they could not even rent it out without the permission of the village *muhtar* (headman).² This uncertainty about property rights contributes to explaining much of the support among 'settlers' for the 'settler parties' (1981–90) and other opposition parties.

Despite the above-mentioned complaints, the fact that the support from the 'settler villages' for the UBP, the main representative of the established order in northern Cyprus, never dropped below 23% calls for some explanation. In general, the UBP has tended to identify with Turkey and with the concept of a larger Turkish nation that includes the 'Turks in Cyprus', while opposition parties have been more inclined towards a predominantly Cypriot identity. The 'settlers' may have found the idea of being part of a larger 'Turkish community' easier to swallow than the prospect of being integrated within a Cypriot or northern-Cypriot nation. This could help explain why a substantial part of the electorate in the 'settler villages' has always supported the UBP. After 1990, the UBP managed to increase its vote to around 40% and to sustain it at that level in the 'settler villages'. One possible reason for this is the 'involvement' policy adopted by the UBP in relation to the 'settlers' since 1990. Under this policy, quotas were allocated to 'settler' candidates (or candidates likely to be favoured by this group) and policies were developed to help bring the 'settlers' into the 'system'. It is true that the majority of the 'settlers' continued to complain about the way in which the UBP distributed favours, but a considerable number of them also benefited from such favours.


As for their continued support for the UBP in the 2003 and 2005 elections, this may partly be explained by the emergence of the Annan Plan. Most of the inhabitants of the 'settler villages' would have lost out as a result of implementation of the Plan, as they

Moreover, such behaviour is not restricted to only some of the political parties: it applies across the board. What differ are the opportunities offered by access to the resources available for politically motivated distribution. By virtue of their electoral strength, such opportunities have accrued disproportionately to the conservative parties (and the UBP in particular). That the opposition should be frustrated under such circumstances is therefore only to be expected.

² Morvaridi (1993).

invariably inhabit Greek Cypriot properties that they would have had to evacuate or purchase back from the Property Board that was to be set up under the Plan to deal with affected properties.³ The ‘settlers’ are mostly small farmers who could not afford to buy the land they are currently using, and they are cultivating land that would have had to have been returned to its pre-1974 owners or other purchasers.

Figure 4.1: Distribution of UBP Votes Within Selected ‘Settler Villages’ and ‘Native Villages’



The campaign conducted against the Annan Plan in northern Cyprus also probably played a big role in fostering suspicions among a large part of the ‘settler population’. Those who campaigned against the plan (and appeared regularly on national television) repeatedly stated that if the plan were implemented, a majority of the ‘settlers’ would be repatriated.⁴ Given that some of them had invested 30 years of their lives and their most productive years in Cyprus, it was only to be expected that this sort of information – or, more often, misinformation – would create negative feelings among them. The strong scepticism among the ‘settlers’ towards the Annan Plan undoubtedly contributed to the lower level of support for the opposition parties in the 2003 elections in places with large ‘settler’ populations. That scepticism was apparently partly dispelled by the time of the 24 April 2004 referendum, however, as demonstrated by the 44% ‘yes’ vote of the ‘settler villages’.

³ See Annan Plan property arrangements (www.cyprusdecides.org).


⁴ Contrary to what these people were saying, the Annan Plan contained a clause that clearly stated that 45,000 of the Turkish nationals residing in the TRNC could be awarded citizenship of a United Cyprus Republic as soon as the agreement was approved in the referenda (this list did not include the Turkish nationals who were married with ‘native’ Cypriots, who would become citizens through assisted naturalization (see Appendix I).

'Settlers' and the Democratic Party

As a result of the merge of the New Birth Party (YDP) and the Democratic Party (DP) in the run-up to the 1993 elections, a considerable number of the votes from the 'settler villages' went to the DP (43.8%). As can be seen in Figure 10, the percentage of the votes for the DP in the 26 'settler villages' is much higher than in the 'native villages' (almost double). It should also be noted that 'settler' support for the DP was not only due to loyalty to the 'settler party' – the YDP. The DP was created in order to oust the UBP from power, since the latter had allegedly become 'authoritarian' and 'corrupt'. The DP also subscribed to the need for international recognition of Turkish-Cypriot sovereignty.

