Executive Summary Since late 2010 the Afghan government, supported by its international partners, has tried to reintegrate insurgents under the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP). The APRP aims to entice fighters from the battlefield with security, jobs and other incentives – provided they renounce violence, respect the Afghan constitution and cut ties with al-Qaeda. The APRP proposes parallel processes of reintegrating lower-level fighters and higher-level political dialogue. But while the Afghan government envisaged reintegration accompanied by talks with insurgent leaders, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) saw it as part of a military strategy to force them to the table, and pressed for quick implementation of the reintegration component. Divisions remain between the government and different international actors over the reintegration “package”, the sequencing of reintegration and reconciliation, and who the program targets. These divisions, rushed implementation, and the absence of a comprehensive political approach, have led to limited results in the first ten months. Implementation has been messy up to now. Coordination among Afghan and international partners in the reintegration structure, and between central and local officials has been problematic, and a lack of trust is undermining the commitment of some to the process. Although reintegration was already taking place, the establishment of the local infrastructure (bank accounts, provincial peace councils, support teams) has taken longer than the ambitious schedule demanded. By the end of May 2011 the Afghan government had received $133.4 million of the committed funds for reintegration, but spent only $7.7 million. Divergent and unclear outreach, vetting, and amnesty policies are being pursued by different actors, and there are concerns about corruption. Although reintegrees are supposed to be vetted and registered, there are doubts about their numbers and backgrounds. Some 85 per cent of reintegration has occurred in northern and western provinces where the insurgency is less intense, and many of those reintegrated appear peripheral to the insurgency, or are unrelated groups seeking influence in local struggles. The little official reintegration in the South and the East may reflect serious problems in the provision of security for the reintegrees, which leave them vulnerable to revenge attacks by Taliban, but also may reflect a degree of cohesion among the Taliban movement. As a result, the total number of reintegrees as of August 2011 (2,385) was still well below the numbers needed for the program to have a strategic impact. Although on paper APRP is a more comprehensive program than earlier efforts at reintegration in Afghanistan, in reality the incentives for reintegrees and their communities have largely been limited to enrolment in the Afghan Local Police, which might intensify local rivalries instead of bringing peace by maintaining armed groups in the country. Reintegrees show a unanimous interest in enrolment in the ALP, although in the near future the implementers will prioritise the provision of civilian jobs and other economic incentives. The major limitation in the APRP may prove to be the lack of a coherent political approach. Reintegration is not embedded in a wider peace process, entailing talks with high-level insurgents and addressing the grievances of large parts of the population vis-à-vis the ruling national and local elite. In part this is the result of the haste with which the program was rolled out, which didn’t allow for addressing politically sensitive issues like local grievance resolution and the formulation of an amnesty policy. Second, the lack of a political approach is the consequence of the division between and within the international community and the Afghan government over the sequencing of reintegration and reconciliation (with high level insurgents). Finally, it has to do with the lack of political will on the part of international actors and the Afghan government to address their own behaviour, which is part of the conflict. Insurgent commanders consistently point to the tactics of the international forces and to the corruption and predation within the Afghan government as reasons to join the insurgency. Afghanistan will need a robust and effective reintegration infrastructure to support the achievement of a durable peace. It is therefore essential for the Afghan government, ISAF, the United Nations and donor countries to consider how to situate reintegration of low and mid-level commanders in a broader process of reconciliation. Second, there should be more emphasis on quality instead of on the numbers of reintegrees and the speed of reintegration. Third, in order to achieve the grassroot dynamic necessary for successful reintegration it is important to support local processes, while making sure the use of resources is thoroughly monitored.