Given that the left-wing parties made hardly any effort (apart from in 1990) to take advantage of the disenchantment among the 'settlers' in order to overthrow the governing UBP, there was no difficulty in redirecting the traditional 'settler' opposition votes to the DP. However, since the 1998 general elections, support for the DP within the selected 'settler villages' has been in decline. In the last two elections, the support of the 'settler villages' for the DP was down to around 26%. Interestingly enough, in these elections the CTP substantially increased its support within the 'settler villages' to 22%. This could be described as a marked success, since in 1998 the CTP received only 3.6% of the votes in these villages, and in 2003 14%.

Figure 4.2: Distribution of DP Votes Within Selected 'Settler Villages' and 'Native Villages'



'Settlers' and the Left

As noted earlier, of the present Turkish-Cypriot parties, the CTP is the only one that existed before 1974. Founded as a left-wing party, it traditionally had a close

relationship with the Greek-Cypriot AKEL. Like AKEL, the CTP was against the island's use as a military base by the 'imperialists'. The TKP, another left-wing party, was established in 1976. This party's strongest support originally came from the Teachers Union (KTÖS), which was formed at the end of 1968 and which, together with the CTP, declared a 'struggle' against the Turkish-Cypriot administration in the early 1970s. The left-wing opposition's criticism of the Turkish-Cypriot administration was reflected in the name they gave it: 'the BEY' – an acronym that stood for the Turkish words 'Bayraktarlık' (the authority that governed the Turkish Defence Organization, the TMT), 'Elçilik' (the Turkish embassy in Nicosia) and 'Yönetim' (the Turkish-Cypriot administration).⁵

The 'settlers' who came to Cyprus after 1974 had no historical affiliation with these parties at all, and the latter made no efforts to win their support. Yet, the 'settlers' did include a number of socialists, though with different backgrounds. Significantly, in 1981, a substantial number of these left-wing 'settlers' supported the TKP, which consequently received 17% of the 'settler' vote. This support, however, was short-lived.

As for the relatively low level of support for the CTP in the early years (1981, 1985), this was partly due to the exclusion of the 'settlers' from the state-run labour market. Their inability to get into the 'system' also prevented them from fully participating in the trade union movement, which was mobilizing votes for the left-wing parties. On the one hand, the UBP controlled the state and was securing voter support by distributing 'favours'. On the other hand, it was creating its own opposition through its inability to prevent the strengthening of the unions and its failure to prevent the unions from mobilizing votes for the left-wing parties.

The other main reason for the initial low level of 'settler' support for the CTP must be seen in the light of the fact that the party has traditionally been among the most vocal critics of Turkish immigration. In particular, former leader of the party Özker Özgür was outspoken in his views on the issue. He made numerous statements criticizing the immigration taking place. For example, in an interview recorded in 1986, he claimed:

In the place of our people who flee abroad to earn their living, people come from Turkey under the name of 'labour force'. This labour force is turned into a vote force for conservative, chauvinistically oriented politicians.... We are faced with the danger of becoming a minority in northern Cyprus ... foreigners in our own homeland.⁶

It has been established in numerous studies that, in times of economic crisis, members of a country's majority group are more likely to feel threatened by minorities, especially if the latter are foreign. The size of an immigrant group is an important determinant of the level of resentment directed at it: the larger the size of the

⁵ Kızılyürek (2005: 250–255).


⁶ Özgür (1986).

immigrant grouping, the greater the perceived threat in terms of competition for existing jobs.⁷

Another possible reason for the left-wing parties' reluctance to embrace the 'settlers' was a lack of information concerning their numbers. However, rather than trying to establish the truth about the size of the 'settler population' in northern Cyprus, left-wing parties in the north were content to carry on doing politics based on grossly and deliberately exaggerated figures.⁸ Political parties often try to increase their constituency by demonizing their rivals. Once an electorate is convinced that the ruling party is being kept in power by a resented 'other', it can be easily convinced that the only way to overthrow the ruling party – which it now regards as the 'agent' of the resented group – is to support the party that has a clear stance against the 'other'.

Interestingly, and perhaps temporarily, in 1990 'settlers' were no longer perceived by the left-wing CTP and TKP as 'agents' of the incumbent regime, but rather as potential allies. This shift was triggered by increasing discontent among 'settlers' towards Denktaş and the UBP – something further highlighted by the YDP's continuous campaign against the status quo (beginning in 1987). In order to change the electoral system before the 1990 elections, the CTP and the TKP sought to form an alliance with the YDP, the 'settler party', and together formed the Democratic Struggle Party. A majority in the 'settler villages' supported this alliance (58%), which was created to overthrow the UBP. This time, it was a majority in the 'native villages' that voted to keep the UBP in power.


Figure 4.3: Distribution of CTP Votes Within Selected 'Settler Villages' and 'Native Villages'



⁷ Morris (1998).

⁸ *Yenidüzen*, 15 February 1989; *Yenidüzen*, 14 February 1990.

Figure 4.4: Distribution of TKP/BDH Votes Within Selected 'Settler Villages' and 'Native Villages'



By 1993, the CTP had also undergone considerable change. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it turned away from Moscow, beginning instead to look to the EU and some of its member-states for models of inspiration. An ideological transformation took place within the party. The relationship with AKEL was re-evaluated and downplayed. In the process, the party was gradually transformed. It shifted from a radical socialist to a more centrist or moderate position and was able to increase its support among both 'native' Turkish Cypriots and the 'settler' population.

The CTP also won more support in the 'settler villages' than previously, capturing 9% of the vote. This can be interpreted as part of a general appreciation for the move the CTP had made towards the centre.

The campaign before the December 2003 elections contained elements of both reconciliation and increased polarization in the relationship between Turkish Cypriots and 'settlers'. The left-wing parties, the CTP and the TKP, professing loyalty to (Turkish) Cypriot-ness rather than Turkish-ness in a wider sense, as noted above, had been the most vocal critics of Turkish immigration. In the election campaign, however, the CTP and the TKP, making up the core of the two opposition alliances (CTP-BG and BDH) took distinctly different stances towards the voters of Turkish-mainland origin. For its part, in the months preceding the elections, the CTP had made what seemed like a concerted effort to reach out to them. Its party organ, *Yenidüzen*, took to publishing interviews and features with Turkish 'settlers', projecting an altogether more humanizing approach than in the past. The party also fielded several candidates of Turkish origin, one of whom was the chairman of an organization of Turkish immigrants. The new policy cost the party and its leader Mehmet Ali Talat some sympathy within the Greek-Cypriot community, but it increased the amount of votes from the 'settlers'.

In the meantime, Turkish-Cypriot leftists who objected to this new departure could take refuge in the BDH. This movement, and its leader Mustafa Akıncı, seemed almost determined to discourage any votes from the Turkish immigrants. Allegations that the government was granting new citizenships ahead of the elections and complaints about ‘demographic engineering’ figured prominently in the BDH campaign.

POSTSCRIPT

UNTIL NOW, the situation on the ground in Cyprus has hindered the conduct of proper research on the issue of the ‘settlers’. Authorities on both sides of the island have been reluctant to release accurate demographic information, and misinformation and propaganda are abundant. On one hand, information provided by the administration in the south has been very selective, based only on arrival and departure figures (and naturally without any distinction between citizens and non-citizens of the TRNC).¹ For their part, the authorities in the north, at least prior to the 1996 census, rather than supplying the proper data when it was requested, preferred to say that they made no distinctions between their citizens. After the 1996 census, data did become available, but few took any notice.

In this report, census data and updates have been used to estimate the number of TRNC citizens of Turkish-mainland origin. Contrary to widely held beliefs, the calculations show that this group (including their offspring) constitutes not the majority but rather only 25–30% of the population, and not more than 20–25% of the current TRNC electorate.

Examination of the voting patterns for selected ‘settler villages’ reveals that the ‘settlers’ were no more pro-UBP (until 2003) than ‘native voters’. The percentage of people in the ‘settler villages’ who have not voted for the former conservative ruling party, the UBP, is fairly high, ranging from 55% to 66%. It is important to note that the opposition to the UBP was not initially aligned with the CTP but rather with particular ‘settler parties’ or social-democratic parties (the TBP, the DHP and the TKP in 1981; the YDP and the DHP in 1985), and in 1990 the ‘settlers’ aligned themselves with the YDP, the TKP and the CTP under the umbrella party of the DMP, and later with other centrist or conservative parties (mainly the DP). Another important – even surprising – finding of this report is the growing level of support for the CTP among the selected ‘settler villages’ in the two most recent elections.

On the whole, the report seeks to contribute to a discussion based as far as possible on empirical evidence. The hope is that this will focus the attention of local and international institutions on the need for a better-informed public debate and improved policies on this sensitive aspect of the ‘Cyprus problem’, and that it will help counter

¹ When the borders opened, it became evident that the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus actually did possess exact information concerning TRNC citizens of Turkish-mainland origin, since at the border crossings they were able to identify and stop ‘settlers’ even when the latter held TRNC identity cards.

some of the simplistic and often erroneous assumptions on which the perceptions of both communities – as well the international community² – are based, which, if left unaddressed, risk constituting a serious obstacle to reconciliation on the island.

The need to promote reconciliation has become even more apparent since the intensification of efforts to reach a settlement, particularly since the publication of the Annan Plan and the referenda. The UN proposal (in its revised form) included a clause stating that ‘nationals of Greece and Turkey’ who would qualify for citizenship or permanent residence of the United Cyprus Republic ‘may apply for financial assistance to relocate to their country of origin’. Though such an approach might have acted as an incentive for some, it seems unlikely that this option would have tempted large numbers of Turkish ‘settlers’ to leave had the plan been implemented. The bulk of the Turkish immigrants who are currently citizens would have qualified either for citizenship or for permanent residency (according to the proposed criteria). It is therefore expected that any future proposal for settlement will most likely include similar provisions concerning Turkish immigrants currently residing in the northern part of the island. But, it is also an established fact that one of the main reasons behind the ‘no’ vote on the part of the Greek Cypriots was the grossly exaggerated numbers and the myths concerning the ‘settler’ population. These fears were partly due to misinformation and demonization emanating from elements within the Turkish-Cypriot community. Therefore, reconciliation efforts on the island should address the issue through three different perspectives, and should aim at promoting reconciliation (a) between the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities; (b) between those *within* the Turkish-Cypriot community whose roots on the island precede 1974 and those whose roots are more recent; and (c) between the Greek Cypriots and the population of northern Cyprus of Turkish-mainland origin, by facilitating debates based on empirical evidence concerning the numbers of this latter section of the Turkish Cypriot community and their characteristics beyond numbers.

² Council of Europe (2003).

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*Appendix I: Citizenships Granted, 1974–2003**

Year	Second- or Third- Generation Cypriots	Bulgarian Turks	Persons from Third Countries	Turkish Nationals
1974				
1975	2			
1976	44		7	3243
1977	87		5	3106
1978	70			4396
1979	68		5	4605
1980	203		10	3695
1981	173		4	2806
1982	162		1	342
1983	167			903
1984	126		43	1063
1985	107		25	975
1986	150		10	40
1987	202		20	422
1988	143		21	470
1989	142		70	525
1990	144		153	2287
1991	107		80	1218
1992	149		66	1298
1993	145	89	150	2156
1994	642	161	17	1323
1995	681	136	472	2036
1996	566	273	65	1271
1997	356	131	112	1444
1998	1	93	96	983
1999	0	59	65	1050
2000	0	46	86	837
2001	0	41	115	832
2002	0	47	114	1238
2003 February		18	13	1124
Total	4650	1094	1825	45689

* Former minister of interior Mehmet Albayrak disclosed that the number of citizenships granted between 1974 and 14 October 2003 totalled 53,904 (*Kibris*, 23 October 2003).

Appendix II: Registered Voters in 26 Selected 'Settler Villages', 1981–2005

Name of Village	1981	1985	1990	1993	1998	2003	2005
Güvercinlik	257	331	457	420	455	593	621
Tirmen	61	72	56	76	81	115	121
Ulukışla	139	164	206	222	281	337	343
Yamaçköy	31	32	41	43	46	48	53
Dört Yol	269	352	413	491	577	704	739
Korkuteli	144	188	215	225	274	346	368
Tatlısu	342	400	533	499	608	653	677
Bahçeli	101	113	140	151	197	259	272
Kayalar	28	47	60	68	87	106	111
Sadrazam	40	46	46	55	83	94	95
Adaçay	29	21	27	34	36	51	54
Aygün	123	142	180	200	245	280	286
Ardahan	137	157	184	206	256	265	270
Bafra	49	80	105	115	164	207	217
Derince	167	224	245	268	319	381	395
Esenköy	27	30	38	26	33	40	44
Gelincik	143	174	191	212	263	332	348
Kaplıca	73	132	170	193	243	271	286
Mersinlik	47	46	69	78	104	125	130
Sipahi	113	162	175	209	269	321	333
Taşlıca	36	44	57	52	76	86	87
Turnalar	36	47	60	61	79	94	97
Yarköy	117	140	156	161	200	228	244
Dipkarpaz	283	368	475	612	792	1066	1118
Gayretköy	71	80	113	135	179	245	262
Pamuklu	84	106	121	134	160	192	204
Total	3114	3698	4533	4946	6107	7439	7775

Appendix III: Registered Voters in Selected 'Native Villages', 1981–2005

Name of Village	1981	1985	1990	1993	1998	2003	2005
<i>Nicosia District</i>							
Akincılar	385	397	431	415	411	336	347
Dilekkaya	273	292	315	354	375	440	359
Erdemli	147	134	138	130	137	137	136
Kanlıköy	73	81	97	97	112	132	119
Yığıtler	190	198	188	188	207	220	224
Demirhan	230	263	270	261	283	34	324
Kalavaç	146	156	165	168	176	198	198
Meriç	307	301	311	317	345	359	361
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>1751</i>	<i>1822</i>	<i>1915</i>	<i>1930</i>	<i>2046</i>	<i>1856</i>	<i>2068</i>
<i>Famagusta District</i>							
Şehitler	51	41	49	43	49	49	50
Çamlıca	107	104	98	99	93	96	90
Çınarlı	171	186	175	180	179	190	185
Ergenekon	56	63	64	70	76	78	84
Gönendere	369	350	350	331	293	325	336
Görneç	207	238	286	297	306	337	344
Mallıdağ	177	189	168	169	165	174	177
Nergisli	216	210	221	222	226	252	261
Sedarlı	564	591	643	694	755	852	846
Akdoğan	1152	1265	1417	1458	1575	1754	1803
Beyarmudu	622	648	688	698	786	890	909
Çayönü	274	303	336	351	418	470	493
Inönü	535	544	580	595	643	690	719
Pile	207	235	281	293	316	373	374
Türkmenköy	464	498	542	566	601	648	665
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>5172</i>	<i>5465</i>	<i>5898</i>	<i>6066</i>	<i>6481</i>	<i>7178</i>	<i>7336</i>

Name of Village	1981	1985	1990	1993	1998	2003	2005
<i>Kyrenia District</i>							
Ağirdağ	213	218	400	296	269	300	307
Beşparmak	14	34	28	36	32	34	36
Boğazköy	196	316	394	610	653	688	730
Dağyolu	319	359	362	380	386	414	419
Göçeri	54	47	66	63	75	90	95
Karaağaç	166	170	181	178	190	213	216
Pınarbaşı	235	250	264	270	290	321	324
Akdeniz	257	283	284	300	346	370	374
Akçiçek	52	60	55	52	61	62	64
Hisarköy	174	173	167	166	150	158	151
Kozanköy	312	322	322	292	331	345	348
Şirinevler	182	190	191	193	211	234	241
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>2174</i>	<i>2422</i>	<i>2714</i>	<i>2836</i>	<i>2994</i>	<i>3229</i>	<i>3305</i>
<i>Guzelyurt</i>							
Akçay	543	595	621	640	694	745	767
Yuvacık	36	34	32	32	35	38	39
Çamlıköy	161	160	149	124	139	150	147
Bademli köy	27	25	55	57	71	80	86
Doğancı	702	739	790	799	848	931	924
Gaziveren	452	473	493	542	591	614	630
Yeşilirmak	292	276	300	272	327	284	294
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>2213</i>	<i>2302</i>	<i>2440</i>	<i>2466</i>	<i>2705</i>	<i>2842</i>	<i>2887</i>
<i>Yeni Iskele District</i>							
Balalan	176	166	132	126	114	113	115
Ergazi	178	169	172	177	185	196	196
Kurtuluş	58	54	57	54	59	67	68
Topçuköy	175	186	199	220	218	246	250
Çayırova	227	237	271	272	284	323	338
Kilitkaya	151	142	141	140	129	143	149
Mehmetcik	722	735	774	797	819	954	967
Sazlıköy	103	93	91	80	77	83	84
Kuruova	150	164	160	148	132	134	141
Kaleburnu	340	327	331	275	250	332	349
Yeni Erenköy	736	821	911	918	1052	1130	1214
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>3016</i>	<i>3094</i>	<i>3239</i>	<i>3207</i>	<i>3319</i>	<i>3721</i>	<i>3871</i>
TOTAL	14306	15105	16206	16505	17545	18826	19467

